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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
In the canon of modern Christian theologians, Dietrich Bonhoeffer has earned a 
unique place.  His treatment of Christian ethics and cryptic (or archaic) project of a 
‘religionless Christianity’ continue to provoke debate.  Karl Barth called his dissertation a 
“theological miracle.”  Nachfolge, usually translated as The Cost of Discipleship, remains 
something of an evangelical classic.  Biographies, novels, plays and prayer guides 
memorialize his discipline and courage.  Pilgrims sojourn to his childhood home and 
place of execution.  Stephen Haynes has spoken properly of the “Bonhoeffer 
Phenomenon.”  In the academy and church alike, the man himself is colored with 
differing hues of partisan admiration.  Even among Bonhoeffer scholars there is often 
something of an exclusive preoccupation bordering on devotion, an occasional tendency 
perhaps to exaggerate his significance by lack of serious comparison.  The fact that 
Bonhoeffer’s first expert interpreter was also his best friend might account for this 
personal element in what are otherwise ordinarily detached circles (Haynes has spoken, 
too, of the “Bethge effect”).   
 Prior to researching this essay, I had only a little knowledge of Bonhoeffer as a 
scholar or a Christian. At the outset, I did not expect his work to hold any direct solutions 
to outstanding theological or social problems.  As the essay began to wind down, I was 
not much more optimistic, but the passage of a few months has helped me see the sources 
of that skepticism more clearly and opened up unforeseen possibilities.  Nonetheless, my 
concerns here are not systematic but historical and are summarized best in the conclusion. 
 The fact that I have a conclusion to mention at all has involved me in several 
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debts, and although thanks always implicates its recipients, the reader may rest assured 
that any deficiencies here are very much my own.  For discipline in the exercise of 
intellectual history, I must first thank my advisor, Paul DeHart.  He has consistently 
modeled the clarity, precision and charity that I hoped to demonstrate in my own writing 
and has brought the present work nearer to that goal.  Doug Meeks has also made me a 
better version of myself, constantly redirecting me to the church, and to our United 
Methodist Church in particular.  Any good I do in that department will owe to his 
influence.  Although we agree more on the problems of theology than probable solutions, 
Ellen Armour has provided a kind counterpoint to this project and to many other thoughts 
along the way.  She has also laughed at some of my jokes, which is its own sort of 
kindness.  Ted Smith has, more than any other teacher, changed my mind.   To take an 
Unpolitischen of Kentucky stock and give him a bad conscience is no small thing.  I will 
decide later if I am grateful for this, but for his efforts and advice, thanks are overdue.  
  Other teachers deserve mention as well.  The questions behind this essay 
developed in seminars at Emory University with Luke Timothy Johnson, Steffen Loesel, 
and David Pacini.  The late John Cobb and Larry McGehee reignited my love of learning 
long before those questions entered my mind.  My parents, Larry and Holly Hayden, are 
my first and best teachers.   My mother taught me to read good books, especially the 
Bible, and to love reading.  My father taught me the work ethic and sheer stubbornness 
without which I would never have seen to completion a project so long on effort and 
short on rewards.  My brother, Seth, and sister, Heather, continuously teach me about the 
priority of family.   My friends in Kentucky continuously teach me that I am not as smart 
as someone apparently told me.   For encouragement and sympathy in the journey, I 
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should also thank ‘Team Awesome,’ Andrew Smith, Gerald Liu, Rich Voelz, Daryl Ellis, 
Lauren White, and Chris Corbin.   Chris Benda was a constant, friendly presence in the 
VDS library.  Without Marie McEntire, I would surely and long ago have drowned in my 
own administrative incompetence.  To all of you, I give heartfelt thanks. 
 Deepest thanks is reserved for my wife and children.  It has been a tremendous 
joy to let Luke, Kellen, and Emery take over my life.  The choice between work and 
family is easy enough, but they have made it all the more pleasant and rewarding.  My 
wife, Caroline, is still my best friend and has helped me along this journey in all sorts of 
ways.  The dedication page is a pitiful token of thanks, but if it means having  full-time 
husband again, perhaps that is a small consolation. 
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EDITORIAL NOTE 
 
The English translation of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke (DBW) is nearly 
complete, and most citations below draw from this standard edition.  In several cases, 
however, I have not hesitated to alter translations or to provide my own.  For the sake of 
brevity and simplicity, citations have been placed in the body rather than footnoted and 
include only a Roman numeral corresponding to the volume of the DBW(E).   So 
citations from Sanctorum Communio, for example, appear in the form of (I, 23), etc., and 
the reader may refer to the bibliography for full citation.  References to Bonhoeffer’s 
main writings are also abbreviated according to the familiar title (SC for Sanctorum 
Communio, AB for Act and Being, LPP for Letters and Papers from Prison, and so forth).   
 I have also noted instances where different volumes of the DBWE diverge in 
translating important German concepts. Only the Hegelian term Aufhebung and its 
variants warrants mention here.  I have used the less common translation “suspension,” 
since it best approximates, in my view, the intention of Barth and Bonhoeffer, and similar 
translations seemed too vague (“sublation”) or misleading (“negation,” “abolition,” etc.).   
 Other difficulties presented by translation should become clear in the course of 
the argument.  Bonhoeffer’s use of “community” (Gemeinschaft) to designate both a 
specific sociological type and any human collective is confusing, but the German 
language and its sociological tradition left him with few alternatives.  I have chosen to 
capitalize Community (also Society) when the specialized meaning is intended.  Similar 
strategies are repeated where necessary and are sufficiently self-explanatory.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A casual observer of contemporary theology might notice two countervailing 
tendencies.  On the one hand, a number of philosophers and theologians speak obliquely 
of a “return to religion” in intellectual life, most often in the form of quasi-secular 
appropriations of the Christian legacy.  So the return to “religion” more resembles the 
admission of an historically or psychologically repressed past on the part of secularism, 
an admission of its own insufficiency, than a full embrace of Christian faith, much less 
Christian life.  On the other hand,  and more to the mainstream of current Christian 
theology, there is a renewed interest in the church not as one topoi among others, but as 
the place from and for which theology speaks, unapologetically, as it were.  To anyone 
with a worn copy of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings, the situation may ring familiar, 
echoing the 1960s dispute over his legacy between dialectical and death-of-God 
theologies.  Not surprisingly, (questionable) appropriations of Bonhoeffer appear on both 
sides of the aforementioned divide, though it may not be the only or the most important 
one, theologically speaking.  Gianni Vattimo’s appeal to “religionless Christianity” and 
Stanley Hauerwas’ commentary on Bonhoeffer’s “faithful performance” of non-violence 
will suffice as examples.  Assuming that academic currents follow deeper cultural 
currents, Bonhoeffer may be worth another look.          
 With respect to the history of Bonhoeffer-interpretation and reception, at any 
rate, the time is ripe for a renewed investigation of his early theology.  Of the half dozen 
or so significant attempts at a complete exposition of Bonhoeffer’s thought, serious 
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problems with method or content limit their effectiveness.
1
  Clifford Green’s important 
study, published in a second edition in 1999, identified the pivotal methodological 
shortcoming, that all previous approaches were thematic, rather than historical, and did 
not take sufficient account of Bonhoeffer’s political and personal contexts.2  Yet Green 
himself commits the same error by forcing the theological concerns of 1927-1933 under 
the theme of “sociality.”  This results not only in a chronological-thematic (rather than 
historical) interpretation but a distortion of key texts, particularly Act and Being.  
Similarly, the biographical and political elements in Green’s study appear as addenda to 
the treatment of intellectual developments, without clear and organic connection to the 
inner motivations of Bonhoeffer’s theological project.  So while he has taken 
methodological steps in the right direction, Green’s work does not go far enough.  In 
none of these readings do the minor texts, such as sermons, letters, student papers, 
lectures and essays play a considered role in locating innovations and developments.  The 
result is a sometimes exaggerated or indistinct view of Bonhoeffer’s contribution to a 
crucial ‘constellation’ in German theology.  That contribution consists above all in the 
appropriation of sociological categories to reconcile dialectical and liberal theologies, or 
as it so often said, to get ‘between Barth and Troeltsch.’  The two dissertations together 
lay the groundwork of this mediation. 
 Unfortunately, the unity of the dissertations and the thought-form (Denkform) that 
underlies them has gone largely unnoticed, prohibiting a thoroughly historical perspective 
                                                          
1
 John Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,  1960). Hans 
Müller, Von der Kirche zur Welte. (Leipzig: Köhler & Amelang, 1961). John A. Phillips,  The Form of 
Christ in the World. A Study of Bonhoeffer’s Christology. (London: Collins, 1967).  Heinrich Ott, Faith and 
Reality.  (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972).  André Dumás, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality. (NY: 
McMillan, 1971).  Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  (Philadelphia, 1985).   
2
 Clifford Green,  Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999). 
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on his theology.  The contest for Bonhoeffer’s legacy between the death-of-God and 
dialectical theologians kept attention from his dissertations, and the polemics of 
appropriation skewed attempts at historical understanding until very recently.  Moreover, 
historical studies in general, as opposed to topical or practical ones, have appeared less 
frequently until the last decade or so.
3
  Since the 1990s, the swelling tide of secondary 
literature breaks into two tributaries.  The first includes biographical or historical studies 
that correct the penchant for hagiography among Bonhoeffer scholars.  The most 
important of these aim specifically at his relation to Judaism.
4
  At the same time, a series 
of more systematic and analytical interpretations of pillars in the Bonhoeffer corpus have 
emerged.  Act and Being has earned some much deserved interest of late, but its relation 
to Sanctorum Communio has still not been the object of a systematic historical study.
 
 On 
both fronts, then, theological and personal-political, we are finally in the midst of a 
“quest for the historical Bonhoeffer.”5   The horizon of that historical recovery stretches 
                                                          
3
 Ernst Feil’s (synchronic) analysis divides the German secondary literature under these headings.  See 
Ernst Feil, ed., International Bibliography On Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, Gütersloh 
Verlaghaus, 1998).  Ralf Wustenberg’s diachronic study of English and German literature suggests the 
following taxonomy: biography (1950s), secularity (1960s), philosophical roots (1970s), and a still 
emerging period (1980-90s), which seems to me primarily historical and can be subdivided according to its 
content.  For a review and extension of Wustenberg’s essay, see John de Gruchy, “The Reception of 
Bonhoeffer’s Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. John W. de Gruchy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999).   
4
 See, for example: Stephen Haynes,  The Bonhoeffer Phenomenon: Portraits of a Protestant Saint, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 2004) and The Bonhoeffer  Legacy: Post-Holocaust Perspectives, (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 2006).    For less critical trends in biography, see: John Moses,  The Reluctant Revolutionary. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Collision with Prusso-German History,  (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009). Friederich 
Schliengensiepen,  Dietrich Bonhoeffer 1906-1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance,  (NY: Continuum, 
2010).   
5
 R. E. Huldschiner,  "The Quest for the Historical Bonhoeffer," Lutheran Forum 3 (September 1969): 12-
13.  For other relevant collections, see: Peter Frick, ed. Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008).  Andreas Pangritz, Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). John  de Gruchy, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999).  Bonhoeffer has also begun to feature in surveys of  early twentieth 
century theology—a relatively new trend in narrating that period and its significance. See John Wilson, 
Modern Theology: Trajectories in the German Tradition, (Philadelphia: WJK, 2007).  Hans Schwarz,  
Theology in a Global Context: The Last 200 Year, (London: SCM, 2005).   
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between the increasingly isolated poles of his dogmatic theology and his intervention in 
the anti-Semitic policies of 1933.  I intend only to clarify the theological pole here.   
 Among the historical expositions of the habilitation essay, Act and Being, two 
deserve mention.  Christine Tietz-Steidung’s  Bonhoeffer’s Kritik der verkrümmten 
Vernuft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999) offers a careful reading of the structure of Act 
and Being with reference to its philosophical background and Sanctorum Communio,  
while Jürgen Boomgaarden’s Das Verständnis der Wirklichkeit (Gutersloh: Chr. Kaiser 
Verlag, 1999) narrows in on the Idealist, Neo-Kantian and phenomenological 
philosophies to which Bonhoeffer is indebted.  Neither study touches upon the real unity 
of the dissertations as two sides of a single argument regarding revelation.  The same is 
true of a forthcoming study by Michael DeJonge.
6
  In isolating Act and Being from 
Sanctorum Communio, each fails to grasp the pattern of thought which is worked out in 
the two together and carries over into Bonhoeffer’s other writings.  This claim holds less 
weight against the excellent volume by Charles Marsh, who reads the early Bonhoeffer’s 
whole project as a response to Karl Barth’s doctrine of revelation.  Marsh intentionally 
veers towards constructive (“reclaiming”) interests and away from historical ones, moves 
back and forth between historical and thematic modes of analysis, and applies reflections 
from different periods to the same problems.  While I have learned a great deal from each 
of these studies, none perceives the inner unity of Bonhoeffer’s thinking on its path from 
                                                          
6
 Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Barth, Berlin and Protestant Theology, 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012).  DeJonge was kind enough to share his dissertation, but I was unable to give it 
full consideration.  The present study is broader in scope.   
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his student years to the habilitation essay.  I will identify that unifying thought-form, its 
elaboration and alteration between 1918 and 1930.
7
  
 
A Heuristic: The ‘Triple Circle’ of Knowledge, History and Ethics.   
The question of revelation as Bonhoeffer understands it is really composed of 
three distinct but inseparable problems, the entwinement of which goes back to the period 
of classical German philosophy and runs throughout the nineteenth century.  In a lecture 
on the history of recent theology, Bonhoeffer describes these as three interlocking 
“circles,” or the problems of knowledge, history and ethics (XI, 224).  The tensions 
between faith and knowledge, Christ and history, ethics and metaphysics set the 
boundaries for theological reflection after Kant.  The conjunction or disjunction of these 
terms depended on the meaning of knowledge, framed as a question of self-consciousness 
or subjectivity.  Knowledge is first self-knowledge.  A generic description of the problem 
of knowledge as one finds it in Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and their heirs is really quite 
impossible, and their divergences reshape the entire structure of the ‘triple circle.’  Those 
divergences amount to different theories of self-consciousness, coordinated with a 
particular understanding of the relation between thought and being, mind and world.  
                                                          
7
 Clifford Green’s study claims to have already accomplished this, but I am skeptical of its success for three 
basic reasons, each rejecting one of Green’s enumerated questions and theses (Green, 33ff).  First, the 
theme of Sanctorum Communio is not ‘sociality’ per se, but revelation, approached from the angle of its 
concrete historical mediation; sociality only supplies the form of revelation (Offenbarungsform).  Second, 
the theme of Act and Being is not anthropology but, again, revelation, approached this time from the 
perspective of human knowledge. Anthropology is central for the simple reason that here the subject 
paradigm of modern philosophy is operative.  Put differently, Sanctorum Communio focuses upon the 
manner of God’s immanence in historical community, while Act and Being begins with God’s 
transcendence to human knowledge.  Both take up from different angles an immanent transcendence, a 
“transcendence in the midst of life.”  Third, sociality is not the embracing category of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology but instead revelation, insofar as its problematic involves a complex structure described below. 
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Hegel, for example, imagines that everything, including the transcendent, can be grasped 
in concepts, since ultimate reality itself is the structure of the ‘Idea.’  Kant and 
Schleiermacher allow no cognitive access to the transcendent but find their way to it 
through moral or affective awareness respectively.  The relation between self-
consciousness and transcendence they collectively refer to as ‘religion,’ and the triple 
circle undergoes a further renovation in the hands of Karl Barth, who deposes religion 
with revelation. Bonhoeffer again modifies Barth’s version of this thought-form. 
 But are there any essential connections between the iterations of this pattern, or 
are we looking merely at historical contingencies? Is the return of so many theologians 
and philosophers between Kant and Barth to these same themes evidence of a common 
and underlying problem or intellectual lockstep? This would seem to be determined in 
part by the connections between the problems which make up the thought-form as a 
whole.  Do the tensions between faith and knowledge, Christ and history, ethics and 
metaphysics amount to an intelligible problem with multiple dimensions and malleable 
expressions (a thought-form), or are they discrete, combined by accidental interest?  
Given the enormous historical and dogmatic complexity of this question, I will resist a 
definite answer.  I do think that at least one version of this thought-form, as it appears in 
Barth and Bonhoeffer, possesses that kind of coherence and therefore a strong heuristic 
value for the following historical inquiry.  Let me sketch its historical genesis very briefly 
before elucidating its systematic structure. 
 The consequences of Kant’s critical philosophy for knowledge of God are 
familiar enough.  Cognition is restricted to the limits of the “conditions of possible 
experience,” where experience (Erlebnis) is defined by the coordination of sensibility and 
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understanding.  By empirically confining the range of concepts, Kant simply dissolves 
the questions of metaphysics:  God is unknowable because knowledge in principle 
excludes anything other than objects.   If the ‘known’ is that conditioned by concepts or 
categories of the understanding, the unconditioned (the transcendent) comes to awareness 
not in cognition but in morality, through the maxim of conscience to ‘do unto others.’  
With the operating range of concepts legally restricted, ethics now performs the labor 
once allotted to metaphysics by bringing the hidden world to mind.  
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, theologians faced two further problems, 
in addition to Kant.  Not only had historical criticism seemingly placed in doubt the 
biblical picture and even existence of Jesus, but scientific naturalism, which surely 
underwrote those doubts, threatened human freedom in general.  Albrecht Ritschl and 
Wilhelm Herrmann seized upon Kant’s philosophy as an escape from both predicaments.  
Their shared solution was a relatively simple one, seeking to route the immediacy of 
moral awareness through Jesus’ preaching of the Kingdom of God.  This effectively lifted 
Jesus’ significance, in the form of an absolute moral claim manifesting the transcendent 
(God), above history and nature. That immediate awareness they called faith.  Faith 
without knowledge, Christ without history, ethics without metaphysics.  This was the 
strategy adopted from Herrmann by Karl Barth, whose basic framework Bonhoeffer 
never abandons.  
 By speaking of a ‘strategy,’ I aim to differentiate Barth’s path from two others 
which dominated the nineteenth century, or what Bonhoeffer refers to as “metaphysics” 
and “inwardness.”  Both identify religion with some feature of human self-consciousness.  
The metaphysical strategy, typified by Hegel, unites finite and infinite in the structure of 
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thought itself.  Being is thinking, divine spirit and human spirit are one.  The strategy of 
inwardness, typified by Schleiermacher and Herrmann, correlates the meaning of 
Christian faith to a non-conceptual aspect of consciousness, be it affective or moral.  In 
displacing religion with revelation, Barth no longer looked for an intersection of divine 
and human, in thought or experience, and this leads him to a strategy one may call 
phenomenological.  The inner structure of his thought-form has been noted implicitly by 
Graham Ward in comparison with Levinas.  Ward speaks of a “trinodal operation” that 
structures the thinking of Barth and Levinas and corresponds rather directly to 
Bonhoeffer’s “three circles.”8  According to Ward, both thinkers begin with an “ethical 
encounter” prior to thought or being that calls into question all judgments of the self upon 
others, an “ethics beyond ontology” (160).  The absence of any “third term” between God 
and humanity then raises the problem of mediation, “of a transcendence entering into, 
constituting the reality of and yet not being domesticated by the immanent…essentially 
concealed and yet an eternal demand” (165).  This is the question of the Word, of Christ 
and history in other terms.  It is also the question of analogy, of a likeness in the knowing 
and being of God and creatures, so finally also of the relation between faith and 
knowledge, which Ward describes as a reconstitution of the subject-object relation.   
What is Ward driving at in this comparison? Certainly not just “similarity in the 
structures of their thinking” or “repetition or permanence…of certain fundamental 
schemes,” but the “grammar of signification itself” as a “triadic economy” that is 
unavoidably theological (176).  Leaving aside Ward’s aggressive framing of Barth and 
Levinas in conventionally “postmodern” terms, he has nonetheless touched upon the 
                                                          
8
 Graham Ward, “The Revelation of the Holy Other as the Wholly Other: Between Barth’s Theology of the 
Word and Levinas’s Philosophy of Saying,” Modern Theology 9:2 April (1993), 159-180.   
xvii 
 
heart of the matter, namely, the ‘structure’ of appearance or phenomenality as it 
overcomes the subject-object dichotomy.  In the end, however, Ward is not much 
interested in talk about revelation but rather signification, an absorption of the Barthian 
problematic into a poststructuralist idiom.  Not in ‘radical orthodoxy’ but in ‘new 
phenomenology’ do we find a revived interest in the theme of revelation.  Here the 
question is raised in connection with the basic tasks of phenomenology itself, as an 
entailment of the questions of appearance and being.  Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry 
have pursued this course with particular rigor.  Barth and Bonhoeffer would readily 
affirm, in spirit at least, the latter’s claim that “the truth of Christianity has precisely no 
relation whatsoever to the truth that arises from the analysis of texts or their historical 
study.”9  Henry also turns to the concept of “self-revelation” to designate a “revelation 
whose phenomenality is the phenomenalization of phenomenality itself” or “the self-
phenomenalization of pure phenomenality” (ibid, 25, 27).  The reflexive language of 
‘phenomenality itself’ carries more than a little Hegelian residue, just as Barth and 
Bonhoeffer embark upon a post-metaphysical refurbishing of the concept of “suspension” 
(Aufhebung).
10
  
Any attempt to hitch dialectical theology too closely to the new phenomenology, 
much less poststructuralism, must address the seriousness with which Barth and 
                                                          
9
 Michel Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003), 
p. 3.  
10
 Compare with Henry, 66. “To give testimony to the truth means that it is truth that gives testimony to 
itself.  And it does so since it is Life, and Life is self-revelation, that which originally reveals itself to 
itself—or in Johannine language, that which testifies to itself.”  In Hegel’s concept of self-revelation, the I 
“reveals itself to itself” in the dialectic of the Concept.  Hegel’s understanding of self-revelation also 
evolved from a concept of “life” as an internally self-differentiated structure, as found in his Jungschriften 
on Christianity.  The difference between his metaphysical approach and the phenomenological ones of 
Henry, Barth and Bonhoeffer is obvious: for Hegel the entire process of self-revelation can be grasped 
objectively,  reflexively, whereas it phenomenologically ‘ruptures’ the subject-object relation and is 
inaccessible to reflection.  This is the basic thesis of Act and Being.   
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Bonhoeffer took Kant’s philosophy, thereby refusing to vanquish ‘the subject.’  Neither, I 
think, really warrant postmodern affiliation but stand nearer to Levinas, who retains the 
concept of the subject as one who is ‘placed beneath’ an ethical claim.  In doing so, 
Levinas goes behind Heidegger’s disposal of the paradoxes of self-consciousness—his 
replacement of sub-ject with Da-sein—without merely returning to Kant’s model of 
subjectivity.  Bonhoeffer makes a similar turn, overturning the “epistemological 
category” of subject-object relations with the “sociological category,” according to which 
the self is constituted in a “basic relation” (Grundverhältnisse, Grundbeziehung) to the 
concrete other made possible by the divine Other.  The inclusion of the concrete other 
marks his break with Karl Barth, whereby he attempts to think revelation not 
individualistically but in “sociality.”   
With this term, also drawn from the Hegelian lexicon, the distinctiveness of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought is most evident.  Like Barth, he finds an escape from the prison of 
self-consciousness only in the “suspension” of knowledge in faith through the freedom of 
a divine act and encounter.  Like Levinas, he locates the constitution of the self in ethical 
relations with concrete others, the neighbor, and not God alone.  Like other social 
theorists, for example, Habermas, he understands the intersubjective constitution of the 
self as mediated by language, which he even grants a priority over thought.  Yet again 
like Hegel, he does not view this priority in exclusion of the dialectics of self-
consciousness but as ingredient to the irreducibly social nature of “spirit.”  The whole of 
his early theology struggles to reconcile these insights with Barth’s theological 
“presupposition” (Ansatz), and therefore to overcome the tension between revelation and 
history. 
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Outline of Argument 
 It is not the purpose of this study to place Bonhoeffer’s theology in view of 
contemporary concerns or figures, or at least not directly.  The historical question of how 
his theology took shape is distinct in principle from its ongoing validity or relevance.  
Comparisons, for example, with Levinas, enter into consideration only to the extent that 
they cast light upon the structure and direction of Bonhoeffer’s own thinking in its 
historical setting.  Judgments on the intelligibility of his theology are rendered only for 
the sake of making it intelligible.  Despite the concentration of this essay on ideas, some 
reference to social history is also necessary to clarify ‘how the words run.’   
 The first chapter therefore examines the social function of the concept of 
“religious community” in German philosophy and theology during the nineteenth 
century.  Conceived as the coupling of finite and infinite in a sequence of progressively 
unfolding historical and social forms, religion provided for the unity of knowledge as 
well as the unity of a German culture fragmented by political, religious and class 
divisions.  The idea of religion could exercise this function only as part of more complex 
cultural ideal with broad conceptual and social dimensions (Bildung).  Against this 
backdrop, the second part of chapter one turns to Karl Barth’s attack on ‘religion,’ 
developing his continuities and discontinuities with the nineteenth century.  By outlining 
the “trinodal” structure of his thinking and its dependence on the Hegelian figure of 
“suspension,” the immanent tensions of his thought-form come into view, so that 
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Bonhoeffer’s own project becomes comprehensible as both an ‘immanent critique’ of the 
Barthian pattern and a synthesis with aspects of the liberal-Protestant heritage. 
 The key to this synthesis is the concept of “sociality” and its antecedents, such as 
the “voluntary form of spirit,” which appear in Bonhoeffer’s student essays and 
correspondence.  By 1925, his conversion to Barth is already cemented, but other trends 
precede his transition from liberal to dialectical theology, including a fascination not so 
much with the concept of the church as its living congregational reality, awakened during 
a trip to Rome.  A reexamination of Bonhoeffer’s critique of Barth shows why he then 
fixed upon the concept of the church as the historical presence of God, “Jesus Christ 
existing as community.”  By conceiving God on the model of the subject, Barth’s 
understanding of revelation is both formalistic, lacking in historical reality, and 
individualistic, thus incapable of touching human beings in their whole historical and 
social existence.  The dualism that separates God’s being and revelation from history 
invades the human being as well.  Although the full design of Bonhoeffer’s appeal to the 
church becomes visible only in his 1927 dissertation, his student essays foreshadow its 
concerns by softening Barth’s dualism between time and eternity through the presence of 
the Holy Spirit “in us.”  Bonhoeffer now conceives God as will rather than mind, as 
person rather than subject.  The epistemic, historical, and ethical circles as aligned by 
Barth demand reconfiguration. 
 Chapter three and four offer close readings of Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, 
Sanctorum Communio (Ch. 3) and habilitation essay Act and Being (Ch. 4), and chapter 
five draws together the threads of this study to demonstrate how these two texts together 
exemplify a unified thought-form.  The distinctiveness of Bonhoeffer’s position and the 
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unity of his thought-form lies in the interweaving of two dialectics.  In the theological 
dialectic, God “suspends” the subject-object relation of knowledge in the Trinitarian 
relations of God’s own self-knowledge.  So God is present, God ‘is,’ only in the act of 
faith.  Barth and Bonhoeffer are in agreement on these points.  Bonhoeffer moves beyond 
Barth by adding a second, namely, sociological or historical dialectic.  The 
intersubjective constitution of human beings in “sociality” means that the ‘canceling’ and 
‘taking up’ of their knowledge affects them in their social existence.  The contrasting 
modes of human life before and after revelation are social, knowledge and being in two 
forms of community, broken and reconciled. Where human beings are by nature “woven 
into sociality,” God’s freedom has “woven itself into the personlike community of faith.”   
The church is for Bonhoeffer the visible communion of divine and human freedom, “the 
revelation of loving hearts.” 
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CHAPTER I 
 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: FROM BILDUNG TO BARTH 
 
 The era of Protestant orthodox theology in Germanic countries came to a close 
with Kant’s critique of rationalist metaphysics in the vein of Christian Wolff.  By this 
time, pietism had thoroughly penetrated the culture, including many of the universities, 
but had declined in influence and vigor for half a century.  The German enlightenment 
(Aufklärung) birthed a new thinking about religion in distinction from the ‘rational 
religion’ of the metaphysicists and the ‘heart religion’ of the ‘enthusiasts.’  It was in fact 
from the weakened language and cultural forms of pietism that a powerful new cultural 
vision emerged, epitomized in the humanistic ideal of Bildung.  Borrowed directly from 
the pietist understanding of the “image of God” (Gottesbild), Bildung traded upon the 
rhetoric of “inwardness” and “feeling” popularized by the bands, molding it into a 
bourgeois value achieved through education.  Against the “cold heart” of the prior 
century’s hunger for autonomy and individualism, Bildung counseled a return to 
“community” and “religious community” in particular.  The morphology of religious 
communions served as the index of progress in a philosophy of history which amounted 
to a domestication of pietist chiliasm. The most developed religious community (German 
Protestant, of course) represented the Kingdom of God in history.  Some variation of 
these ideas guided the luminaries of German society for over a century. 
 The commanding continuity of this cultural heritage shattered in the first World 
War, and its view of historical progress earned special rebuke.  Among the beleaguered 
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theology faculties, it was a young Swiss pastor who dropped the decisive ‘bombshell.’  
Karl Barth set the Kingdom of God and history, time and eternity, in contradiction rather 
than continuity.  God is above not within humanity.  Revelation replaces religion.  
Bonhoeffer accepts Barth’s critique of religion, but tries to reinsert the concept of 
community, not only to correct a theoretical difficulty but to open the possibility of 
redemption for the cultural pattern that concept signifies.  The first half of this chapter 
develops that pattern in broad-brush fashion, while the second closes in on the structure 
of Barth’s early theology.  From this twofold standpoint, one may survey the practical 
and theoretical tensions Bonhoeffer felt it necessary to reconcile.     
 
I.  The German Paradigm: Religion and Community Across the Long Nineteenth 
Century 
 
The concept of ‘religion’ is not one among others in nineteenth century Germany.  
In its several variants, it defines an entire intellectual paradigm that is at once and perhaps 
uniquely a cultural paradigm.  The German enlightenment turned from the geometrical to 
the historical, from the abstract or negative to the concrete and positive.  Religion was no 
exception to this trend.  The ‘rational religion’ of the eighteenth century gave way to a 
renewed emphasis on ‘revealed religion,’ particularly in the form of developmental 
historical schemes as an apology for the superiority of Christianity.  ‘Religion’ served as 
the engine and index of an upward historical process in which ‘higher’ religions attained 
a greater clarity regarding human nature.  Philosophy could answer in this way the crisis 
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generated by consciousness of its own history, but the turn to ‘positive religion’ in 
classical German philosophy met a specifically German (and not solely philosophical) 
need as well.   
While France and Britain took on the structure of politically, economically and 
militarily unified nation-states, ‘Germany’ remained a collective of petty princedoms, led 
by the dominant powers of Protestant Prussia and Catholic Austria.  Fearing 
‘encirclement’ by Franco-British forces, and with Russia looming to the east, German 
unification seemed a political necessity and a strategic impossibility, facing the 
restrictions of religious division and ossified, miniature absolutism.  As Helmut Smith 
has remarked, under such circumstances, Germany had to be imagined before it could be 
established.
1
  Pietism provided the raw materials, and classical German philosophy, 
Idealist and especially Romantic, wrought a partial secularization of its themes into a 
spiritual, cultural, and political ideal, Bildung.  Weighed as a late or even final fruit of 
providential history, Bildung captured the essence of religion and the essence of German 
humanity in a single breath.   I shall consider its full semantic range in a moment, but a 
provisional word on its social range is necessary first.   
 Bildung belongs to the social world of the German middle class or Bürgertum.  
Emerging from the bureaucratization of the monarchical government during the 
eighteenth century, the Bürgertum included not only the ‘educated middle class’ 
(Bildungsbürgertum) of lawyers, clergy, and above all academics, but the entrepreneurial 
upper middle class (Besietzbürgertum) and lower middle class of trade professionals 
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(Kleinbürgertum).
2
  The alliance of these variegated Bürger identities aggregated enough 
social, political, and economic capital to assert reforms via bureaucracy ‘from above,’ 
having no taste for revolution ‘from below,’ in the French fashion.  German liberalism, in 
the main, distinguished itself from its French, British, and American counterparts by 
prioritizing the whole over the part, the community over the individual, opting for an 
‘enlightened absolutism’ or constitutional monarchy. With its center of power and vision 
in the university, the educated middle class initially aimed at a ‘classless society’ in 
which a demoted aristocracy and elevated peasantry would eventually pursue the goods 
of Bildung.   
As the architects of the new cultural vision, these academes or “German 
mandarins,” exercised tremendous influence over the mind of modern Germany, 
composing a spiritual symphony of classical, modern and mythic sources and 
orchestrating its public reception in salons, liturgies and festivals.  Their “new 
mythology” named the social program of Bildung.3  Fritz Ringer has summarized the 
“mandarin type” and its precarious dependence on specific social conditions.4  As a social 
elite based on educational achievement rather than hereditary title, they assume a set of 
economic conditions after the decline of absolutism but prior to democratization, serving 
as the officium of a heavily bureaucratized and politically weakened monarchy.  The 
humanistic goal of self-cultivation demands a culture of classical rather than technical 
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learning and calls for a rationalized government led by the educated, rather than the 
arbitrariness of monarchy or masses.  The legitimacy of such a government rests on the 
people (Volk) it creates, a ‘cultured state’ (Bildungstaat), spiritually regulated by the 
intelligentsia.     
Although Ringer speaks of the mandarin ‘type,’ appealing to the sociology of 
Max Weber, the Bildungsbürgertum (to which Weber belonged) are perhaps better 
understood through Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of a class “position” within the total 
“economy” of a society.5  The main advantage of Bourdieu’s sociology in this instance is 
that permits a more dexterous connection between theory and practice.  Into the educated 
middle class position is concentrated a specific measure and brand of social, political, 
fiscal and symbolic capital, the cumulative availability and arrangement of which shapes 
the German economy for over a century.  The stability of the theoretic or symbolic capital 
depends on the collective stability of the other forms.  Bildung presupposes Bürgertum.  
The difficulties of German liberalism reside in the middle-class’s deficiencies in these 
latter capital forms.  If the symbolic capital concentrated into Bildung drew upon a 
number of historical and cultural resources, it assumed the fiscal capital to permit leisure 
for self-cultivation, the social capital to secure institutional channels for learning, and the 
political capital to directly effect legislation protecting them.  These four capital streams 
flowed into the economic subject position Bildungsbürgertum, where Bildung marks the 
“social imaginary” directing the flow of capitals.6  
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Since the shape of Germany’s ‘economy,’ along with the rest of Europe’s, alters 
dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century, generalizations about Bildung 
prove risky.  Its valences shift as the educated middle class position dissolves between 
the pressures of monarchical reassertion, industrialization, democratization, and monetary 
inflation.  The advent of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) coincided roughly with 
mandarin division into reactionary “orthodox” and more democratically accommodating 
“modern” camps.7  The moderns occupied the University of Berlin, one of the most 
prestigious educational institutions in the world, and counted among their ranks leading 
intellectuals such as Max Weber, Frederich Meinecke, Ferdinand Tönnies, Hans 
Delbrück, Ernst Troeltsch and Adolf von Harnack.  Bonhoeffer’s father was part of their 
circle in Berlin, and we may trace the deterioration of his legacy in five stages.  
 
Religious Community in the Historical Paradigm: Five Phases 
 Since nothing resembling an accurate ‘history’ of Germany in the nineteenth 
century is possible in the space allotted here, two sorts of observations will have to 
suffice.  I want to note, first, some mutations in the concept of ‘religious community’ as 
the core of the mandarin imaginary, and then, second, the coincidence of those mutations 
with the repositioning of capital forms.  Before doing so, it may be useful to describe 
briefly the wider cultural pattern which embraces the concept of “religious community,” 
namely, Bildung, the semantic of range of which I would now like to expand.  As the 
cultural ideal of the educated middle class, Bildung is of largely Romantic vintage, 
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drawing from at least three wells of influence.  Again, it is fundamentally a partial 
secularization of the pietist habitus, with its insistence on inwardness, communal feeling, 
and the formation of the soul in the image of God.  Herder was the first to envision a 
cultural and educational program along these lines.  Within this Protestant vision the 
Romantics sought to recapture the medieval sense of cosmic politic-religious harmony in 
a modern and specifically German idiom.  Coupled to these Christian elements is a 
Greco-German paganism, a mythology of German origins and identity.  Bildung 
combines philosophical, cultural and political ideals from these sources.   
The concept itself has a wide semantic halo, which, while largely stable, shifts 
over the course of the nineteenth century as it functions in the various contexts of 
Germany’s struggle for unification.  We might depict the web of semantic relations in a 
series of concentric circles, in which the significance of the outermost is concentrated and 
fulfilled in the innermost:  a people (Volk) emerges in the context of a specific language 
(Sprache) and history (Geschichte), giving rise to their unique spirit (Geist) and culture 
(Kultur), grasped through a unified ‘scientific’ knowledge (Wissenschaft) and towards the 
expansion and fulfillment of aesthetic and religious capacities (Kunst/religion).
8
  
However consistent this vocabulary, the semantics of Bildung varies intensely between 
figures, movements, and periods, with perhaps one exception.  German philosophy and 
politics (in that order) generally framed their designs with a unique concept of history, so 
much so that we might speak here of the ‘historical paradigm.’  Not that the Romantics, 
Idealists and Neo-Kantians shared a single theory of history—their differences were 
several and significant.  Nonetheless, one may properly point to the outlines of a ‘German 
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idea of history,’ which unfolds the logic of religious inwardness and national 
community.
9
  After tracing the transformation of these connections through five phases of 
the historical paradigm (preparatory, foundational, revisionary, reactionary, reparative), I 
will return to a few cumulative remarks about the content of Bildung.      
 The first and preparatory stage (1774-1789) grows out of a comparative deficit in 
all capital forms, as ‘Germany’ lagged politically, economically and culturally behind 
France and England (Helmut Plessner would later write of his ‘delayed nation’).10  The 
emerging middle class had confronted something of a vicious capital circle on an 
international scale.  The political capital required to secure fiscal and social freedom 
(capitalism and constitutional government) presupposed a degree of social capital 
sufficient to accomplish political change in the first place.  Revolution was certainly one 
way out of that circle but not one palatable to the orderly and deferential Germans, who 
soon witnessed the French revolution with considerable horror and distaste.  The 
‘bourgeois public sphere’ (bürgerliche Offentlichkeit) and its Publikum were first 
constructed as reading publics in the German equivalent of French salons, often as 
outgrowths of the university.  As Benjamin Redekop observes, “in the Germanies the 
general trend was towards overcoming the isolation borne of the diversity of German life 
with a more coherent, unified, and enlightened public.”11  From the Aufklärung forward, 
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the unity of that public depended heavily in the minds of its architects on a shared 
language that could bridge regional, religious and class boundaries.   
 Herder programmatically explored the theme of language in connection with 
German history, origins and mythology, and forged a more explicit and theoretically 
sophisticated bond between public, nation and Volk.
12
  His Idea for a Philosophy of 
Human History (1784-91), along with Kant’s Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) and Lessing’s Education of the Human Race 
(1774/8), indicates two tensile tendencies in this earliest phase.  On the one hand, these 
works shared in the cosmopolitanism, the universal humanism, of the entire era, and 
despite their conflicts are joined by an interest in the common history of humanity 
without the forms of universalism plied by the rationalists.  So on the other hand, the 
German conception of history increasingly emphasized the healthy competition of unique 
national spirits.  Lessing more than Kant supposed the value of positive religion and 
moved towards a universal history in which the history of religions bridged somewhat the 
“wide ugly ditch” between “necessary truths of reason” and “accidental truths of 
history.”13   Herder advanced a step further by advocating an organic relation between the 
language, landscape, religion and politics appropriate to a given people in the “garden of 
nations.”  The merger of the organic with the historical rendered the garden of human 
spirits a garden of the divine spirit as well, and religion opened up the possibility of a 
“community of nations” with the integrity of individual nations. 
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 In the foundational stage (1789-1848) a critical mass of capital accumulates to the 
middle class and German philosophy enters its classical period.  The sharp contrast 
between Herder and Fichte’s Speeches to the German Nation, while not exactly 
characteristic of this stage, still exemplifies its basic trajectory from the articulation of a 
German essence to its universal self-assertion.  That trend finds two gentler expressions, 
far more subtle and influential, in Schleiermacher and Hegel, and in both cases we find a 
comparable definition of religion as the unity of finite and finite, humanity and God 
(Lessing had already ventured a similar view).  Despite their considerable philosophical 
differences, the two shared three basic convictions: that history was to be understood as a 
process of upward development in which the human spirit achieved greater likeness to 
the divine spirit; that nature served as a substrate of this process through an organic 
grounding of human spiritual achievement in national identities, languages and environs; 
that the fusion of art and religion marked the telos of this process of human formation.
14
 
 Interests of a broadly liberal nature gained momentum from the convergence of 
these capital forms until the revolutions of 1848, when the failure of the Frankfurt 
Assembly reversed their fortunes.  In a third and revisionary stage (1848-1918), the 
synthesis of capitals presupposed by the economic position Bildungsbürgertum 
destabilizes.  Where political and symbolic capital had been decisive in the preparatory 
and foundational stages, industrialization lent weight and volatility to social and fiscal 
capitals.  Not only did the gap between middle and lower class Germans increase 
dramatically, but the wealth of government officials and upper class entrepreneurs, as 
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well as the fragility of  trade professions, slowly unraveled the former burger alliances.  If 
socio-economic conditions thwarted mandarin ambitions from below, the reassertion of 
the monarchy and the policies of Bismarck cut them off from above.  Moreover, the 
modest success of the constitutional program backfired on university elites when the 
party system opened the door for Social Democrats to siphon off their religious support 
base and popularize Marxist ideology against vulgarized Romanticism, which was then 
eventually coopted by the National Socialists.
15
   
Under these circumstances, a socially and intellectually integrative program made 
little sense, and the mandarins settled for a mediating and therefore necessarily 
conservative posture between the monarchy and boiling workers’ parties.  A renovated 
Kantianism served admirably in this capacity, with its mild skepticism, cool objectivity, 
and dutiful ethics.  Their sense of society was forced to distance itself somewhat from the 
metaphysical confidence of Hegel, and in this climate the science of sociology emerged.
16
  
Despite the success of the Ritschlian school, with its anti-historicist tendencies, Troeltsch 
genuinely captured the self-image of protestant theology during the founding of the 
Reich.  The German idea of history carried the day.  
 Yet significant strain preceded the ‘Great War.’  The German economy could not 
support the burden of military expenditures, save on the promise of victor’s spoils.  
Defeat and the Treaty of Versailles awarded them instead with calamitous war debts, 
accumulating under the clouds of a global financial depression.  Intellectual and aesthetic 
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forces resistant to the prevailing mandarin ideology gained in potency and freedom 
during the Weimar era, as did a variety of revolutionary social movements, including 
workers and students, women and Jews.  In the fourth and reactionary phase of the 
historical paradigm (1918-1945), the German spirit undergoes an apocalyptic inversion.  
Inflation lent a phantasmagoric absurdity to the exchanges of everyday life and 
threatened the population with poverty and violent discontent.  With the Kaiser banished 
and power in the hands of Social Democrats and Catholics, the mandarin majority opted 
for what Peter Gay once called “public careers of honorable impotence,” if they did not 
finally throw in with right wing assaults on the Republic.
17
  The idea of history 
underwent its own sort of inversion, its axis shifting from the horizontal (progress) to the 
vertical (crisis).  This vertical historicism came in many forms with just as many political 
agendas, encompassing the  Krisenliteratur of the Weimar era.
18
  In the young Karl 
Barth, the two fiercest children of the “reactionary decade,” Marx and Kierkegaard, 
return in a single voice, attacking from both sides the invisible compound joining 
‘culture’ to ‘protestantism’ (Kulturprotestantismus).  Bonhoeffer was clearly impressed 
with the Kierkegaardian gesture, much less so with Barth’s socialism, already on the 
wane in the mid-twenties.  The question was what could be salvaged of Bildung from the 
overall wreck of the war. 
 
Dimensions of Bildung: Philosophy, Culture, Politics.   
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We must keep this arc of depreciation in view when generalizing about the 
meaning of Bildung, but perhaps one can see why the philosophical element achieved 
such a peculiar priority.  After all, the German philosophers presumed their insights to be 
the ripest fruit providence had yet produced.  The problems of history, nature, culture and 
knowledge converged in a single principle which came to define German thought down 
to the World Wars: “inwardness” (Innerlichkeit).  Against the mechanism of the 
empiricist Enlightenments in France and England, several strands of German thought 
pointed away from the mere givenness of observable, calculable nature to its inner 
potency and perfectibility. The notion of a perfectible finite nature stretched back to the 
beginning of German pietism, but appeared more systematically (and independently) in 
the philosophy of Leibniz, in the emerging biological sciences, in the German idea of 
history, and in the new aesthetic movements from Sturm und Drang to Romanticism.
19
  
Each in their own way observed that nature, as a whole and in its parts, possessed a telos, 
a destiny, whose form and fulfillment were not predetermined.  Bildung named both the 
process and the final product of that freely attained form or perfection.  
A pantheistic leaning always accompanied this conception after the foundational 
stage of the historical paradigm, with its desire for a system of ‘Spinozism plus 
freedom.’20 In conscious life, the spiritual ground (Grund) of nature achieves a 
breakthrough to self-direction, so that the problem of knowledge was simultaneously a 
problem of ethics, a question of how to reconcile the determinate and free aspects of our 
being in the sphere of creative power (culture).  The self embedded in nature thus 
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mediated its own identity, created itself, through its cultural productions.  The organic 
metaphor provided the metaphysical tissues linking nature to landscape, language, nation 
and culture.  And because the self stood in a relation not of abstract, atomistic, preformed 
observation but of ‘dialectic’ or ‘interpenetration’ (Auseinandersetzung), its individuality 
was to be built up, like its knowledge, out of fragments.  A whole knowledge and a whole 
self, smoothly integrated through the process of education, was the primary meaning of 
perfection or being ‘cultured’ (gebildeten).   
 If the balance of part and whole informed the desired pattern of German 
inwardness, as knowledge and as individuality, and if that inwardness mediated itself 
through the cultural environment, then it demanded a cultural as well as a political ideal.  
A unity of art and religion (Kunstreligion) marked the ideal of culture as an open totality.
 
21
  Yet while the religious sensibility clearly derived from Lutheran pietism, and even the 
Romantics never abandoned a Christian coloring to the form (Bild) of Bildung, the 
aesthetic ideal owed as much to the revival of interest in Greek culture as to Christianity, 
and the coupling of Christ with Dionysius and Apollo became a persistent theme from 
Novalis to Nietzsche.  Romantic fascination with Dante’s vision of a complete scientific, 
political and religious reality (an ‘encyclopedia’) rendered poetically merged with such 
pagan themes as eternal recurrence.  The taming or complete immanence of the ideal of 
the Kingdom of God (Gottesreich) cleared the space for an Athenian secularization of 
Christianity under the sign of the Beautiful.
22
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With this, the individuality of the ‘inner man’ attained a kind of universality, a 
modern humanization of the eternal form prized by ancient Greece.
23
  Refracted through 
the organic metaphor, the renewal of ancient values took on new significance.  Such 
terms as ‘unity’  (Einheit), ‘simplicity’ (Einfach), ‘purity’  (Reinheit), ‘naturalness’ or 
‘authenticity’  (Eigentlichkeit, Eigentätigkeit), and ‘harmony’ (Harmonie)  aimed at 
recapitulations of Greek aesthetic ideals, though within the historicist, organic 
framework, they typically pointed to an ‘unfolding,’ a simplicity and unity not of static 
eternity but of free and dynamic growth into inner potentiality.
24
  Given the pantheistic 
overtones applied to the concept of nature as inward, spiritual reality and the explicitly 
religious vision of history as progress towards the Kingdom of God, it is not surprising 
that the Germans looked upon the outer manifestations of culture, arising from the wells 
of spirit, as revelation (Offenbarung) or ‘objective spirit’ (objektiv Geist).  The divine 
embraced the complete context of thinking and being.  The concern for organic 
inwardness therefore gives way to a consuming interest in harmony, expressed in the 
“symphonic analogy” of parts ordered under a whole whose meaning is only recognized 
in its temporal completion.
25
   
 In the aesthetic-religious ideal, the political implications of Bildung are already 
evident.  In the part-whole relation, the accent falls squarely on the whole.  Although the 
concept of the nation-state always prioritized the collective over the individual in 
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nineteenth century Germany, the desire for a harmonious, organic whole grew acute in 
the Weimar era and expressed itself increasingly in the language of ‘community’ 
(Gemeinschaft).  As with the individual, the character of a nation and its political order 
must grow out of its own resources and history.  Troeltsch admirably encapsulated these 
opinions in 1922: 
[The individual] is a particular concretion of the divine spirit in unique persons and in 
suprapersonal communal [gemeinschaftlich] organizations…The state and society are not created 
from the individual by way of contract and utilitarian rationality, but from the suprapersonal 
spiritual forces which emanate from the most important creative individuals, the spirit of the 
people or the religious idea.
26
    
What he here terms ‘state mysticism’ (Staatsmystik) is elsewhere pitted against the 
“whole mathematical-mechanistic West-European scientific spirit.”27  
 The oddity, and ultimately the tragedy, of this political conception and its 
humanistic foundation lay in its ‘unpolitical’ (unpolitischen) bias, its ‘disinterest’ 
(Zwecklösigkeit) towards the outer, mundane, and material, set below and against the 
inner, other-worldly, and spiritual.  The liberalizing of pietistic chiliasm became the 
excuse for indulging in philosophical and religious eccentricity.  The triumph of the 
material through industrialization and the threat of ‘the masses’ through democratization 
spelled the end of the culture-state and of those mandarin institutions without which their 
mode of life was impossible.  Weimar thus inspired a climate of ‘cultural despair’ or 
‘politicized nostalgia’ among the academic elite.28  Anti-western sentiments had escalated 
since the founding of the Reich, but Weimar sent them into overdrive.  An arsenal of 
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critique taking aim at everything scientistic, western, industrial, and socialistic 
reproduced itself in university circles.  “Positivism” was but the most prominent epithet, 
associated with terms like ‘psychologism’ and ‘subjectivism,’ describing epistemological 
or methodological dispositions with cultural and political consequences.
29
   
The usually vague thrust of these terms was threefold, mirroring the constitution 
of Bildung.  First, they involved an epistemic confusion of the mental and the material, of 
subject and object, of free and rule-bound, ideal and empirical.   Bildung presented a free, 
organic, dialectical interpenetration of subjective and objective, self and culture.  Second, 
the cultural consequence of that confusion was to promote the learning of ‘things’ over 
spiritual realities, natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) over human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften), and the fragmenting of understanding into isolated fields of 
information.  Bildung promoted wholeness, totality and integration.  Finally, the net 
political result was an individualistic, atheistic materialism, robbed of religious depth and 
social duty.  Bildung, by contrast, was essentially religious, opening the inner depths of 
self, rooting the self in the Volk and Volk in divine history and purpose.  When the 
Treaty of Versailles stipulated a ‘western-style democracy,’ the Germans took it as insult 
added to injury.   That the socialists and Catholics led this “unnatural” imposition was 
only fitting in the mandarin mind.    
 The German paradigm thus presupposed not merely a religious but a protestant 
center, which, for all its talk of inwardness, served to secure the priority of the community 
over the individual, the whole over the part.  The controversy over ‘religious community’ 
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in each phase of the historical paradigm played a crucial role in both the philosophical 
and social questions, entwined as they were with the German idea of history.  Karl Barth 
uncoupled God from history and society by excising their point of contact in religion. 
 
II. Barth Against Berlin: Critical Transformation of the German Paradigm  
  
The disagreement between Barth and Bonhoeffer stems less from this uncoupling 
than what happens to the leftovers, particularly to the role of the church in dogmatics.  
The preceding account of the ‘historical paradigm’ has sketched the confusion of 
religious community with national community, or how ‘religious community’ functioned 
in the social imaginary of the German economy in its struggle for integration and 
equilibrium.  That confusion was implicated in the church’s status as a metadoctrine for 
German theology, how it functioned as the very basis of thinking about doctrine. 
30
  In 
Hegel’s philosophy, the church as community represented the self-recognition and 
culmination of Spirit, to be superseded only by the German state as the final outworking 
of the divine Dialectic.  For Schleiermacher as well the religious community preceded 
any particular doctrine as the context of those religious affections to which doctrine gave 
expression.  In a less direct way the same could be said of Ritschl and Herrmann, both of 
whom presupposed the church community as the place where Christ could be perceived 
as the datum of moral experience.   
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 The central epistemological function allotted to the concept of religious 
community meant that the social problem was usually digested in highly theoretical 
terms, as a function of epistemological problems.  This partly resulted from the unique 
position mandarins occupied in regulating the German economy, a position determined 
by the path of German unification.  If Germany had to be imagined first, then 
philosophical decisions really did have massive social consequences.  Barth’s seemingly 
obtuse declaration that Bultmann’s (at times minor) difference of opinion should have led 
to Nazism makes a little more sense in this light.  The “social question” (Sozialfrage) and 
the philosophical one concerned the problem of mediation.  The social question arose 
from the pre-industrial ideal of a “classless” or “civil society” but was exacerbated by the 
class conflict that accompanied industrialization.  In both cases the problem was the 
same: how could the middle class unify Germany around itself, mediating between the 
aristocracy and the peasantry?  As a vital mandarin institution, the church could serve this 
mediating capacity, with certain ideological renovations.  Schleiermacher was 
instrumental in the promotion of a “national liturgy” to this end, part of an “attempt to 
infuse the public sphere with mythical meaning.”31  The ‘new mythology’ was primarily 
a myth of German identity.   
As Bonhoeffer himself recognized, the priority of the whole over the part was a 
distinguishing feature of the German social ideal, being at once an end in oneself and a 
means to the whole.  The idea of religious community gave this a metaphysical 
justification by theorizing the mediation of the infinite through the finite, a mediation 
following one of two strategies which Bonhoeffer eventually describes as “metaphysics” 
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and “inwardness” (VIII, 344, 348).  For both, religion is a “mediating concept” 
(Vermittlungsbegriff) in the sense that it stands between the positive content of Christian 
faith and a general conception of humanity or reality.  As an essential feature of self-
consciousness, religion “mediates” in a way that corresponds to the structure of self-
awareness.  If consciousness can discover the order of its own operations, if reason can 
ground itself in its own activity, then metaphysics really is possible and the mind has 
found its way back into the super-sensible.  That is the path of absolute Idealism, typified 
in Hegel.  If this path is cut off, either by an explicit acknowledgment of the Kantian limit 
(Ritschl) or by the dependence of the mind upon a ground which it cannot access 
reflexively and conceptually (Schleiermacher), then the invisible must manifest itself in 
some non-conceptual way, either through moral experience (Ritschl) or affective 
awareness that the ordering of the mind is not self-sufficient (Schleiermacher).  Troeltsch 
called this the “agnostic theology of mediation”—‘agnostic’ because God remains 
unknowable, ‘mediating’ or ‘correlating’ because it locates the meaning of positive 
religions in some immediate aspect of consciousness.   
Barth protested the reduction of Christianity to religion (defined anthropologically 
as a feature of self-consciousness), but his break with the nineteenth century was not so 
clean as once suggested.  Christophe Chalamet has established his continuity with 
Herrmann in terms of the functions and concepts of dialectical thinking, but Chalamet has 
not recognized the underlying structure of the three circles, much less its potential for 
variation while retaining its basic form.
32
 After responding to a few interpretive issues 
surrounding Barth, I will trace the genesis of that structure from Kant through Herrmann 
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to Barth and then analyze the systematic structure of Romans II in terms of the epistemic, 
historical and ethical circles.  The oscillation between diachronic and synchronic 
analysis, genesis and structure, will recur throughout the study.   
Approaching Barth: Interpretive Issues 
Bonhoeffer always placed himself within the camp of dialectical theology, and his 
intellectual development follows very closely that of Karl Barth.  So some perspective on 
Barth’s own development is necessary.  Bruce McCormack has outlined four stages in 
Barth’s career, dating the first from 1915 to January 1920, the second to May 1924, the 
third to September 1936, and the fourth until the end of Barth’s career.33    Each stage, he 
argues, is marked by shifts in Barth’s thinking on the relation between the Kingdom of 
God and history, or the “dialectic of veiling and unveiling.”  Contrary to those 
interpreters who see two major breaks in Barth’s theology (a turn from liberalism and 
later to the doctrine of analogy), McCormack sees a fundamental continuity after his 
departure from liberalism.  The dialectic of “veiling and unveiling” describes how God 
becomes ‘visible’ without becoming a ‘thing,’ how God becomes an ‘object’ without 
ceasing to be ‘Subject.’  This underlying dialectic displaces ‘religion’ or self-
consciousness as the center of Barth’s thinking in 1920, and it remains the foundation of 
his theology until the end.   
McCormack’s contribution was to show that this dialectic undergoes several 
iterations, while maintaining its basic character.  In the second stage (1920-May 1924), 
the dialectic of veiling and unveiling is expressed as the “dialectic of time and eternity.”  
The eschatological framework appears first as a “process” (1919) and then a “consistent” 
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(1922) eschatology.   In the former, Barth draws upon the pietists’ organic imagery of the 
Kingdom growing in time; in the latter, he sets history and the Kingdom in a disjunctive 
dualism.  McCormack also describes this as a move from “supplementary” to 
“complementary” dialectics, from ‘both/and’ to ‘either/or.’  The common denominator of 
the last two stages is their concentration not in eschatology but in Christology, which 
allows Barth to “conceptualize how revelation can be fully present in history without 
becoming a predicate of history” (ibid, 21).  In the third stage, Barth focuses on the Holy 
Spirit and the present recognition of the revelation event; in the fourth, upon the event of 
the Incarnation itself.  We are concerned here with the second stage and the beginning of 
the third, the point where Bonhoeffer encounters Barth. 
McCormack convincingly argues that these three latter stages are the unfolding of 
a single material insight—that the changes in Barth’s theology result from his struggle to 
clearly articulate the subject matter (Sache) of theology and not from methodological or 
philosophical commitments.  The “dialectic of veiling and unveiling” names that subject 
matter.  In making this claim, McCormack repudiates the thesis (originating with von 
Balthasar) that Barth moves from dialectic to analogy as his determining thought-form.  
Among the several criticisms he mounts against the older account of Barth’s 
development, three will suffice here (and not all possess equal weight against von 
Balthasar’s complex reading).  First, “dialectic” has several meanings for Barth, so a 
transition from ‘dialectic’ to analogy is too vague to be heuristically useful.  Second, 
Barth’s mature form of analogy (analogia fides) is itself dialectical, grounded in the act 
of “veiling and unveiling.”   The analogy occurs not in “being” (analogia entis) but in 
act, and specifically in the act of knowing, when God graciously permits the creature’s 
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knowledge of God in faith to resemble God’s own self-knowledge.  Third and finally, the 
dialectical ‘method’ of Romans II does give way to a dogmatic one (Göttingen 
Dogmatics, Church Dogmatics), but both are grounded in the dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling. 
McCormack insists that the dialectic of veiling and unveiling, with its ‘actualistic’ 
and epistemic character, is nonetheless real—a Realdialektik.34   For this reason, 
Bonhoeffer (and not him only) accused Barth’s dialectic of being “formal rather than 
real” and sought to unify “act” and “being” in revelation.  The chief differences between 
Barth and Bonhoeffer, I suggest, lie primarily in how each views the role of the church in 
theology and revelation.  Barth’s dogmatic theology returns to the church as authority, as 
the locus of creed and confession. “We are not floating heads, but baptized Christians,” 
he barked at Tillich.  Dogmatics explicates dogma, dogma belongs to the church.  
Bonhoeffer instead linked the church to theology as the ‘living community’ in which the 
Word speaks, “Jesus Christ existing as community.”  Since Bonhoeffer sees this as an 
extension of Barth’s early theology, we need to identify the generative tensions in Barth 
that he exploits.  
 The question here is what it means to know God and how Barth understood the 
very precarious term ‘knowledge.’   Early on, he followed  Herrmann in separating faith 
from knowledge, such that faith is an “experience of God [Gotterlebnis], an immediate 
awareness of the presence and efficacy of the power of life” conditioned by the “inner 
personality” of Jesus, present through the church and in the piety of the biblical authors.35  
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But in August 1914, the Reich declared war for the expressed purpose of national 
expansion and the annexation of foreign lands, a declaration vigorously supported by 
several of Barth’s teachers.   In a letter to Herrmann, Barth lamented that “[from you] we 
learned to acknowledge ‘experience’ as the constitutive principle of knowing and doing 
in the domain of religion…[but the German Christians] ‘experience’ their war as a holy 
war.”36  When his friend Martin Rade defended German ‘self-assertion,’ Barth was 
unmoved: “Something of the deep respect which I felt within myself for the German 
character is forever destroyed…because I see how your philosophy and your Christianity 
breaks into pieces in this war psychosis.”37   Despite a lingering desire to affirm the 
worldly ambitions of religious socialism, Barth wrote again to Rade that the “world, as 
the totality of our life’s conditions, is godless” (ibid).  The profound division of God and 
world turned Barth emphatically against religion as the point where, for the nineteenth 
century, the two intersected and even attained identity.   McCormack summarizes the 
conclusion of these early trends: “Barth had no real interest in the question of the locus of 
revelation in religious subjectivity from this point on.  On the contrary, he would do 
everything in his power to safeguard the distinction between an objectively real Self-
revealing God in human consciousness.”38   
This statement of the problem, faithful to Barth’s concern, is significant for 
several reasons.  First, and most importantly, the question of revelation is here a matter of 
how God can enter into the constructive field of human consciousness without being 
subjected to its rules, becoming an ‘object.’  Second, this way of posing the matter has a 
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negative consequence for any attempt to rest theology in individual religious experience.  
Third, the individual is nonetheless the one for whom revelation ‘happens.’  In the first 
edition of his commentary on Romans, Barth does distinguish sharply between “real” and 
“so-called” history, or between the Kingdom of God and human history, but the dualism 
is relieved by an organic growth of the Kingdom in time; the two histories coincide at 
‘the right time’ (Jenseits) but are never directly identical.39   In Romans II, the opposition 
is sharpened to the point of contradiction, without any real coincidence.  Eliminating the 
last vestiges of the organic metaphor, with its links to pietist and socialist views of the 
religious community, effectively cut Barth’s ties to the direction of protestant theology in 
the previous century.  Religion signified the inward-communal pattern of Bildung, the 
creative individual and the priority of the state.   In Kierkegaard, he found an antidote to 
religion, the judgment of humanity before God and a pitting of the disciple against the 
state.   Yet far more than Kierkegaard, he was concerned with establishing the ‘content’ 
that makes a disciple, beginning with Kant’s subject-object dichotomy as the 
straightjacket from which theology must escape.   
In this respect, and with a mild correction to McCormack, Barth is perhaps best 
understood as combining dominant themes from the thought of Kant and Kierkegaard.  
The primary template is Kantian: the dialectic of veiling and unveiling presupposes the 
clear distinction between known and unknown, between reality conditioned by the 
categories of the understanding and ‘things in themselves.’   The relation of priority 
between the two is of course entirely reversed—the unknown is the Real which 
relativizes the operation of human understanding and its self-assurance.   So beneath the 
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stormy expressionism of Romans II, there is a kind of systematic structure, borrowed 
from Herrmann and modified to Barth’s own ends. Upon the Kantian distinction of 
known and unknown Barth imposes the Kierkegaardian distinction of time and eternity, 
finite and infinite, world and God.  I now turn to a diachronic view of Barth’s thought-
form  
 
From Kant to Barth: Knowledge, History, Ethics. 
  Kant’s philosophy is motivated by two problems: metaphysics and freedom.   
How is metaphysics, as knowledge of the supersensible (God, the soul, immortality), 
possible as a science on par with mathematical physics?  How is freedom possible when 
physics teaches, with mathematical certainty, that the world is wholly determined by 
laws, and how is philosophy to serve the cause of freedom?  Kant attempts to resolve 
both issues through an analysis of self-consciousness.  Metaphysics is not possible 
because cognition cannot extend beyond the limits of the conditions of possible 
experience, where ‘experience’ (Erlebnis) is limited to the sensual.  The definition of 
knowledge contains within itself the exclusion of metaphysics but also resolves the 
question of freedom by placing the inflexible laws which order the world within the 
mind.  That is, the patterning rules of the mind, the “categories of the understanding,” 
account for the apparently rule-bound character of the world.  ‘The world’ is simply a 
product of those mental rules which govern perception. 
 Kant’s transcendental thought project asks what kind of a self could produce 
representations such as those experienced in a reflective self-consciousness like mine.  As 
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Dieter Henrich has suggested in one of his many studies on Kant, a self of this sort has at 
least three distinctive qualities.
40
   First, it must be a unity, otherwise the stream of 
experience would break into an incoherent series of tributaries.  There is a constancy to 
its character, apart from any given thought or sensation, else “I would have as multi-
colored and diverse a self as I have impressions.”41   Second, every thought must be 
incorporated into the overall order of my awareness and does not assimilate itself of its 
own accord.  Consciousness therefore has an active character, is constituted by acts that 
provide for its unity.  Finally, both the unity and the activity of the self point to the fact 
that no single thought or representation necessarily belongs to my conscious life; my 
mind is, in a sense, empty, capable of combining infinite possible representations.  Unity 
means a shared form to my experience; activity means the molding of that experience by 
my mind; emptiness means the freedom from any particular experience.   
 The empty self is thus the formal self or the self defined by the mental rules for 
ordering experience.  Abstracted from concrete experience, what remains is a logical 
pattern or form of the mind, which Kant describes in a table of categories.   Because we 
have no access to things apart from these rules (‘things in themselves’), to say that 
something “is” is merely to define it with reference to the purely formal, empty 
categories of the understanding, i.e., with reference to an act of consciousness.  This link 
between a merely formal act and ‘being’ will become a bone of contention for many of 
Barth’s critics.  As for Kant, let us add two other observations that follow from his 
interpretation of subjectivity.  If the self has no access to the perceived world apart from 
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the categories governing cognition—the categories which prescribe the world in terms of 
rules—it can only ‘know’ itself, paradoxically, through these categories, hence as rule-
bound and unfree.   The line which separates the phenomenal and noumenal worlds runs 
straight through the self, leaving a cleavage in the soul (a fact which did not particularly 
worry Kant but which his students were bent on eliminating).  Without some factor to 
join these two independent worlds, Kant’s whole system seemed rather arbitrary.  After 
all, what is the point of an invisible world which in no way manifests itself?  But it does.  
For Kant, the invisible, undetermined, realm of freedom manifests itself in the moral 
domain.  The ‘categorical imperative’—the unconditional, universal law of conscience to 
love thy neighbor as thyself—reveals the reality of the hidden, noumenal self as free.  It 
thus serves as the “keystone” in the “vault of reason.”42  
 Kant’s successors looked for the unity of reason elsewhere, seeking to ground 
reason in itself (Hegel) or in the pre-rational, mystical identity of self and nature 
(Romanticism).   When these more comprehensive gestures tired after 1848, theologians 
followed the cry of ‘back to Kant.’ Neo-Kantianism departed widely from Kant’s original 
design, but these changes were less significant for Ritschl and his school than for 
Troeltsch and those thinkers still devoted to a metaphysical interpretation of historical 
development.  By the time Herrmann began to adapt Ritschl’s ideas, several new 
challenges were set before theology, perhaps most importantly the decline of confidence 
in the biblical picture of Jesus and a certain rigidity in the Weltanschauung of physics, 
psychology and other natural-scientific disciplines.  In order to escape the sharp edge of 
this skepticism, Ritschl and Herrmann both set out to separate faith from knowledge, 
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Christ from history and freedom from nature.  Kant provided the template for their 
solutions.   
 Distinguishing between faith and knowledge as an theological strategy had good 
precedent in Schleiermacher, who placed religion in the sphere of feeling rather than 
knowledge (Hegel) or morality (Kant).  Ritschl and Herrmann turned back to morality, 
still distinct from conceptual knowledge.   From this perspective, the epistemic, historical 
and ethical questions interlock in very a particular way.   If there can be no metaphysical, 
conceptual knowledge of God (Kant’s limit is acknowledged), how can one ‘know’ God 
at all?  Said Herrmann, “God makes Himself known to us, so that we may recognize 
Him, through a fact, on the strength of which we are able to believe in Him…No doctrine 
can bring it about that there shall arise in our hearts the full certainty that God actually 
exists for us; only a fact can inspire such confidence within us.”43   This ‘fact’ is Jesus 
and his appearance in history, though not the actual figure of Jesus living in Jerusalem 
during the first century A.D.  ‘Jesus’ means the living “Inner Personality” communicated 
by scripture and the community of faith, and ‘history’ means the historical immediacy of 
our relationships with others in community.   The character of that relation and of Jesus’ 
“personality” is the same: unconditional moral demand.  Such an “unconditional” moral 
claim alone has the authority of a “fact.”  “Above all,” writes Herrmann, 
the knowledge that we are bound to unconditional obedience can never die away into sloth...So 
that when we are faced by something that wants to force itself on us as Power over our entire life, 
the doubt arises in our minds whether in it we really find something we can be conscientiously 
willing to obey unconditionally…Therefore, the only God that can reveal Himself to us is the one 
who shows Himself to us in our moral struggle as the Power to which our souls really are subject. 
This is what is vouchsafed to us in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
44
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 The thought-form displayed here is relatively simple.  First, Herrmann consents to 
Kant’s critique of metaphysics and separation of known and unknown.  For Ritschl and 
Herrmann, this was the prerequisite for defending theology from the false God of 
rationalist metaphysics, as well as escaping the rising tides of scientific determinism.   If 
God evades cognition through concepts, then ‘knowledge’ must be deferred to another 
sphere, in this case, morality or ethics, which does a double duty.  Not only does it 
announce the Unconditioned (God), but by linking that awareness to Jesus’ preaching of 
the Kingdom of God, it lifts Christ’s significance above the vicissitudes of historical 
research.  The immediacy of moral consciousness translates into anti-historicism. The 
transcendent manifests itself in moral consciousness, and moral consciousness manifests 
itself in and provides the meaning of Jesus’ ‘personality.’  The question of the historical 
Jesus is simply by-passed.   
 As a student of Herrmann’s, Barth inherits directly this pattern of thought, its 
statement of the problems as well as the solutions.  In his earliest writings, he affirms the 
Kantian division of known and unknown and looks to conscience awakened by the inner 
experience of Jesus’ person and preaching as the locus of theological understanding.  The 
disjunctions of faith and knowledge, Christ and history, ethics and metaphysics are all 
acknowledged by Barth and survive his break with liberalism.  Three factors altered 
Barth’s theology in route to Romans II. The first was his continued struggle with the 
Swiss religious socialists and the problem of social democracy.   Here his sense of the 
righteousness of God as a theological reality deepened beyond its moral expediency 
found in Herrmann.  The second was the support of the German war declaration by his 
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theology professors, particularly Herrmann.  In this, the sense of God’s righteousness was 
darkened into wrath, as judgment against the presumption of religion.  The inability of his 
teachers to separate the inner experience of God from German experience forced Barth to 
set God over against religion as moral or aesthetic experience, as he had already done 
with metaphysics.   The third factor was the discovery of the several conceptual resources 
through which he expressed this disjunction, including Plato, Kant, Overbeck, 
Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky.  Kant and Kierkegaard together provide the substance for 
his new position.   
 Kant is the more influential figure, insofar as the question of revelation is 
determined by a vaguely Kantian description of known and unknown, phenomenal and 
noumenal.  Kierkegaard was not concerned (principally, at any rate) with how God could 
enter into human consciousness, categorically defined.  That is a Kantian question, and it 
is Barth’s fundamental question from Romans to the Church Dogmatics.  At the same 
time, Barth utterly overturns the character of that distinction by mapping Kierkegaard’s 
‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between time and eternity onto the Kantian distinction 
between known and unknown.  What served to establish human autonomy for Kant is 
enlisted for the sake of divine autonomy by Barth, since the Kierkegaardian paradox 
completely reverses the relation of priority between subject and transcendence in Kant.  
He thereby realigns the epistemic, historical and ethical circles without abandoning them.  
 In comparison with Herrmann, then, the more pronounced divergences occur in 
the historical and ethical problems, even if the formal structure is very similar.  The line 
between known and unknown remains; the reality of Christ still transcends history;  the 
relation of ethical immediacy in revelation continues to support the entire edifice.  The 
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key differences we may attribute to the Kierkegaardian paradox.  First, the ‘unknown’ is 
no longer a regulative idea, a blank no-thing, but Reality itself, Eternity, God.  The accent 
no longer falls on the limit of our cognitive abilities defined from within (thus a negative 
definition of the unknown) but rather on the supremacy, the “infinite qualitative 
difference,” of God from humanity, Unknown from known—or in a formulation 
Bonhoeffer wrestles time and again, the ‘incapacity of the finite for the infinite’ (finitum 
incapax infiniti).  The hermeneutical paradox arising from this incommensurability 
between God and creatures is what Barth describes as the “inner dialectic of the subject 
matter and the recognition of it in the wording of the text” or the “connection of the 
words to the Word within the word.”45  The reality manifest in revelation, and in proper 
reading of the Bible, is nothing other than the reality of God, which remains ‘wholly 
other’ from any finite reality.  The veil of the finite, the known, the concrete, must be 
‘seen through’ by an illumination which cannot arise from within ordinary cognitive 
functioning.   
This is the meaning of those three salient images in Romans II, the tangent 
striking the circle, the impact crater of the bombshell, and the prisoner become 
watchman.
46
   The circle illustrates the self-enclosure of consciousness and knowledge.  
Anything which enters the circle becomes its creation and captive, and God touches it 
only as a tangent, a contact without entry, along a single point.  The image of the impact 
crater adds depth to the structural character of this first image, as it concerns the relation 
between ‘form’ and ‘content.’  The known is “empty” and “concave,” lacking in content, 
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like Kant’s categories.  Yet the reality of revelation leaves a visible, tangible trace in the 
sphere of the known.  The impact crater has its own form of concreteness—just not the 
concreteness of the reality to which it points.  Finally, the image of the prisoner become 
watchman colors fully the ethical and theological dimensions implicit in the 
circle/tangent and impact crater.  Consciousness closes humanity in upon itself and apart 
from God, involving us in the illusion of our freedom and autonomy, the illusion that 
there is no ‘outside.’  The precondition for freedom is that someone alerts us to our 
condition, a feat we cannot accomplish on our own.  Only then can the prisoner wait for 
release and the barred door become a way of escape.  The paradox, then, is that a prisoner 
as a prisoner becomes free, and this change of state is what Barth means by justification 
and faith, the subjective and objective sides of the event of revelation.   Only God can 
bring about the recognition of Godself. 
Whereas Herrmann found Jesus’ meaning in his ethical relevance, his similitude, 
to the present, the significance of Jesus for Barth lies in his contradiction of the present.  
Further, where Herrmann sought this experience of Jesus in the conscience of the believer 
awakened by ethical relations with the community of faith, Barth places it entirely 
outside the sphere of experience, including all communally shared moral or aesthetic 
feelings.  He refuses any ‘point of contact,’ and a two-sided predicament emerges from 
this solution at the poles of knower and known.  Given the formally Kantian standpoint of 
Barth’s thinking, the poles of knower and known are naturally bound up with each other.  
The priority goes to God as both subject and object of revelation.   Christ is the tangent, 
the bombshell, the way of escape, the crossing of eternity at the edge of time: “And out of 
what abyss arises our knowledge of these last, unknown things, by which everything is 
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measured, this shattering knowledge of the invisible Judge in whose hands lies our 
condemnation?” (ibid, 83).  It is not, says Barth, “a point among other points,” but rather 
that “Jesus Christ is the point at which it can be seen that all other points form one line of 
supreme significance” (ibid, 96).    
This dualism, which is really the duality of time and eternity concentrated into 
Christ, has a parallel in its human perception  and acceptance, expressed by the Pauline 
phrases “in Adam” and “in Christ” (ibid, 165ff.).  Barth’s way of treating these two 
modes of subjectivity conflates the epistemic, historical, and ethical circles, for the 
obvious reason that there is no mediation of the unknown within the known, of Christ 
(God) within history, and this makes parsing out the layering of the ‘circles’ difficult.  
Nonetheless, we may discuss the epistemic in terms of the Adam/Christ typology, the 
historical in terms of how Christ’s death and resurrection creates this dualistic awareness, 
and the ethical in terms of the “imperative” conjoined to this “indicative” (ibid, 224).  A 
final component of Barth’s theology in Romans II, which stretches across all three circles 
and is of great importance for understanding Bonhoeffer, is the relation between the 
Church, history and community.  I will discuss each in in turn. 
 
The Substructure of Romans II 
The Epistemic Circle: Adam and Christ 
 In some of the most intensely tangled pages of Romans II, Barth treats the nature 
of theological knowledge in the language of two ‘subjects,’ Adam and Christ (ibid, 167ff, 
181ff.).    ‘Adam’ represents (more or less) the Kantian subject.  He is “transcendental” 
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and “has no existence on the plane of history and psychological analysis” (ibid, 170).   
The transcendental subject has no place ‘in’ the world because ‘the world’ is what it 
constitutes through the operation of its sense-organizing apparatus.   This is perhaps the 
best way to understand Barth’s claim that “the world is our whole existence, as it has 
been, and is, conditioned by sin…That is to say, there is a world ‘without us’ which has 
broken loose from the world ‘within us’ and what is in us is mirrored again in what is 
without us” (ibid, 168).  In short, ‘the world’ as we know it is a product of ‘the Fall,’ 
which occurs “behind” time, and this “invisible operation of the old world is illustrated in 
observable facts,” just as the transcendental subject is known only indirectly through the 
appearances it generates (ibid, 172).  As subject, Christ is also transcendental, a new 
subject “from above” or the “invisible and nonhistorical power” of faith, which, as Spirit, 
“provides faith with content which is not a thing in time…a void and negation” (ibid, 
151, 158). Righteousness and sin alike are “timeless and transcendental” (ibid, 171).    
 If two subjects now occupy the transcendental sphere, how are they related?  
“Dialectically” or by “negation” or “dissolution” (Aufhebung) is Barth’s difficult refrain 
(ibid, 188).  He insists that the two do not stand “side by side” and are “utterly separated” 
by their “content” (ibid, 176).  The “existence” of one is the “non-existence” of the other, 
and Adam has “no separate, positive existence” (ibid, 165, 171).  If the new subject 
corresponds to a new object, for which Adam has no capacity, which the transcendental 
subject cannot cognize and create from its own resources, how does this transition occur?  
With this question we move from the subjective dimension of the Adam/Christ typology 
to the objective side of Christ’s death and resurrection, and then back to the subjective 
decision of God in election and justification, the site of ‘ethics’ in Romans II.      
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The Historical Circle: The Paradox of the Cross 
 Revelation for Barth means the breaking open (the “crisis”) of the circle of 
knowledge established in self-consciousness.  But because the Eternal never becomes the 
temporal, the Unknown known, this event can only occur through a specific kind of 
medium.  Neither Hegel nor Schleiermacher, Troeltsch nor Herrmann, doubted that 
revelation was mediated, but rather than suturing together time and eternity, the world 
and God with feeling or morality or a general category of being, Barth drives them apart, 
and that division, expressed as the ‘righteousness of God,’ is what comes to light in 
Christ.  Consequently, Barth has to explain how something worldly (Jesus) can reveal 
what is unworldly (God).   The death of Christ upon the cross is the catalyst for the event 
of revelation, Barth claims, to the extent that we comprehend in it our distance from God: 
“When we recognize in suffering and brokenness it is God whom we encounter, that we 
have been cast up against him…” (ibid, 157).  It is those “rare but nevertheless possible 
cases which crop up, where one person dies for another; a mother during childbirth, a 
man from occupational exhaustion, a doctor or missionary in service, a soldier on the 
battlefield.  Certainly, the death of Jesus as a historically effective event and as the object 
of such experiences (‘martyrdom’) also belongs to this series of directly communicating 
self-sacrifices” (ibid 138, 263).    
Even so, such events, including the cross, have no theological self-evidence.  How 
is their ‘eternal’ parabolic meaning discovered?   Barth presses a contrast between Christ 
and the self as “unobservable positive x, contrasted with the death of Christ on my behalf 
which I die with him, is the hinge upon which, and by which, the supreme movement 
from old to new turns and is effected.”  But how is it that the hinge finally turns? By 
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inference or deduction? “The invisible constitution of this world, if the minus sign be 
changed into plus, is the constitution of the new world.”  How is it that the cross moves 
us to the negation which is affirmation?  How is it that a person sees themselves in Christ 
so as to see also the righteousness of God? 
 Barth’s dilemma is apparent.  He wants the phenomenon to bear its own 
meaning—that is the burden of every appeal to immediacy.  Yet he cannot allow any 
direct identification of the content (Sache) with the medium in its historical appearance.  
If he cannot appeal to an immediate identification of the medium with the reality it 
signifies, nor to a prior grasp of the content which is then correlated to the medium—the 
Kulturprotestant strategies of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘inwardness’—then all that remains is a 
subjective principle of recognition foreign to the human subject.  Enter the Holy Spirit.  
With this recourse to an extra-subjective non-objective principle, Barth has sealed fast the 
three circles and the problem of mediation into a closed circle of a different sort:  
The Holy Spirit is the operation of God in faith, the creative and redemptive power of the 
Kingdom of Heaven, which is nigh at hand…He provides faith with content which is not a thing in 
time; if it were a thing, it be nothing but a void and a negation…He is invisible, outside the 
continuity of the visible human subject and beyond all psychological analysis…He is the subject 
of faith (ibid, 158).   
The relating of a “new subject” to a “new object” thus occurs by an act conditioning our 
consciousness which coincides with but is not of itself our act of consciousness.  Apart 
from this, neither the subject nor the object are real.  Their reality, which is the reality of 
revelation, “exists” only in the act of faith, which is an act of the Holy Spirit. 
 This, roughly speaking, is what critics described as Barth’s “actualism,” 
sometimes phrased as “decisionism.”  “Actualism” covers a wider sweep of conceptual 
connections and problems, including divine as well as human being, and the kind of 
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knowing that ‘corresponds’ to that being.  “Decisionism” by contrast points narrowly to 
the epistemic paradox that the human act (decision) of faith seems to create its own 
objects—that it ‘chooses’ for a reality to which it has no access prior to that leap of faith.  
For Barth, so far from confusing God and humanity, actualism secures divine sovereignty 
in revelation, a fact which brings us to the final structural element of his early theology: 
election and ethics.  The event of revelation occurs because God elects to reveal Godself, 
to constitute ‘new subjects.’  “Grace is the power of obedience; it is theory and practice, 
conception and birth; it is the indicative which carries with it a categorical imperative” 
(ibid, 207).   
 
The Ethical Circle: Election  
 This link between “indicative” and “imperative” solidifies Barth’s interpretation 
of the basic pattern inherited from Herrmann and relies upon the personalist nature of 
revelation: that God is not an object but a person, that revelation is not “fact” but 
commandment.   The true commandment, “Love the Lord Thy God,” is a demand for 
repentance and a negation, since it asks what is impossible for humanity—“Thy will be 
done, on earth as it is in heaven.”  As the primary ethical act, it is “intellectual” and 
“formal” only, thus “invisible.”    It is the “negative possibility” of worship.  From this, 
and from it alone, flows the “positive possibility” and second commandment, “Love Thy 
Neighbor.”  The meaning of this charity also lies in its “form” rather than its “content,” in 
the fact of ‘giving over’ and ‘giving away’ which echoes the primary act of repentance 
(ibid, 459).   Ethics as command (Love!) coincides with the act of election and the gift of 
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faith so as to give the event its real content.  In the suffering of Jesus, one hears by faith 
the whole of the law, is set under judgment and freed.   
Herrmann circumvented the historical problem by collapsing the historical circle 
into the epistemic and ethical ones, letting moral awareness provide the criterion for 
Jesus’ significance (ethics overcomes history) and the content of the divine (ethics 
overcomes metaphysics).  Barth replaces the human subjective pole of moral awareness 
with the divine subjective pole of the Holy Spirit.  Ethics as the ‘great negation’ gives the 
meaning of the cross (it overcomes history) and the free, hidden word of God (it 
overcomes metaphysics).  Herrmann’s method assumes intersection, God within 
humanity as conscience; Barth’s assumes disjunction, consciousness as prison to 
humanity and a fortress against God.  Structurally, the combination of Kant and 
Kierkegaard could scarcely have led to another conclusion.   
 It is this particular combination that breeds the difficulties besetting Romans II, 
above all the charge that Barth had shortchanged the incarnation.
47
  By way of summary, 
I want to detail briefly how this accusation might arise and also how it might lead to a 
position like Bonhoeffer’s.  Recall Bonhoeffer’s (1927) critique: “the ‘dialectic’ of 
dialectical theology is formal rather than real and risks neglecting the historicity of Jesus” 
(IX, 441).  We have seen that Barth’s structuring of the ‘dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling,’ according to the tropes of circle/tangent, impact crater, and prison, depend 
upon the activity and emptiness of consciousness as theorized by Kant.  In doing so, 
Barth also accepts Kant’s formalism, i.e., the denial of substantial reality to the world and 
the affirmation of its ‘as if’ character.  The result, contrary to those senses of mediation 
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from which German liberalism set out, is a rather complete denial of mediation: 
cognitively, ontologically, socially.  God is unknown.  God does not enter ‘the world.’ 
All ‘social-religious’ claims to the Kingdom are void.     
 Lest we side too quickly with Bonhoeffer’s gripe that this dialectic is “formal 
rather than real,” what keeps Barth from sliding into theological skepticism is the 
Kierkegaardian supplement to his Kantian ground-clearing, an ‘existential’ 
presupposition (Ansatz) of the “superior being” of God, whose being is in act.  This vital 
presupposition affords Barth the theological realism distinguishing him from both forms 
of liberal mediation—the cumulative effect of the reversal of priority between thought 
and reality wrought by his use of Kierkegaard.  Nonetheless, Barth eventually admits that 
he emphasized God’s transcendence at the expense of the incarnation.  To style the 
dialectic of veiling and unveiling in terms of the dialectic of time and eternity—to impose 
Kierkegaard’s existential distinction on top of Kant’s epistemic one—could only have 
yielded this result, since ‘existence’ really belongs only to God.  The ‘as if’ character of 
the ‘world’ or ‘objects’ in Kant is converted into a virtual denial of the world’s reality: 
“All that stands between beginning and end is excluded for us.”48  When consciousness is 
conceived as pure act, being is reduced to ‘being for’ such a consciousness.  Actualism in 
this sense leads to formalism, and the problem is only compounded when a divine 
actualism is mapped over it through a revised doctrine of election.  As Bonhoeffer will 
later argue, act seems to require the complement of being.   
The Being of Christ: From Individual to Gemeinschaft.  
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 Finally, we should note the extent to which Barth’s portrayal of the problem 
amounts to a kind of thoroughgoing individualism.  The act he begins with is the act of 
the transcendental self in its loneliness.  The ‘methodological’ forsaking of mediation 
forces an exclusion of ‘history,’ of ‘world,’ of ‘pen- and ante-ultimate,’ of ‘religion,’ 
even, perhaps, of ‘church’ and ‘sacrament.’   The eschatological dualism of Adam and 
Christ translates into a similar ecclesiological dualism, the ‘church of Esau’ and the 
‘church of Jacob,’ the church in time and the true church in eternity, between which there 
is only disjunction (ibid, 340ff.).  The visible church is identified with “Israel,” “law” and 
“religion,” with human attempts to fabricate God.  Here too, there is a “dissolution” 
(Aufhebung) of sorts, a passage from above: “The Church is the fellowship of MEN who 
proclaim the Word of God and hear it…for the Church is condemned by that which 
establishes it, and is broken to pieces upon its foundation” (ibid, 341).   Its movement is 
analogous to the movement of ‘repentance’ and ‘worship,’ and insofar as it fulfills this 
vocation, it echoes to the world the awakening which Christ first thrusts upon the church.  
By the same movement of judgment which divides the individual, the church is not only 
divided into hidden and visible communions, but its visible communion is shattered, 
“broken into pieces upon its foundation.”  
 In the later chapters of Romans, Barth’s protests against the political totality, the 
Romantic whole, are constant and pungent.  In an exemplary passage, he writes  
It must be Fellowship (Gemeinschaft) which is encountered in the community (Gemeinde): but 
this means an encountering of the OTHER in the full existentiality of his OTHERNESS.   In the 
neighbor it must be the ONE who is disclosed.  Thus understood, Fellowship is not an aggregate 
of individuals, nor is it an organism.  In fact, Fellowship is no concrete thing at all…Fellowship is 
the ONE which lies behind every ‘other…Fellowship is communio—sanctorum!  There is no 
other communio; and there are no other sancti. (ibid, 443).   
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Barth’s attack on the church, its ‘tribulation,’ becomes an attack on all visible forms of 
community in that they implicitly or explicitly claim for themselves a false legitimacy, a 
righteousness of their own.  Only in Christ is there real community.  “As Fellowship, the 
community is constituted by Christ, the One, the INDIVIDUAL” (Das Individuum, der 
Eine, Christus konstituiert die Gemeinde als Gemeinschaft) (ibid, 444).  The dualism of 
time and eternity forces this community into non-existence, or into a true existence 
leaving over no earthly remainder.  The absence of any real mediation, which is the 
consequence of the actualistic-formalistic strategy, reduces the neighbor to a cipher for a 
divine immediacy, ethics to an ‘intellectual’ act (“repentance”) rather than a concrete 
commandment, and  seems to eliminate any traditional sense of sacrament (‘real 
presence’).    
All of this results from the broadly Kantian account of the subject-object 
dichotomy which frames the dialectic of veiling and veiling.  By drawing on the category 
of “sociality” and existential phenomenology rather than neo-Kantianism, Bonhoeffer 
aims at a real mediation of revelation in the category of the church and a concrete ethics 
focused in the sacrament, sanctification in addition to justification and election.  In a 
revision of Hegel’s phrase, he identifies the church—the concrete, living sanctorum 
communio—and revelation with “Jesus Christ existing as community.”  Barth’s dualism 
of two subjects (Adam and Christ) and two churches (Esau and Jacob) is partially 
overcome in this way. For Bonhoeffer, in the Gemeinde the Gemeinschaft becomes 
concrete and visible and real.  Christ, the ‘Individual,’ does not merely ‘constitute’ the 
community but exists as the community. At the intersection of Barth’s formalism and 
individualism, Bonhoeffer began to seize upon an alternative.   The eschatological or 
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eternal location of the new subject, of Christ, of the church and of ethical commandment 
leaves the world untouched.  Barth has removed religion but given no concrete direction 
to the church lost in the world.  Bonhoeffer aims to supply it.   
44 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 BEYOND BARTH AND BERLIN: REVELATION AND THE ‘VOLUNTARY-
FORM’ OF SPIRIT. 
  
Barth intended a complete and final divorce of Christ from culture.  Bonhoeffer 
accepted the break but not its terms, fearing that the world vacated by Barth’s God was 
the bourgeois German world.  Not only were Luther’s children left out in the cold, but the 
incarnation itself seemed void.  If Barth hammered at the mandarin house from the 
outside, Bonhoeffer did not wish it to come down on his own head.   The cultural border 
between the Swiss teacher and his German pupil tracks with other significant distinctions, 
especially that between Reformed and Lutheran sensibilities.  It will become clear that 
Bonhoeffer’s ‘Lutheran’ arguments, much like Barth’s appeals to Calvin, are means of 
organizing deeper theological decisions and political motivations.  I will turn to those 
theological decisions in a moment, but a further word on political motivation is first in 
order.  The integrity of politics and theory in the German university at this time has 
already been discussed.  Bonhoeffer’s mandarin outlook never faded entirely, and he later 
relied on his family’s Bürgerlich credentials as a defense against accusations of 
“subverting the people (Volk).”1 
 Like many in the modernist mandarin minority, his parents were ambivalent about 
the War, as well as the Republic and its general disorder.  His father supported 
Stresemann and Brüning but tolerated the SDP affiliation of Karl-Friedrich, the eldest 
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son.  The second eldest, Walter, likewise flirted with socialism but settled into the more 
moderate German Democratic Party (DDP).  If, in Dietrich’s words, the war had created 
“four spiritual generations” within Germany, the revolutionary fervor seemed to cool 
with each subsequent generation, at least in their family, whose relation to both Kaiser 
and Republic remained tenuous (X, 361).  The Bonhoeffers mourned the defeat of 
Germany and were outraged at the stipulations of the Treaty of Versaille, yet none “shed 
a tear” for the banished Wilhelm II.2  Dietrich wrote to his parents that “I hardly believe 
one can accept [the terms of peace] in their present form” (IX, 29).  Certainly, his 
participation in the Youth Movement, with its militarism and nationalism, may have 
dampened sympathies for the Republic.
3
  On the other hand, he vented indignation at the 
assassination of Rathenau, and the “right-wing Bolshevik scoundrels” among his peers 
(IX, 49).  The radicalism of the Youth Movement and his fraternity eventually forced 
Bonhoeffer to sever ties with both. 
Maturing under a variety of social and personal pressures made for his unique 
personality, too liberal for Kaiser or radical right and too conservative for Social 
Democracy, nationalist enough for the Reichswehr but not for the Youth Movement.  As 
the youngest son, he proved too obedient to defy his father’s politics but fiercely 
independent enough to pursue a career that perplexed the patriarch and annoyed his 
brothers.  Where his father and brothers inclined to science, he was a lover of literature 
and music, and the impress of Bildung is evident early on.  Even in the brief span 
between his last years in the Gymnasium (1922) and the dissertation at Berlin (1927), that 
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spiritual pattern undergoes three decisive transitions.  The first concerns the philosophical 
idiom of Bildung, as he turns from a more ‘subjective’ or Romantic to an ‘objective’ and 
Idealist disposition.  Despite revising his epistemological framework, Bonhoeffer’s 
mandarin aesthetic continued to inform his political and theological perception in vital 
ways.  From this emerges a second significant transition, in which aesthetics provides the 
generative context for his “discovery” of the church (Bethge).  Without these two prior 
changes, it would be difficult to imagine the third, a transition from liberal to dialectical 
theology under the influence of Karl Barth.  After tracing these three broad tendencies in 
Bonhoeffer’s early formation (I), I will turn to his criticism of Barth (II) and finally to the 
rudiments of his distinctive position as it emerges in student essays, sermon and 
correspondence (III). 
  
I.  Three Trends in Bonhoeffer’s Early Development 
  
As the preceding analysis of the German paradigm highlights, there were at least 
two acceptable idioms for the values concentrated into Bildung, one Romantic, the other 
Idealist, and both laden with heavy political and social bearings.  Despite their massive 
intellectual differences, Schleiermacher and Hegel were but variations on a cultural 
theme.  While Kant’s philosophy returned to favor after 1848, Neo-Kantianism was 
thoroughly suffused with Romantic and Idealist elements and operated in a climate 
charged with the political and aesthetic aims of the prerevolutionary period, however 
disappointed and chastened.  By the 1920s, many academics looked back on the 
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resurgence of Kantianism as a shallow accommodation to the scientistic, industrial 
impulse pervading the last decades of the nineteenth century.  Nonetheless, 
transcendental Idealism offered an alternative expression for mandarin identity well into 
Weimar’s adulthood.  The first transition in Bonhoeffer’s thinking amounts to a 
movement from Romantic to Idealist philosophy, from subjective to objective emphases.  
Given Barth’s consistent commitment to a broadly Kantian framework, we can see how 
this prepares the way for his appreciation of dialectical theology.   
 
‘Great Sentiments Alone Remain Eternal’: From Romantic Subjectivism to Idealist 
Objectivity.   
His attraction to Kant seems to have a single impetus in coursework at Tübingen 
during 1923, where Bonhoeffer studied with Karl Heim and took a seminar on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason with Karl Groos.  A different emphasis appears in his 1918 
matriculation essay, which reflects a popular opposition between two types of 
personalities, implicitly associated with Romantic and Idealist, subjective and objective, 
educated and lower middle class.   Here the Romantic and subjective are prized; when he 
enrolls at Berlin, Kant and objectivity have moved to the forefront.  It is tempting, given 
the rather abrupt change in disposition and its dating (1922/3), to identify Bonhoeffer’s 
first transition with the “New Objectivity” (Neue Sachlickeit) arising around the time of 
‘relative stabilization,’ but this seems unlikely for at least two reasons.  First, the 
positions of Heim and Groos—the evident influences on Bonhoeffer—were quite distant 
from the innovations of the Bauhaus, Paul Klee, or the German theatre.  Second, if the 
New Objectivity was principally an artistic movement, Bonhoeffer’s aesthetic sensibility 
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remained characteristically Romantic, as we will see in a moment.
4
  A comparison of the 
matriculation essay with correspondence from his Tübingen years illustrates the shift. 
 The matriculation essay (dated January 1923) on the Latin poetry of Horace and 
Catullus begins with a methodological assertion: “Even if we valiantly attempt to be 
objective, in truth we can only offer subjective opinions” (IX, 198).  Catullus possesses 
this subjective orientation, Horace its opposite, and Bonhoeffer quickly sides with the 
former.  In true mandarin fashion, epistemological dispositions are imbued with class 
values.  The “unemotional” and “contemplative” Horace was raised the son of a 
freedman, who by economic success managed to send one child to the better Roman 
schools.  Catullus, who “oscillates from one extreme to the other,” was born into a 
privileged family and highly educated from birth (IX, 199).   Bonhoeffer does seem to 
appreciate Horace’s sense of humor but places the two at the extremes of a continuum, 
marking two “completely different types of souls” from which everything in their poetry 
follows.   “One is revolutionary; the other is conservative,” and they “respond to the 
world” in utterly different ways (IX, 200).   Bonhoeffer sides with the revolutionary and 
emotional over the conservative and contemplative.    
 In comparing their poetic styles, he may as well have written an essay on Kant 
and Schleiermacher.   Horace “assumes a vantage point that is external to the space” and 
permits the “domination of the Ego” (IX, 201).  Catullus poetically conceives in the 
“midst of a vital point of life that is suddenly illuminated,” limiting himself to a part and 
“absorbing it fully and creatively” through an “inner melding” of the poet and the subject 
matter (IX, 201).  Like Kant’s transcendental ‘I,’ Horace stands outside the world and 
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constitutes it as an object by “selecting, sorting and comparing” in a “reflective method” 
(ibid).  In a dramatic description of the ‘thing in itself,’ Bonhoeffer complains that 
Horace “relegates experience to the backdrop of a stage” and hides that which “gives 
rise” to the work (IX, 202).  For him, nothing comes from the “moment of life” which 
remains a “concealed backdrop,” colored with clear thoughts but lacking temperament, 
emotion and “sentimentality” (ibid).   
 The organic analogy is expressed powerfully in the account of Catullus.  In 
contrast to the “broad and shallow” lyric of Horace, which Bonhoeffer likens to painting, 
Catullus exemplifies the “depth” and “assimilation” to reality consistent with sculpture or 
the “simplicity” (Einfachheit) of an “emotional method” for which aesthetic experience is 
“mirrored in the soul,” so that “the poem is a necessary immediate sequel to the 
experience” (IX, 203).    His passion “approaches madness,” and the “disintegration of 
his entire inner life” follows the “separation after union.” 5   Romantic organicism bleeds 
through in effusive flourishes as the essay wears on, piling praise on Catullus’ attention 
to irony, friendship, travel and, most importantly, nature. “Nature is personified” (IX, 
206).  Individuality shows through, “but the ‘I’ never does,” for nature is the actor, and 
the ego “dissolves into nature and becomes one with it” (ibid).  Organicity, naturalness, 
simplicity, unity, feeling, immediacy and depth are all quintessentially Romantic tropes, 
in distinction from Idealism.   
The political edge of these aesthetic values also peers through Bohoeffer’s 
evaluation.  Horace’s “pathetic fantasies” of a “poetic crown” are judged “French like,” 
and linked to his ordering of subject matter prior to its composition (IX, 212).  With 
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 “All people can restrain their passion and shut themselves off from it, but to struggle through all that is 
beautiful and terrifying and not be afraid takes an enormous amount of emotional power. At the end of this 
struggle Catullus is has mastered it and was victorious…He was not crushed by his passion.”  IX, 206.  
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Catullus, the “order arises organically” in the process of composition.  Horace longs for 
Rome’s lost power and importance and for the education of the people.   Catullus “writes 
because he must,” for friends rather than posterity, forgetting “themes of the state” and 
the education of the people—he “lived for himself and was then destroyed” (IX, 213).  
Writing after the defeat of the Reich and under a government of foreign design, the air of 
mandarin despair and nostalgia could not be more transparent.     Bonhoeffer’s 
concluding analysis is exemplary:  “On a purely emotional level, I find contemplative 
poetry like Horace’s to be an absurdity and an attempt at cultivating later culture.  
Reflections have never conquered the world, but emotions have.  The most impressive 
thoughts fade away, but great emotions remain eternal” (IX, 214).  The truth of that 
statement perhaps became visible only in 1933.  
 In the meantime, philosophy came to the center of his attention.  A seminar on 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with Groos (winter 1923) seems to have withered the 
rhetoric of subjectivism, and in a note taken on Schleiermacher’s Speeches around the 
same time, emotion already recedes in the interest of ‘truth,’ although even here truth 
concerns “individual determination” and not merely the existence of universally valid 
judgments (IX, 215).  Between the summer of 1923 and April 1924, Bonhoeffer studied 
in Tübingen, taking courses from other prominent figures there such as Adolf Schlatter.  
From this point forward, the Romantic aesthetic of the matriculation essay is wedded to 
an interest in objectivity, the character of which I will explore more completely under his 
transition from liberal to dialectical theology.  For the moment, we may observe that after 
a year of college, he has taken up with Horace. 
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‘Immersed in Antiquity’: Bourgeois Aesthetics and the Discovery of the Church. 
During the second semester at Tübingen, amid tremendous political turmoil, 
Bonhoeffer planned a trip to Rome and departed on April 3.  In a comment 
foreshadowing the future direction of his theology, his Rome diary notes, “I think I’m 
beginning to understand the concept of ‘church’” (IX, 89).  The light of that discovery 
was hardly the philosophy of Kant or Heim, but rather the mandarin aesthetic already 
pronounced in his youth.  “Antiquity is not completely dead” (IX, 84).  Nor, he mused, 
were its gods.  The air of Romantic melancholy is sometimes amusing: “I spent an hour 
sitting on an overturned pillar…[and was] transplanted into the classical world” (IX, 87).   
Bonhoeffer consistently expresses a range of aesthetic values, including “naturalness,” 
the “absence of reconstruction,” “uniformity” and “wholeness,” which are ideally 
fulfilled by Rome itself, “the Rome of antiquity, the Rome of the Middle Ages, and 
equally the Rome of the present…the fulcrum of European culture and European life” 
(IX, 99-100).  And “Rome as a whole” is “epitomized” in St. Peter’s (ibid).  The church 
crystallizes Romantic vision. 
 Bonhoeffer’s perception of ‘the church’ was surely colored by a pallet of values 
common among educated Germans.  A cross reference of his response to various pieces 
of art and architecture (the context of his ‘discovery’ of the church) with Baedeker’s tour 
guide would help to draw these connections more fully, but that is a needlessly intensive 
task.
6
  At any rate, the form of the church in its universality was not the only attraction 
for Bonhoeffer.   Of the St. Maria Maggiore he writes, “I will probably come to this 
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 Karl Baedeker, Southern Italy and Sicily, with exursions to Sardinia, Malta, and Cordu: a Handbook for 
Travelers,  (New York: Scribners, 1912). 
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church more often to observe the life of the church rather than to look at it from an 
artistic standpoint, even though it is among the most beautiful churches” (IX, 90).     The 
“life” he has in mind here centers around confession as the “concretization of the idea of 
the church” and “a way for primitive people to talk about God” (IX, 89).  Similarly, his 
debate with a local priest concerns the issue of sacrifice in the mass.  He objects to the 
“symbolization” and “spiritualization”—and thus “falsification”—of those ‘objective’ 
theological facts incomprehensible to modern humanity (IX, 91).
7
   Protestantism, he 
claims, at least has the advantage of “letting the symbols fall away.”  Presumably, 
Bonhoeffer is talking about what is at stake in both confession and mass, the mystery of 
guilt and justification.  In this way, “Catholic dogma veils every ideal thing in 
Catholicism, without knowing what it is doing.  There is a huge difference between 
confession and dogmatic teachings about confession—unfortunately also between 
‘church’ and the ‘church’ in dogmatics” (IX, 93). 
 This judgment follows his rebuke of the priest for falling into the “vicious circle” 
of Catholic reasoning that “confuses logical and faith-based knowledge” (ibid).  Kant 
provides his sure defense, and he confidently rejects the appeal to teleology as a 
theological proof.  So in the end Kantian objectivity does have its part to play in 
Bonhoeffer’s discovery of the church, but only in the sense that it prohibits a total 
embrace of Catholicism.  Specifically, it drives him towards a sense of immediacy, reality 
and authenticity.  He frowns upon what he perceives to be the rehearsed, ritualized shell 
of Catholicism, as well as the bureaucratic deadlock of the Protestant state churches 
(Landeskirchen).  His attitude toward theological matters is reflected in his aesthetic 
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sensibilities.  The groundless assertions of art historians are judged as unnecessary and 
misguided: “When one doesn’t have to interpret, one should just leave it alone…One 
either intuitively [intuitiv] sees the right thing or one doesn’t” (IX, 103).  This either/or 
provides a further touchstone for his reception of Barth.   
 
“Acceptably Reactionary”: From Liberal to Dialectical Theology    
 Tübingen and Rome left a permanent stamp on Bonhoeffer, the first tempering his 
Romanticism with philosophical objectivity, the second illuminating the church.  
However significant these developments are in retrospect, they pale in comparison to his 
first year at Berlin, beginning in the summer of 1924.  Bonhoeffer now found himself at 
home again, but without a decisive intellectual orientation.  His preference for systematic 
theology had been somewhat disappointed at Tübingen, and in Berlin he looked forward 
to a combination of systematic and historical thinking in von Harnack, Holl and Seeberg.  
During the summer semester he took courses with von Harnack (History of Dogma) and 
Holl (Church History, Protestant Confessions), but aside from a dogmatics course with 
Titius, Bonhoeffer did not study theology in earnest until the summer of 1925.  In what 
we may judge to be his most significant semester, he took two courses with Holl, two 
with Seeberg, and one with von Harnack.  At the same time, he had become acquainted 
with the theology of Karl Barth, whose impression was to remain deep and long-lasting.   
In that case, we must speak of a transition from liberal to dialectical theology with some 
reserve, since his attraction to Barth preceded any thoroughgoing methodological or 
dogmatic commitments.  Marking that transition is complicated by the fact that we have 
only one essay from before his summer 1925 turn to Barth, written for Harnack’s seminar 
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on the topic of “The Jewish Element in First Clement.”  Even then Bonhoeffer possessed 
notes on Barth from a friend in Göttingen and had read the commentary on Romans 
(1922) and some recent essays (The Word  of God and Theology, 1924) during a bout of 
influenza over the winter months.  What can we infer about his theological commitments 
prior to the summer semester of 1925? 
 Very little is to be gathered from his time at Tübingen, although two basic 
attitudes come across with some consistency, and a third is at least in evidence.  These 
spell out further that initial transition to ‘objectivity’ and the shape of his early liberalism.  
First, he regards the distinction of faith and knowledge as appropriately Protestant, while, 
secondly, insisting on objectivity and the primacy of historical objectivity in particular.   
Finally, he expresses a few opinions regarding the church, that the Protestant church 
should have remained a “large sect,” and that Catholicism falsifies the reality of the 
church through its mediations.   Taken together and within the general ideological frame 
of mandarin identity, there is a vague coherence to these thoughts, sharpened in Berlin.   
The differentiation of faith and knowledge is the governing perspective, 
underwritten by a broadly Kantian epistemology.   An exchange with his student 
colleague, Wilhelm Dreier, hints at the flavor of Bonhoeffer’s theological position.  He 
apparently regarded faith as “only something that is nonexistent, purely negative” and 
thought “that the self-revelation of God is out of the question” (IX, 132).8  There is no 
way of determining exactly what Bonhoeffer was rejecting in the concept of self-
revelation, but he is, in any case, standing his Kantian ground.  What is significant from 
the standpoint of Bonhoeffer’s mature theology is the scheme which foregrounds the 
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‘problem of being an Ich.’   
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productive power of consciousness and connects it “with its opposite, injustice, or grace 
with sin” (IX, 134).  He will offer a phenomenological interpretation of that problem later 
under the categories of ‘sociality,’ ‘act’ and ‘being’ and in concert with the central 
concept of self-revelation.  Here, however, that concept is denied and the categorical 
scheme transfigured into a theory of religion as a “universal value” that prioritizes the 
“logical sphere” (over will or feeling, for example) (ibid).  God seems to be confused 
with the categorical scheme itself, and Dreier can even ask whether God’s existence is 
really necessary in Bonhoeffer’s solution. 
 It would be interesting to trace these attitudes back to Bonhoeffer’s professors, to 
Groos, Maier or Heim, but by 1925 his liberal ideas have come decisively under the 
influence of Karl Barth.
9
  Given the absence of essays from Tübingen or his other courses 
in 1924, the essay for von Harnack can at best signal for us another set of theological 
orientations and not a clue as to his total framework.   Bonhoeffer certainly seems to be 
working within von Harnack’s own systematic and historical presuppositions, however. 
 As Bethge reports, Bonhoeffer experienced in his first reading of Barth a 
“liberation” from the liberal theology of his professors.10  In what did that liberation 
consist, and what path did this exodus take over the next few years?  First, Bonhoeffer’s 
theology reflects a wholesale reorientation towards the theological categories of the 
‘Word of God’ and divine self-revelation, as Barth developed them between 1922 and 
1925.  The essay on the spiritual reading of scripture from his summer 1925 seminar with 
Seeberg offers a striking example.  At the same time, Bonhoeffer was quick to register a 
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fundamental criticism of Barth’s emerging dogmatic position, evident in the Göttingen 
lectures, which to the Lutheran theologian’s mind signaled a “relapse into servitude” (IX, 
154).  Similar language appears years later in the famous accusation that Barth had sunk 
into a “positivism of revelation,” rather than completing the revolution he inaugurated.  
Was this diagnosis present, perhaps only in the bud, from the beginning?   Although the 
road is far from straight, the basic terms of Bonhoeffer’s relation to Barth’s theology are 
laid down in the earliest reception and guide him though both dissertations to 
Finkenwalde and Tegel.  In both the prison writings and in his dissertations we find a 
similar halo of critical terminology associated with the indictment of ‘positivism’ (e.g., 
‘formalism’ or ‘psychologism’).  Clarifying this contentious issue will go a long way 
towards revealing the unity of the dissertations and their argumentative structure. 
 
II. Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Barth  
 
Bonhoeffer clearly positioned himself alongside Barth while attempting to 
salvage something of the Berlin spirit, but his initial reaction to Barth was not instant and 
unflinching devotion.  After his summer 1925 encounter with Barth, Bonhoeffer mounted 
a sharp criticism that echoed throughout the rest of his writings and personal dealings 
with the Swiss theologian.  Two factors complicate any attempt to decipher the meaning 
of this critique.  First, we have few direct references to Barth in Bonhoeffer’s writings 
prior to the 1927 dissertation and licentiate theses, even though Barth’s influence is 
apparent on nearly every page after 1925.  One might be inclined then to simply forgo 
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speculative reconstruction of this early work and begin with the dissertations.  I have 
already suggested the risks in this approach and hope to show that the student writings 
can contribute decisively to an historical understanding of Bonhoeffer’s theology.  
Assuming that this is the case, one might go directly to the textual sources where 
Bonhoeffer’s critique of Barth is clear and work back from there.  Here we face a second 
and considerable obstacle, for such references are few before (and after) 1930.  It is no 
exaggeration to say that Bonhoeffer’s criticism of Barth, if not his relation to Barth quite 
generally, remains clouded by longstanding disagreement over that ominous phrase, 
‘positivism of revelation,’ coined just before his death in 1944.   
 If Bonhoeffer is renovating the Barthian ‘thought-space,’ we must grasp the 
demolitions as well as the additions, and the history of attempts to cope with the 
interpretive problems indicates that no plain blueprint is in our possession.  We proceed 
in a rough and indirect fashion.  The correspondence with Richard Widmann from 1926 
offers the best insight into Bonhoeffer’s mindset at the time.  After teasing out his 
position from Widmann’s responses (only the responses survive), I will turn to the 1944 
letters as a foil for his early critique.  This will lead directly to the student essays, which 
begin to revise Barth’s thought-form.    
 
Correspondence With Richard Widmann  
During his years at Berlin, Bonhoeffer struck up a number of revealing 
conversations in letters to friends, and he discusses Barth at some length in a few of them, 
after his cousin, Christoph von Hase, spoke electrically of the lecture cycle in Göttingen 
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(1924-25).  His exchange with Richard Widmann is especially interesting and concerns 
both Barth and the eventual content of Bonhoeffer’s dissertation.  Three features of these 
letters, dated to Spring (February, March, April) 1926, deserve mention: the mutual 
criticism of Barth’s ‘dogmatic’ method, Bonhoeffer’s denial of any “sociological 
prerequisites” for faith (as Widmann puts it), and a rather technical dispute over the 
identity and subjectivity of Christ, Church and Ego (Ich). 
 Widmann and Bonhoeffer met at Berlin in the summer of 1925, shortly after von 
Hase had delivered transcriptions of Barth’s Göttingen lectures, which marked a new 
phase in Barth’s theological development.  The principle innovation in these lectures is 
the shift to an ‘anhypostatic-enhypostatic’ Christology, concentrating the ‘dialectic of 
time and eternity’ into the person of Christ, so that “the time-eternity dialectic could now 
gradually be dispensed with at no loss of the critical distance between God and human 
which that dialectic had once secured.”11  This, in Barth’s view, provided for the 
incarnation where the dualism of the Romans commentary seemed to prohibit it.  
Accompanying this new focus in substance is also a new method, the kernel of both 
culled from the handbooks of Heppe and Schmid.  In a January 1924 letter to Brunner, 
Barth had considered several possible approaches to his first lectures in theology, 
preferring a mixture of commentary on the confessions with a “prophetic” trailblazing in 
the manner of Calvin.
12
  Such a method was to be both “churchly” and “scientific,” 
occurring in the “highly concrete situation” of preaching.  With this turn to confession 
and preaching, he developed his doctrine of the threefold word for the first time, 
exclaiming later that “here I found myself visibly in the realm of the Church.”  It is this 
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meta-doctrinal (but still ‘dogmatic’) employment of the church as a rigid confessional 
standard to which Bonhoeffer so vehemently objects and seeks an alternative. 
  The letters make it abundantly clear that neither party cares for Barth’s dogmatic 
turn.  Widmann acknowledges that “things are said better and more clearly here,” that the 
dogmatics is “more objective” and lacks the “sensationalism and journalism” of Romans 
II (IX, 154).  He even approves of Barth’s desire to “make connections with the past,” 
whereas Bonhoeffer, according to Widmann, protested “the slavery that Barth has fallen 
into in this Dogmatics—that he anxiously guards himself, walking in the footsteps of the 
old dogmaticians.”13  Romans II, Widmann agrees, was “less reactionary” and that 
connections should be sought with the future as well as the past in order to suspend the 
“reactionary crutches,” the “depending on the old ones,” that make the Dogmatics a “step 
backward” (ibid).  Bonhoeffer, in his own words, ascribed to both a “tactical purpose,” 
but his sympathies lie clearly with the “formulations” of Romans II and its “basic 
dialectical relationship between time and eternity” (ibid).  All of this amounts to a 
rejection of the dogmatic method, whereby the authority of the church secures the 
hermeneutical circle of revelation. 
 At another point, however, the interlocutors diverge sharply, and here Bonhoeffer 
sides with Barth.  Widmann complains that Barth’s theology has “certain sociological 
prerequisites,” that it has “grown up in the soil of the modern world” and is thus 
“inappropriate” to the ordinary church (IX, 156).  As a pastor trained in the university, he 
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feels the impossibility of speaking to the church-goer: “the sermon is after all a dialogue, 
but a dialogue between an intellectual and a middle class person or farmer is impossible” 
(ibid).  Bonhoeffer counters that “ultimately” what Widmann describes as “historical and 
psychological factors” are irrelevant to the “decision” of faith.   Admitting that he has 
perhaps “drawn nondialectical consequences” from Barth’s work, Widmann still presses 
repeatedly a single point, that “penultimate and anteultimate things do make a 
difference,” that “in the end” they can “cause a vocational existence to fall apart” (158).  
“At some point,” he asks, “can the sociological dialectic become so critical that even the 
theological dialectic cannot be any assistance?...For once, take the church as a 
sociological reality seriously and draw the consequences from it” (ibid).  Bonhoeffer of 
course thought he was doing just that, and it is striking how much Widmann sounds like 
Bonhoeffer’s dissertation or even the prison letters, which demand a “nonreligious” 
Christianity for the “religionless worker” to whom Barth’s theology “has nothing to say.”   
 Even more surprising is Widmann’s suggested answer to a “second problem” 
pertaining to the church as a “homogeneous subject” (the phrase is Bonhoeffer’s) in 
Romans II and Barth’s second lecture cycle in Göttingen (IX, 159).  Given the general 
tone of these passages, it is difficult to tell where Widmann is summarizing Barth or 
possibly even Bonhoeffer and where he is criticizing them and making original claims.  It 
seems that both are reworking Barth’s remarks on the sanctorum communio (cited above) 
in Romans II, insofar as it concerns the unity or identity of Christ with the Church and the 
individual ego (Ich).
14
  A second interest is the relation of the visible and invisible 
churches, with reference to “Dogmatics II,” although which passages remains unclear.  
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Finally, Widmann deals with the topic of ethics and how the call of Christ in the neighbor 
as ‘other’ and ‘Thou’ (Du) “holds [one] in obedient service…by one link in the chain.”  
He also distinguishes between the ‘Thou’ as a “reflexive condition” and the individual as 
an “immediate condition.”  “The ‘You’ is given-over (Aufgegebene); individuality is the 
given (Gegebene)”   
 These letters present a potential difficulty, since Widmann is anticipating many of 
themes, even the specific phrasing, of Bonhoeffer’s dissertation.  Is it possible that he 
helped chart the course for Sanctorum Communio?  Nor should we miss the fact that the 
basic theme of Act and Being (Being in Adam/Christ, reflection and immediacy) is 
already in play here as well.  Lastly, Widmann’s three concise paragraphs on these topics 
treat the three ‘circles’ (epistemology or subjectivity, history or mediation, and ethics) as 
discrete questions, supporting our thesis of a complex thought-form inherited from Barth 
and molded to new purposes.  Only further examination of the student essays can clarify 
these matters, but it is noteworthy that Bonhoeffer decided on his dissertation topic the 
previous Fall, in a November 1925 letter to Seeberg.  We know that Bonhoeffer was 
critical of Barth from the beginning, but in what capacity?  An excursus here will clear 
the ground for a deeper analysis of pre-dissertation work, illuminating his distance from 
and dependence upon Barth’s conceptions. 
 
Bonhoeffer’s Barthkritik 
 To understand Bonhoeffer is to understand his relation to Karl Barth, a task 
complicated by the expansive and subtly shifting vision of the latter, the “impulsivity” of 
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the former (as Barth later put it), and by the controversial reception of Bonhoeffer’s 
writings.  The cloud of that controversy gathered straightway around a single 
terminological thunderhead, a phrase whose monumental opacity casts its shadow over 
the interpretation of Bonhoeffer right down to the present: “positivism of revelation” 
(Offenbarungspositivismus).  The phrase itself does not appear until 1944, but Regin 
Prenter, in one of the earliest expositions of the problem, suggested a similar critique was 
perhaps present from the beginning.  Prenter elected to avoid this rabbit hole, and the 
majority of attempts to deal with the problem have followed suit by remaining within the 
confines of the letters and a few additional documents.   
A recent exception to this trend is Ralf Wustenberg’s essay on religionless 
Christianity.  Noting that “religionless Christianity” or the “non-religious interpretation 
of biblical concepts” is the antidote to Barth’s positivism of revelation, he proposes that 
Offenbarungspositivismus concerns not revelation itself but Barth’s attitude towards 
religion: “We see that with the Church Dogmatics, the critique of religion issues into a 
revelatory positive view of religion, instead of, as Bonhoeffer expected, into a non-
religious interpretation.  Instead of the non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts, 
Barth offers a revelatory positive interpretation of religion.”15 In other words, rather than 
maintain the opposition between religion and revelation put forward in Romans II, Barth 
evaluates religion ‘positively’ in light of revelation, allowing it to be “suspended” 
(aufgehoben)  in the event of revelation.
16
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63 
 
 Wustenberg draws this conclusion from the three letters (Apr 30, May 4, June 8 
1944) mentioning “religionlessness” and “positivism,” all of which “exhibit the same 
structure: Bonhoeffer first engages in a critique of religion, acknowledges Barth as 
having begun the critique, and then criticizes him with the questionable expression 
[positivism] and deduces for himself the non-religious interpretion.”17  Now Wustenberg 
persuasively argues that §17 of Church Dogmatics (“God’s Revelation as the Suspension 
(Aufhebung) of Religion”), published in 1938, is the target of criticism, but his larger 
thesis is unconvincing for three reasons.  First, he simply neglects the primacy of 
revelation for both Barth and Bonhoeffer.  Are we really to believe that “positivism of 
revelation” is not in fact about revelation but rather religion?  Second, he ignores contrary 
evidence in the letters to just this effect.  Third, he does not adequately treat the history of 
the term or its substantive, ‘positivism.’  Working through these objections will sharpen 
our perspective on both the later and early criticism of Barth.   
 The most obvious problem with Wustenberg’s thesis is the paradoxical claim that 
‘positivism of revelation’ targets Barth’s conception of religion rather than revelation.  In 
a limited sense, he is correct: Bonhoeffer objects to the notion that religion is now given a 
place within and through revelation.  He is wrong that this is primarily a difference of 
opinion regarding religion, in and of itself, and not a difference regarding revelation 
insofar as it relates to the reality of religion, to which Barth initially opposed it.  As 
Wustenberg himself acknowledges, “the charge of revelatory positivism is directly 
associated with the Barthian critique of religion, and cannot be explained substantively 
from the perspective of the doctrine of revelation in and for itself, but from the 
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revelatory-theological understanding of religion.”18  Put differently, Bonhoeffer refuses 
Barth’s reaffirmation of religion from the perspective of revelation and the consequences 
that a ‘suspension’ of religion has for the relation between God and humanity in 
revelation, particularly religious individualism.  Each of the three letters points in this 
direction. 
 As in its mandarin coinage, ‘positivism’ describes an epistemological problem 
with ethical and social consequences, and Bonhoeffer intends for the term to cut in both 
directions.  Barth’s critical epistemology suspends religion within revelation, but in so 
doing is “negatively determined” by it, erecting the church in the place of religion, on the 
“periphery” of the world (VIII, 430-431).  We may schematize the options as follows.  If 
religion is anthropocentric and otherworldly, Barth is theocentric but still otherworldly.
19
  
Revelation rightly ‘cancels’ religion but wrongly ‘takes up’ its otherworldly locus.  Thus 
Bonhoeffer’s appreciation for the critical gesture against religion in Romans II (“with all 
its neo-Kantian eggshells”) and his rejection of its ‘suspension’ in CD I/2.  In contrast to 
Barth and liberal theology, the correct path would be both theocentric and worldly.  Yet 
such a criticism would really hold, if at all, only against CD I/2 and could not be 
transferred to their first encounter, unless one recalls that the dogmatic method and a 
parallel conception of Trinity and revelation appeared as early as 1925.  The full breadth 
of Bonhoeffer’s critique becomes evident upon further examination of the phrase 
Offenbarungspositivismus and its context in the letters and papers of 1944-5.  
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 ‘Positivism’ generally connoted both a confusion of ‘givens’ (positiva) with 
products of mental activity and a loss of totality, wholeness and integration.  Both 
meanings are evident in its theological appropriation.  Wustenberg simply follows 
Andreas Pangritz’ claim that the term was coined by Erich Seeberg in his 1929 book on 
Luther and held currency among the Berlin faculty during the 1920s and 30s.  Pangritz 
assesses that Seeberg “seems to have meant something like this: in ‘positivism of 
revelation’ the word of God revealed in Jesus Christ is accepted as something positively 
given…as a truth of faith natural reason cannot analyze or question…in juxtaposition to a 
‘natural’ knowledge of God.”20  The Berlin faculty of the 1920s did utilize the phrase, but 
it predates them considerably, appearing at least as early as 1855 in opposition to the anti-
Hegelian, Stahl.
21
  Stahl’s failure lay, predictably enough, in an appeal to immediacy, an 
original grasp (Urerrinerung) of the human essence (Wesen) that mistakes the dialectical 
for the given, the mediated for the immediate.  By the 1920s, the specific term 
Offenbarungs- positivismus seems to have been applied almost exclusively against the 
Ritschlians as a way of describing their rejection of natural theology and any positive 
relation between reason and revelation.
22
  Given the disjunction of faith and reason by 
Ritschl and Hermann, and Barth’s appropriation of the same, the extension of the 
criticism to Barth might not be surprising, had Bonhoeffer not taken a similar stance.  So 
Offenbarungspositivismus must entail something more. 
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before Schelling himself in 1840 to exterminate the Hegelian left.  The reference appears in F.H.T. Allihn’s 
Die Umkehr der Wissenschaft in Presseu (Berlin, 1855), p. 153.   
22
 See, for example, Erich Stange, Religionwissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung, Bd. 2 (1926), 
p. 55.  Two additional instances appear in Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, Bd. 44 (1936), pp. 172, 
179, also targeting the rejection of natural theology.  Bonhoeffer knew Stange’s work firsthand. Compare 
Sanctorum Communio, pp. 257, 285.   
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 Recall that ‘positivism’ belonged to a small but flexible lexical armory, including 
vague synonyms such as ‘subjectivism,’ ‘psychologism’ and ‘formalism.’  All describe a 
faulty view of subject-object relations.  Psychologism broadly referred to a conflation of 
‘natural’ laws with ‘logical’ ones (which is to say, psycho-logical, insofar as ‘logic’ 
meant the functional rules of the mind).  ‘Formalism’ involved a similar charge that the 
logical ‘form’ of the mind overran its objects, reducing them to shadows of mental form.  
This semantic web gives a thin ledge to move between Bonhoeffer’s 1944 allegation of 
positivism and a parallel claim in his 1927 licentiate theses, that “the dialectic of 
dialectical theology has a formal rather than real character, and is in danger of neglecting 
the historicity of Jesus.”  Assuming for the moment that ‘real’ and ‘historical’ belong on 
a semantic plane with ‘worldly,’ a line of sight from which to compare the early and late 
Barthkritiks opens to view.    
 In his prison writings, Bonhoeffer follows a trope established in Romans II by 
linking “religion” to “circumcision” (VIII, 365ff., 430).  For Barth, the pairing invokes 
that human ‘work’ which governs the visible, known world, at whose “boundary” 
(Grenze) and “periphery” stands  God (as a tangent striking a circle, etc.).   For 
Bonhoeffer, the metaphor of circumcision underscores the “otherworldly” character of 
religion, its attempts to find a place for God “in a world come of age” through the twin 
strategies of “metaphysics” and “inwardness” (VIII, 362ff).  The metaphysical solution 
imposes itself on science, the sphere of knowledge, so that God is retained as a “stop 
gap,” a “working hypothesis,” and a “deus ex machina” (VIII, 405; 478-9, 500; 366, 450, 
479).  The solution of inwardness arises in the sphere of morality and feeling, where God 
answers to the “last things” of human frailty, guilt, and death.  Religion fails because the 
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boundaries of the world are always receding, even to the point that guilt and death no 
longer represent real limits.  Against scrambling for what Schleiermacher called a “mess 
of metaphysical and ethical crumbs” (we should add, ‘affective’!), Bonhoeffer raises an 
epistemological and social protest.  “Epistemological transcendence has nothing to do 
with the transcendence of God. God is the beyond in the midst of our lives” (VIII, 367).  
Similarly, the form of this ‘in the midst’ is the form of the church as “being for others,” 
the true form of divine “weakness” that is “called out (ek-klesia)…without being 
favored” or ‘set apart’ from the world (VIII, 364). 
 Barth and Berlin are in his crosshairs here.  The May 5 letter asserts that “what is 
above  the world is meant for the world in the sense of the incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection of Christ,” and from there Bonhoeffer launches his most sustained volley 
against Barth in the LPP. 
Barth was the first theologian to begin criticism of religion, and that remains his really 
great merit; but he put in its place a positivist doctrine of revelation which says, in effect, ‘Like it 
or lump it’: virgin birth, Trinity, or anything else; each is an equally significant and necessary part 
of the whole, which must simply be swallowed as a whole or not at all.  That isn’t biblical.  There 
are degrees of knowledge and degrees of significance; that means that a secret discipline must be 
restored whereby the mysteries of the Christian faith are protected against profanation.   The 
positivism of revelation makes it too easy for itself, by setting up, as it does in the last analysis, a 
law of faith, and so mutilates what is—by Christ’s incarnation!—a gift for us.  In the place of 
religion there now stands the church—that is biblical in itself—but the world is in some degree 
made to depend on itself and left to its own devices, and that’s the mistake. 
I’m thinking about how we can reinterpret in a ‘worldly’ sense—in the sense of the Old 
Testament and of John 1.14—the concepts of repentance, faith, justification, rebirth and 
sanctification. (VIII, 373) 
 
 
 
The gibe of ‘positivism’ encompasses three closely related but distinct elements.  The 
first is epistemological and cites Barth for misconstruing the relation between the parts of 
theological knowledge (virgin birth, Trinity, etc.) and their whole, forcing faith into an 
‘all or nothing’ situation.  The second is social and derides Barth for ‘leaving the world to 
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itself’ by setting up the church on the site of religion.  The third aspect is theologically 
constructive, recommending instead a ‘worldly’ or ‘non-religious’ (the two are 
synonyms) interpretation of biblical concepts.  How are these three related, and what can 
they tell us about the earlier language of “formalism” and “servitude” to “the old ones”?  
 The tropes of “circumcision” and “law” tie the epistemic and social dimensions 
together.  The “law of faith” denies “degrees of knowledge and significance.”  In a book 
outline (July/Aug 1944), Bonhoeffer writes that Barth “encourages us to entrench 
ourselves behind the faith of the church without asking the honest question of what is our 
real and personal belief,” and then remarks that “dialectical theology says we have no 
control over our own faith” (VIII, 495).    Cumulatively, these references depict 
uneasiness with the wedding of Barth’s actualism to a dogmatic method.   By ‘actualism’ 
I have in mind here his dictum that the event of revelation proceeds, as it were, 
‘vertically, from above.’  As an event, it stands entirely outside human capacities and 
brings the reality of its object wholly of its own accord; this is no less true of Romans II 
than of CD.  Two meanings of ‘positivism’ are implicated in this formulation.  First, the 
impossibility of differentiating subject and object in the event of revelation, or rather 
finding any legitimate role for human subjectivity within the ‘unabolishable subjectivity 
of God in His revelation,’ lends itself to the charge of positivism as a confusion of subject 
and object, given and constructed.   Second, the given is encountered as an 
undifferentiated objective mass, en bloc.  Both aspects could be described as 
‘undialectical.’  The dogmatic method reinforces this by deducing everything from the 
sole ‘presupposition’ (Ansatz) or ‘axiom’ of the incarnation, unfolded in creed and 
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confession.
23
  The ‘impersonal’ aspect derives from the actualistic form of revelation in 
league with its authoritarian medium in church dogma.   
 If the epistemic worry is directed against the marginalization of humanity in the 
event of revelation, its social parallel concerns the marginalization of the world.  Now in 
what sense does this ‘law of faith’ “mutilate” the world, which has been made a “gift” by 
the incarnation?  The connotation of “mutilate” is crucial, for it implies ‘circumcision,’ or 
the erroneous separation of world and God committed by liberalism and Barth alike.
24
  
Bonhoeffer seeks a correction in the church as ‘called out’ (ek-klesia) but not ‘set apart.’  
In this, the church only follows the incarnation, which makes its form of worldliness 
possible in the first place.  By way of implication, Barth denies the incarnation, and that 
is just what Bonhoeffer had said in 1927: that “the dialectic of dialectical theology is 
formal rather than real and is in danger of neglecting the historicity of Jesus.”  Did Barth 
himself not eventually admit as much, believing that he had since righted his course?
25
    
 Summing up, we can say that a compelling parallel exists between the accusations 
of “formalism” (1927) and “positivism” (1944), even if the two terms target different 
texts (Romans II (1922) and CD I/2 (1938), respectively).  Formalism neglects ‘reality’ 
and the ‘historicity of Jesus,’ just as positivism neglects the world; both speak to a 
neglect of the incarnation.  The parallel is strengthened by Bonhoeffer’s solutions to the 
problems represented by formalism and positivism.  If the answer to positivism is a non-
religious or worldly Christianity, understood as a mode of ec-clesiality, the answer to 
                                                          
23
 For a helpful account of Barth’s method in light of Bonhoeffer’s critique, see Heinrich Ott, Faith and 
Reality: The Theological Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1972), 129ff.   
24
 It is worth observing that Bonhoeffer frequently turns to the Old Testament as a model for such ‘worldly’ 
faith, balancing somewhat his use of Jewish images to signify the deficit of otherworldliness and religion.   
25
 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, (Louisville: WJK, 1960), p. 43.   
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formalism is the church-community (sanctorum communio), understood as a mode of 
sociality.  Between 1927 and 1944, the direction and emphasis of Bonhoeffer’s theology 
changes, but not its fundamental structure.  The young academic sees the sociological 
category as the solution to the problem of revelation, and the category of the church as 
the solution to the problem of social mediation between part and whole.  His emphasis 
falls upon formulating a clear conception of the church.  The man come of age sees—if 
one can put it this way—worldliness as the solution to the problem of being a Christian, 
and a non-religious interpretation as the solution to the problem of understanding.  A 
comparison of two vital passages from 1944 (LPP) and 1927 (SC) is illustrative: 
I am thinking about how the concepts of faith, justification, rebirth and sanctification should be 
reinterpreted in a ‘worldly’ way. 
The more this investigation has considered the significance of the sociological category for 
theology, the more clearly has emerged the social intention of all the basic Christian concepts.  
‘Person,’ ‘primal state,’ ‘sin,’ and ‘revelation’ can be fully comprehended only in reference to 
sociality.  
Sociality and worldliness are two distinct but structurally cognate responses to a complex 
epistemic-social problem that drives Bonhoeffer’s theology from beginning to end.  His 
formulations change with intellectual insight and social context, but the basic theme, in 
my opinion, does not.  His middle period only deepens the Christological center from 
which he could arrive at the new vistas of his late work. 
 So Widmann’s language of “reactionary crutches” and “relapse into servitude,” 
with which Bonhoeffer seems to have sympathized in 1925, has a neat analogue in the 
prison writings (“entrenching ourselves behind the faith of the church,” etc.).  The flow 
of his exchange with Widmann, and the shape of Bonhoeffer’s early theology as a whole, 
suggests that both students find the answer to this problem in the church as the “body of 
Christ.”  I have already shown how Widmann’s identification of Christ and the 
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sanctorum communio directly revises Barth’s “homogeneous subject.”  Two final 
comments will bring this analysis full circle.  First, the one other critical reference to 
Barth in his student writings attacks the same problem with the phrase “heavenly 
double.”  Quoting from the passages in Romans II dealing with the two “subjects” of 
revelation/election, Bonhoeffer counters that “it is after all not the Holy Spirit in me but 
instead a second self that has been separated off, and this one lives in heaven far away 
from here. It is a ‘heavenly double’ of my earthly self! But this should just not be.”26  The 
April 1926 letter and this essay (Feb 22, 1926) both attack the residual effects of Barth’s 
dualism—the dualism of time and eternity, known and unknown, God and world, bisects 
the self as well, robbing it of its “concreteness” (Gegebene) in Christ, its sanctification.  
As I demonstrated in the last chapter, this dualism is of a piece with Barth’s actualism 
and formalism, both derived from his reliance upon Kant, for whom ‘act’ is the act of the 
mind in its formal categorical operation.
27
  Second, then, we can see that “formalism” is 
the reverse side of this charge.
28
  It fractures the knowing subject into temporal and 
eternal, but also fractures the ‘object’ of faith in the incarnation; Christ never enters 
history.  To mend this fracture, Bonhoeffer locates Christ “in me” through the will, the 
incarnation in the church-community; voluntarism replaces intellectualism, sociality 
replaces individualism.  These coordinates guide the student essays and sermons. 
 
                                                          
26
 IX, 343.  The quotation by Barth is from Romans, 158ff. “…the invisible…new subject of the person 
who stands and exists upright before God,…who can be comprehended and understood…only as not 
given.”   
27
 One might better express ‘formalism’ as ‘intellectualism,’ if it communicated the proper sense of 
‘intellect.’  When Barth speaks of repentance as an “intellectual act,” this is what we have in mind.  
“Intellectual” means “formal,” or concerned only with the dialectic of visible/invisible, known/unknown, 
defined in Kantian terms.    
28
 Such a reversibility is built into the terms of the discussion: the object is the ‘backside’ of the subject.   
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III. Beyond Barth and Berlin: A New Theology Emerges (1925-1927) 
 
 Between the summer of 1925 and winter of 1926/7, Bonhoeffer wrote about a 
dozen seminar essays, mostly for seminars in theology and history with Karl Holl, Adolf 
von Harnack, and Reinhold Seeberg, who later advised his dissertation.  The essays cover 
a variety of topics, usually related to the content of the seminar, and it was not unusual 
for the professor to assign a topic related to his own research.  So the titles do not 
necessarily reflect Bonhoeffer’s interests or a ‘direction’ to his theology.  Moreover, his 
enthusiasm for Barth is sometimes muted by deference to his professors, none of whom 
cared for Barth, and though the references to Barth are spare, his influence is pervasive.   
A good deal of reading between the lines is required to get at the emerging pattern of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology. 
If the indirectness with which Bonhoeffer is working out his own theology in 
these essays curtails strong claims about development, a few distinctive changes are 
nonetheless perceptible.  Barth’s eschatological ‘dualism,’ or the dialectic of time and 
eternity, seems to frame every thought, but with growing resistance.  The phrase “in me” 
becomes a salient note across the essays as he approaches the dissertation and sums up 
his emendation to Barth.  Through the themes of will, church-community and Holy Spirit, 
Bonhoeffer softens Barth’s dualism without falling back into the confusion of God and 
humanity which it corrected in the first place.  This explains his growing preoccupation 
with the third article of the creed.  Finally, he increasingly expresses these emphases in a 
Lutheran idiom, opposing the sharper dualism of Barth’s Reformed tendencies (extra 
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Calvinisticum, ‘superformal principle,’ etc.).  The remainder of this chapter traces the 
rough outline of that renovated pattern, piecing together its structure from evidence 
sometimes direct and sometimes oblique.  Bonhoeffer’s critique of Barth naturally forces 
him to refigure the epistemic and especially the historical circles—a problem of 
mediation—and he only takes up the ethical question after his habilitation essay.   
  
The Epistemic Circle 
 In a May 1925 letter to Walter Dreβ, Bonhoeffer mentions that he must submit a 
paper for Holl (whose seminar is “not very stimulating”) on ‘Luther’s Feelings About His 
Work.’  He asks if Luther “developed an independent dualistic view of history,” rooted in 
his experience of grace and calling, or if it depended on the scholastic tradition (IX, 144-
145).  Already here he is seeking a Lutheran counterpart to Barth’s Reformed dualism.  
In the essay itself, he poses a similar question: “Are we standing before a dualistic 
understanding of history, a conflict between the God of light and of the darkness, or are 
we confronted with a superstition of Luther that arises from the medieval belief in 
demons and the devil?” (IX, 264-265).  The point is that “the absolute division between 
[Luther’s] person and his work” results from an essential theological insight into the 
division between his frailty of self-understanding and God’s election (ibid).  The dialectic 
of veiling and unveiling, God’s self-revelation, is localized in Luther’s vocation and the 
dis/continuity of divine and human purposes.   
This concern appears in another essay from the same semester, written for 
Seeberg on the topic of historical and pneumatological interpretation of scripture:  
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“Christian religion stands or falls with the belief in a historical and perceptibly real divine 
revelation, a revelation that those who have eyes to see can see...[and] it raises the 
question we take up here, the relation between history and the Spirit” (IX, 285).  
Bonhoeffer invokes Barth’s incapax and the distinction between the scriptural medium 
and the “subject matter” of revelation, concluding that in the circle of theological 
understanding, “object must become Subject, God must become the Holy Spirit.”29  Faith 
understands this subject matter “out of itself,” not out of the ‘I’ or a priori, and “the 
question of genesis can never touch the other question—of the thing itself” (IX, 295).  
More concretely, the historical critic “can contest the image of Jesus as religious 
leader…but never as God’s Son” (ibid).   All of this is in keeping with the dualism of 
Romans II and its antipathy for historical criticism, but then Bonhoeffer adds that  “God 
wished to become manifest in history…All other interpretations [that place the 
resurrection outside the realm of faith and revelation] seek to remove the decisive 
characteristic of God within history” (IX, 296).  The accenting of ‘within history’ 
represents a departure from Barth (Seeberg applauds in the margin) as to the character of 
the ‘content’ (Sache) of revelation.  The content is what “drives towards Christ” (Luther), 
and “what the content of revelation does not have is not canonical” (IX, 297).  The 
Reformed scripture principle as “repristinated” by Barth places canon above content, and 
Bonhoeffer concludes by describing the Word as the sole norm of theology and of the 
empirical church congregation (ibid).     
The critical distance from Barth seems to increase as Bonhoeffer further considers 
the Holy Spirit as the presence of God “in” the believer, requiring a rehabilitation of 
                                                          
29IX, 290.  “The solution lies in the fact that God opens human eyes to receive revelation in certain 
indescribable and undetermined moments and words.”   
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‘experience’ and ‘conscience’ for theology: “Thus the conscience becomes the place 
where the Holy Spirit is truly experienced by humanity…not every conscience is the 
voice of the Holy Spirit, but the voice of the Holy Spirit is felt only in the conscience” 
(IX, 333).  The ‘within’ is not the ‘inwardness’ of religion because the ‘experience’ is 
pure gift, and “there is no direct path from the wrath of God to grace” but only a 
“rupture” (IX, 336).  The Trinity “immediately” creates a “holy circle” of faith and 
revelation as a divine act, based on the reciprocal relation of Spirit and Son.
30
  “Christ is 
in us through the fact that the Spirit is in us…Christ is in us in the same way as our faith 
is in us, that he is in us, lives, is raised, etc.” (IX, 339, 338).  Circumincession reunites the 
‘heavenly double’ by way of an identification between Christ and the Spirit, the Spirit 
and the human person: 
Thus the Holy Spirit in me, Christ in me, I believe.  It is of critical importance to preserve this ‘in 
me.’  My sin called forth God’s wrath.  The Holy Spirit annihilated me.  Therefore I must be 
helped.  My guilt must be blotted out.  What confronts this is the fact that the Holy Spirit is in me, 
and it must always remain subject, or especially in faith as [gift], because it establishes the holy 
circle…It is of critical importance that both things remain a reality…If I am not the subject of 
faith, what is the meaning of the conversation about my faith?...In faith the Holy Spirit creates a 
new person, a new self, a new will, a new heart…not externally but instead inwardly, in the ‘I.’  
Now freedom and action are no longer opposed to each other.  Instead, they are the same content 
[Sache] seen from two perspectives.  It is truly the Holy Spirit who gives [geschenkt] to the human 
being; and it is truly the human being [Mensch] to whom the Holy Spirit is given [geschenkt wird]. 
(IX, 341-342)   
The volitional mode of the “in me” is clearly articulated here for the first time as the 
transformation of the will.  Avoiding ‘presence’ as presence-to-thought allows 
Bonhoeffer to bypass the disjunction between God and world created by Barth’s 
formalist-intellectualist actualism, that is, the ‘heavenly double,’ rejected directly after 
this passage.  “It corresponds to the Spirit’s holiness also to sanctify the human being in 
this world of sin…to allow the human being to feel [spüren] the beginning of new life, to 
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 “This somewhat difficult dialectic grew for Luther out of his experience of faith.” IX, 339.  
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extend its action from the perceptible into the imperceptible” (IX, 343).  With these 
measures he intends to overcome the pitfall of impersonal faith and authority that 
accompanies Barth’s dogmatic method.   
 Spirit and faith are not “poured out substantially, quiescently into us, but instead 
faith is active and alive…and is a gift [Geschenk] according to its content” (IX, 343).  
The preference for ‘action’ over ‘substance’ corresponds to the preference of will over 
intellect, and Bonhoeffer even speaks of a “voluntary form of the concept of Spirit” 
which permits a union with humanity, despite the fact that the “concrete person [die 
konkrete Mensch]…stands in the midst of the sinful world” (IX, 344).  A lengthy 
excursus on the relation between the divine and human wills leads back to the 
paradoxical conclusion that “God is, at the same time, the subject and the object of faith, 
and yet in full freedom the person believes in saying yes and no” (IX, 358).  From here, 
Bonhoeffer returns to the problems of scriptural interpretation, preaching, theology, and 
the church community “here in the world” (IX, 367). 
 One last pair of distinctions fills out his revision of the epistemic circle.  In his 
paper on “Grace and Spirit in Franke,” we find several familiar ideas, for example, that 
God “creates the organ of knowledge,” that the ‘I’ and the Holy Spirit equally say ‘yes’ 
in the event of revelation, and the two are connected not “substantially” but 
“functionally” (IX, 417).  Up to this point, Bonhoeffer has not identified with much 
precision the difference between the Spirit and Christ, insofar as they are related to the I, 
except by the phrase “in me.”  He now adds a distinction crucial to his dissertation.  
Christ “generates” the new I, the Spirit “actualizes” it; Christ brings “judgment,” the 
Spirit “power”; Christ “justifies,” the Spirit “sanctifies” (ibid).  It will become clearer in 
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the dissertation that the “voluntary form” of the Spirit related not merely to renewal of 
the will, but to the “form” it takes in concrete, empirical communities.  The Spirit 
mediates Christ’s historical presence in the Church. 
 
The Historical Circle: Christ, Spirit, Church 
 The themes of eschatological dualism and the Spirit’s efficacy reappear in close 
connection to the church in an essay on “Church and Eschatology” (January1926).  
Almost immediately he contradicts Barth, arguing that the idea of the Kingdom of God 
“presupposes that social and historical elements act as complements within human 
experience,” and this means that “it is not so much the faithful individual who is the 
counterpart of the concept of the Kingdom of God, but more so the concepts of church, 
then state, humanity and all of history” (IX, 311).  As in his analysis of Luther, the 
“battle” between the Kingdoms of God and Satan takes place in the will and through the 
Spirit, and the Kingdom is itself defined by the “sovereign will of the Father 
[Herrschaftswille], the redeeming and judging will of the Son [Erlösung- und 
Gerichtswille], and the love forming will of the Holy Spirit for the spiritual community 
[Gemeinschaft]…realized in complete unity” (IX, 311).  The forms of willing and their 
“bonds” will recur at length in the dissertation, but here Bonhoeffer is preoccupied with 
the relation between the Kingdom of God and the Church, or how Christ is “temporally 
present.” 
 The eschatological reality of the Kingdom is “the goal and end to which 
everything must be related,” a “community of redeemed persons” (IX, 312). It is “always 
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complete” and “consummated,” whereas the church “grows in time.” The church is 
“restricted to a portion of history,” while the Kingdom “encompasses the entire unfolding 
world” (IX, 314).  The distinction between “generation” and “actualization” above is 
refined here by several new pairs of concepts.  “Actualization” appears alongside 
“realization” and “consummation” (Vollendung), as it will Sanctorum Communio.  The 
Kingdom corresponds to the “essential [wesentlich] church” or the “so-called invisible 
church,” which is “essentially the entity predetermined…in eternal election” (IX, 315).  
Unlike Barth, however, the elect have a counterpart in “Christ’s continued spiritual work” 
in history (IX, 312).  This is the “visible” and “empirical church,” harboring the non-elect 
as the mixed field of wheat and weeds or the catch of fish.  Nonetheless, the two are 
“conceptually identical in purpose and constitution” (IX, 315).  The vocabulary employed 
here, abstract in itself, attempts to represent the biblical tension between ‘already’ and 
‘not yet.’  ‘Real’ and ‘actual’ or ‘essential’ and ‘empirical’ convey its substance with 
difficulty, formally designating a primary reality with a secondary manifestation.  So the 
more concrete distinction of “gift” (Gabe) and “task” (Aufgabe) really does justice to 
Bonhoeffer’s intent, highlighting the active role of the church in the “task” of 
proclamation and forgiveness of sins, through which the visible church is the 
“instrument” of God with the Word as its “weapon” (Kampfmittel) (IX, 313, 324).  The 
‘completeness’ of election and justification is expressed in the gift of the sacrament, the 
task in the ‘struggle’ of the church for sanctification.  Bonhoeffer put this beautifully in a 
children’s sermon: “before God commands, God gives” (IX, 463).  We will return to this 
in connection with the problem of ethics. 
79 
 
 He also rejects several ‘confusions’ of the church with the Kingdom, such as 
Catholicism, sectarianism, pietism, and idealism, and the last receives special attention.  
Idealism rightly understands the church as a “community of ethically and spiritually 
liberated personalities,” but the true ideas of “community and election are missing” (IX, 
318).   Election and justification drive a temporal wedge between church and Kingdom, 
so that the “state of grace” must be “taken up” (aufgehoben) into the “state of perfection” 
(ibid).  Because that ‘taking up’ is now directed to the will, the church stands in a “double 
position in relation to the bustle of this world,” as “leaven” in addition to “judgment” (IX, 
319).  In contrast to Barth, the church is “the actual place where struggles take place and 
from where power and all other life relationships radiate,” even if the church is the “sole 
signpost in the midst of the world” pointing to the Kingdom (IX, 320).  Barth left the 
world unleavened in Romans II, but the young Bonhoeffer finds it only in the church.  
For the student, the “world exists for the sake of the invisible church, not the other way 
around,” whereas for the prisoner “what is beyond this world is meant…for the world” 
(IX, 321; VIII, 373).   His concern for the world already shows itself in this early stage 
but without the strength and the openness of his later writings.   
 Bonhoeffer’s attitude towards the world and the mediation of God’s presence in 
the church also turns up in an essay on Paul and John (alluded to in the previous one) and 
in his commemoration speech for von Harnack on the theme of “joy” in the New 
Testament.  The essay on Paul and John, written for Deiβmann’s seminar in summer 
1926, focuses again on the “in me” of Christ’s eschatological presence by comparing 
Paul’s “being in one body” with John’s “remaining in Christ.”  One is tempted to say that 
Bonhoeffer’s habit of typologizing has once more overrun the text, as John is reduced to 
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a foil for Paul and demonstrates most of the characteristics elsewhere ascribed to 
“religion.”  Where Paul’s center is in the “moral” and “anthropological dualism” of sin 
and justification, law and gospel, Adam and Christ, history and eschatology, John’s lies 
in a “cosmological dualism” that borders on “nature mysticism” and distorts the relation 
between church, kingdom and world (IX, 402, 398).  John’s community is in the world 
(kosmos) but also “chosen out” (exelexamen) of the world as “an entity that is radically 
opposed to the self-revealing God” (IX, 402).  Paul sees the world as “not fundamentally 
evil” and as “reconciled through Christ,” which would be “impossible for John” (ibid).  
John’s antipathy for the world seems to be indirectly rooted in the fact that he “thinks 
individualistically” where Paul thinks “collectively” (IX, 396).    
 The speech for von Harnack (May 1926) also paints John as “impractical” and 
“contemplative,” with a “quiet, supraworldly emphasis,” lacking Paul’s “ethical dualism” 
(IX, 380).  John’s joy derives from “individual” interests, Paul’s from a sense of 
“mission” that flows from the church as the hope of the parousia.  The link between the 
church and ethics as ‘task’ and ‘mission’ brings us to the final circle. 
 
The Ethical Circle: Election, Spirit, Sanctification 
 Bonhoeffer’s volitional and communal understanding of how revelation is 
mediated through the church clearly has ethical implications, but he is less concerned to 
spell them out in these early essays and really turns to the problem at length only after 
working out both the historical and epistemic circles in more detail.  Traces of his ethical 
position are of course present, and we find an exemplary passage in the exegesis for a 
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(July 1926) sermon on James.  Arguing that the ‘yes’ given in response to election must 
“remain truly our yes” and that faith and obedience are inseparable, Bonhoeffer 
comments that the 
relationship between the indicative and the imperative in Christian ethics can in principle not be 
abolished (unaufhebbares) but simply points to an observation from two different perspectives.  
From God’s perspective every ethical coming-into-being is an organic occurrence (tree, fruit, the 
field!).  From a human perspective it is something occurs in starts and fits, and that means in the 
dialectical imperative mood. (IX, 495) 
The single reference to ‘indicative/imperative’ refers to Barth’s lone usage of the same 
terms in Romans II.  A comparison with Barth evinces again Bonhoeffer’s new direction: 
Grace is the power of obedience; it is theory and practice, conception and birth; it is the 
indicative which carries with it a categorical imperative; it is the call, the command, the order, 
which cannot be disobeyed.  Grace has the force of a downright conclusion; it is the knowledge 
which requires no act of will to translate it into action, as though the will were a second factor side 
by side with knowledge.  Grace is knowledge of the will of God and as such it is the willing of the 
will of God…the knowledge that…their existence…is beyond all concrete things, beyond the 
being and course of this world. (Romans, 207ff).   
The rejection of any strict identification or “suspension” of will and knowledge is part 
and parcel of Bonhoeffer’s whole protest against Barth’s formalism, his placing the new 
existence ‘beyond all concrete things.’  To equate commandment (imperative) and 
obedience (indicative) in this way requires either transforming concrete life into the 
Kingdom of God or evacuating it altogether.  Barth takes the latter route.  Bonheoffer 
distinguishes will from reason in order to allow for ‘struggle’ of the will in the real world 
where it is experienced as threatened by humans, as victorious by God. 
 The simultaneity of victory and struggle arises from the dialectic of Law and 
Gospel.  The encounter with grace is first an encounter with Law, an ethical encounter 
with the commandment of God whose judgment is experiences as “an effective moral 
will with all its consequences,” a “personal and demanding will,” one “totally opposed” 
to mine and effecting my “inner being…my heart, my conscience” (IX, 255, 330).  The 
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ethical and epistemic circles are joined by the event of election, for which the word is a 
“temporal expression.”  The manner of its comprehension differs greatly from Barth, 
however. 
The human being can hear and understand it intellectually, because it is certainly said in words.  
However, the human being can grasp it and relate to it only through ha means that is analogous to 
the divine will.  Like can only be known by like…It must therefore be personally 
created…through the Holy Spirit, which is given to us as a gift (donum) ‘in’ faith…The object of 
faith, however, is God, not God’s absolute being…but gift and ability, and this means Christ.  This 
means Christ has been brought to us as a gift through the Holy Spirit.  In faith, which is the action 
of the Holy Spirit, we grasp the pro nobis of his death and his resurrection.  We not only see 
historical events objectively; we recognize that he died for our sins and was raised for our 
justification.  In that we grasp this, we possess Christ as a gift…So faith from the Spirit, Christ in 
faith, Spirit from Christ, and therefore in faith Christ gives the Spirit.  This is the essential 
interrelationship (IX, 338-9).  
This passage nicely summarizes the role of the ethical circle in the event of revelation.  
The manner of ‘grasping’ the content of faith is spiritual and volitional (1), but is 
nonetheless mediated through the preached word which in turn presupposes the whole 
community of faith (2) for which the word is both law and gospel, imperative and 
indicative, justification and sanctification (3).  Much of what will later appear under the 
topic of ethics, even as early as the dissertation, does not surface in the student essays.  In 
these first excursions beyond the frontier cut by Barth, Bonhoeffer’s interest was in how 
revelation is mediated, its worldly presence.  Everything else relates to this, but the 
conceptual links forged here only converge fully for the fist time in his dissertation, to 
which we now turn.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
SANCTORUM COMMUNIO: THE PROBLEM OF CHURCH-COMMUNITY 
RESOLVED IN REVELATION 
  
The path of Bonhoeffer’s theology during his student years seems largely 
determined by a two-sided response to Karl Barth.  On the one hand, he applauded the 
critical diastasis supplanting religion with revelation, expressed as the “dialectic of time 
and eternity.”  On the other, he perceived in this dualism a failure to take seriously God’s 
‘real presence’ in history through the incarnation.  Against Barth, the young Lutheran 
asserted the reality of that presence “in me” through volitional and ecclesiological 
mediations, and the full design of these threads becomes visible only in his doctoral 
dissertation, Sanctorum Communio: A Dogmatic Study, written in 1927 and published in 
1930.
1
  The systematic structure or ‘triple circle’ underlying the student essays is 
operative here as well, so that the fundamental epistemic question of revelation expresses 
itself also in matters of history and ethics.  For Herrmann, ethical immediacy resolved 
both the problem of epistemological transcendence and that of Jesus’ historical 
significance. Barth replaced the ethical a priori with the Holy Spirit and Herrmann’s 
“inner personality” with the “superior reality” of the divine Word.  Bonhoeffer chided 
                                                          
1
 The 1927 dissertation (Sanctorum Communio: Eine dogmatik Untersuchung) was published in 1930 under  
the slightly altered title, Sanctorum Communio:Eine dogmatic Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche.  At 
the request of Seeberg, whose foundation paid for the publication, Bonhoeffer cut around twenty percent of 
the original text.  This raises a question about how to interpret the two editions in the course of his 
theological development.  The revisions, in my opinion, only slightly effect the content, and even then by 
way of omissions rather than alterations in substance.  I argue as if the two were in essential agreement and 
lift quotations accordingly.  
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Barth for omitting the human person from the event of revelation, for reducing revelation 
to a formal or intellectual, rather than real and volitional event.   
 The introduction of this volitional element entails a revision of the human being 
for whom revelation occurs.   The Kantian subject presupposed in Romans II is replaced 
by a person whose consciousness is essentially generated from ethical (volitional) 
relations or “sociality” (Sozialität).  The “sociological category” thereby realigns the 
epistemic, historical and ethical circles.  The human subject of revelation takes on the 
“voluntary form” of community; the historical reality of revelation takes on a parallel 
communal form as church; concrete ethical relations are constitutive for both but actual 
only in the ‘community of saints.’  These departures from Barth in substance have 
methodological consequences, permitting Bonhoeffer to speak of “Christian social 
philosophy” and “Christian sociology” within the ambit of dogmatics.  On this score, his 
cousin Christoph von Hase was surely correct: “There will not be many who understand 
it, the Barthians won’t because of the sociology, and the sociologists won’t because of 
Barth.”  To clarify what neither Barth nor the sociologists could comprehend, we must 
distinguish the methodological procedure(s) of SC from its conceptual strata, showing 
how the sociological dialectic of primal, broken and reconciled community emerges from 
the theological dialectic of revelation. 
   The ‘method’ of the dissertation is roughly synonymous with its theme: 
revelation.  Under this concept the usually proposed themes of ecclesiology and sociality 
are subsumed.  The church is the historical reality or medium of revelation; sociality is 
the anthropological medium of the church.  Sociality is restored by revelation in the form 
of the church, and revelation (God) manifests itself in sociality.  So far from a tangent 
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striking a circle, revelation ‘intersects’ the world in the church, “Jesus Christ existing as 
community.”  The so-called thesis of Sanctorum Communio explicitly equates church 
with revelation in the sequence of chapter headings: “The more this investigation has 
considered the significance of the sociological category for theology, the more clearly has 
emerged the social intention of all basic Christian concepts.  ‘Person,’ ‘primal state,’ 
‘sin,’ and ‘revelation’ can be fully comprehended only in reference to sociality” (I, 21). 
The list of “basic concepts” is identical to the contents of chapters two through five, with 
the exception that “revelation” replaces “sanctorum communio.” This identification is 
repeated throughout the book, frequently formulated as “the church, or the revelation 
which we have heard” (I, 65).  This stands in marked contrast to Barth’s declaration that 
“the individual, the solitary ‘I’ is the first to be addressed.”  The ‘we’ designates the 
manner in which dogmatics presupposes the church, as context of life rather than 
authority, or as the authority of obligation to the neighbor rather than to confession.  
Sociality serves as the reference point for all theological concepts because it is the 
historical form of revelation and is recognized only in the event of revelation.
2
  Without 
the ‘suspension’ (Aufhebung) effected by revelation, there is no standpoint from which to 
grasp its significance or even its reality but only the isolation of broken community.  That 
suspension or ‘taking up’ is the method which “sets in motion” and orders the concepts of 
person, primal state, sin and church. 
 
I.  Method and Concepts. 
                                                          
2
 The original preface states the matter more directly: “Only when one comprehends the Christian basic-
relation of I and You can one understand the idea of the church as the revelation of loving hearts” (I, 22).  
Sociality (the ‘basic-relation’) serves the understanding of revelation.  Only in this sense is Bonhoeffer 
developing a ‘theology of sociality.’  
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 Barth’s dialectical method in Romans II allied Kant and Kierkegaard for an 
‘expressionistic’ subversion of the human subject’s priority in the event of revelation.  
Underlying the dialectical method was the Realdialektik of veiling and unveiling 
expressed as the dialectic of time and eternity.  The basic dialectic of revelation was in 
principle separable from any particular idiom with regard to method or substance.  Only 
in this way could Barth exchange the dialectical method for a dogmatic one and the 
dialectic of time and eternity for the concentration in Christology.  The kernel of 
continuity in that ‘real dialectic’ derives less from Kant or Kierkegaard than from Hegel, 
whose concept of “suspension” (Aufhebung) describes the core dialectic from Romans II 
to Church Dogmatics.  The subject-object relation of consciousness, inescapable in itself, 
is ‘taken up’ into the divine self-relation.  ‘Knowledge’ becomes ‘faith’ as grace creates 
an analogy between human knowledge of God and God’s own self-knowledge, as the old 
humanity ‘in Adam’ is raised up into the new humanity ‘in Christ.’  Bonhoeffer keeps the 
‘method’ of suspension but trades the epistemological for the sociological category.  The 
two subjects of ‘Adam’ and ‘Christ’ are now two communities, one broken and one 
reconciled, one in sin and the other in faith.  Where Barth’s “suspension” split the human 
subject in half, creating a “heavenly double,” Bonhoeffer locates the continuity and 
concreteness of the new self in real, volitional relations of the church community, and 
this is the key to comprehending both the methodological structure of the dissertation and 
the concepts situated within it. 
 
I.a. Methodological Unity and Plurality: Theology, Social Philosophy, and Sociology.  
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 To speak of a single ‘method’ in Sanctorum Communio seems misleading, since 
there are in fact two or three methods or “directions of approach,” a theological approach 
“from above” and social-philosophical and sociological approaches “from below” (I, 33).  
The unity of the essay consists in its theological method, which incorporates social 
philosophy and sociology by compounding the revealed form of the church with the 
phenomenological form of human spirit and the empirical form of community.  Insofar as 
“form” (Form, Gestalt) or “structure” (Struktur) or “essence” (Wesen) links all three 
levels of analysis and Bonhoeffer relies upon the methods of formal phenomenology 
borrowed from Scheler, the whole approach could be described as phenomenological.  
The theological method cannot, strictly speaking, merit the title since it exceeds the limits 
of formal phenomenology through the suspension of what is ‘given,’ and while both 
social-philosophical and sociological methods are described explicitly as 
“phenomenological,” the phenomenological character of sociology depends upon its 
philosophical presuppositions.  I will therefore refer to the three methods as theological, 
phenomenological or philosophical, and empirical or sociological.  
 Before setting forth the content and procedure of each, two difficulties deserve 
mention, one concerning the argument of the dissertation, the other its order of 
exposition.  As to the argument, Sanctorum Communio presents itself as an essay in 
ecclesiology, an attempt to understand the church from two perspectives as a sociological 
and a theological reality, as “religious community” and “community of saints.”  That 
Bonhoeffer argues as if he were trying to understand the church as a “reality of 
revelation” rather than understanding revelation through the reality of the church does 
not discredit my basic thesis that the dissertations, and his entire course of thought, is 
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about revelation.  He is simply approaching revelation from its worldly face in the 
church; the theological method of the book proves as much.  Now as to exposition, it is 
just the theological method which the sequence of concepts obscures, or rather the 
theological method covers its own tracks.  To understand the church as a religious 
community (sociologically) and as revealed (theologically) means that the sociological 
aspect is viewed “from above” or “from within,” only in light of reconciled community 
(I, 33).  The church has noetic priority.  Logically and ontologically, however, the church 
is anterior to the “primal state” and the “broken community” of sin.  This “reversed 
logic” risks hiding the very frame of reference—revelation—that makes it possible (I, 
65).   
 The illusion that the order of knowledge and the order of being are the same 
(rather than crossing along inverted paths) arises from the structural symmetry of the 
chapters or concepts, a symmetry ordered by the perspectives of social philosophy and 
sociology.  If the primal state, sin, and church all include 1) “social basic relations” 
underlying 2) those “constitutive acts” which generate 3) empirical social “structures,” 
then social philosophy treats relations while sociology deals with structures and acts.  
The formal symmetry of relations, acts and structures explains the external 
methodological unity of the essay.  The fact that reconciled, broken and original 
community are all composed of relations, acts and structures permits the comparative 
elucidation of the church’s unique form.  As Bonhoeffer remarks in the original preface, 
the church is a “unity composed of several layers of problems (Problemschichten),” and 
his goal is to “separate out these distinct (verschiedenen) layers and grasp their fitting 
together in the concept of the church” (I, 22 A).  The “layers” are those “basic Christian 
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concepts” of primal state, sin and church (I, 21).  They can form a ‘unity in the concept of 
the church’ because each is determined by its own configuration of relations, acts and 
structures.  After explaining these terms, the theological method becomes more 
intelligible. 
 
I.a.1. Social Philosophy and Sociology: Relations, Acts, and Structures. 
 Bonhoeffer devotes his first chapter to the distinction between social philosophy 
and sociology and advances the discussion sporadically throughout the rest of the essay.  
Sociology always builds on the foundation laid by social philosophy, since the “intrinsic 
connection of sociality and spirit” issues in “constitutive acts of spirit that comprise 
distinctive structures” (I, 28, 30).  Only in the circuitous course of the essay is it clear that 
the “acts” sociology investigates are acts of will and that its “structures” are social 
patterns of willing with “essential” (wesentlich) or formal qualities. Among them is the 
manner in which a structure combines the plurality, community and unity of persons.  
The character of a structure’s unity defines its “objective spirit,” for example, as a 
“collective person.”  That all of these terms belong to sociology emerges slowly over 
several chapters, and below I will give a more composite presentation of Bonhoeffer’s 
sociological vocabulary, but first we must look at social philosophy. 
 The crucial difference between Barth and Bonhoeffer comes down to the idea that 
human beings are constituted in social relationships; thus revelation is social and has an 
historical presence.  Social philosophy studies this “primordial mode-of-being of sociality 
per se” or the “social basic relation,” which has two basic forms, social-ethical and 
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metaphysical (I, 29, 59ff.).  The metaphysical cannot properly be called social but exists 
as a relation between subject and object, between a knower and the thing known.  
Metaphysical relations always fail in one of two directions, atomism or idealism, neither 
of which can balance the plurality of individuals with community and its unity.  Atomism 
sacrifices community to the individual by denying their inherent sociality; idealism 
sacrifices community to unity by dissolving the individual into an ultimate unity.  
Bonhoeffer concerns himself more with idealism than atomism, and Kant’s 
“epistemological concept of person” (another way of saying ‘metaphysical’) takes most 
of his criticism: “the synthesis of transcendental apperception resolves the opposition of 
subject and object as well as I-You relations in the higher unity of spirit, of intellectual 
intuition” (I, 40).3  He also refers to the ‘metaphysical’ or ‘epistemological’ relation as 
“immanent spirit,” which for Kant is the “highest formal principle that encompasses and 
overcomes everything material, so that the universal and spirit become identical” (I, 42).  
The result is an “ethical formalism” undermining any material (concrete) ethic, and his 
critique of Kant echoes his critique of Barth: “One is like the other…It is the destiny of 
the human species to be absorbed into the realm of reason, to form a realm of completely 
similar and harmonious persons...and so one sees that the subject-object schema can 
never lead to a sociological category” (I, 43).   
 The sociological category is the “sphere” of ethical or genuinely social basic 
relations.  Unlike idealism, it understands that there “is no cognitive way to reach [the 
other], just as there is no cognitive way to reach God” (I, 45).  Epistemological 
immanence must be abandoned for “ethical transcendence,” “cognition” (Erkenntnis) for 
                                                          
3
 Kant of course denied any notion of intellectual intuition, which entered idealist philosophy with Fichte 
and was read back into Kant by the Neo-Kantians.   
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“recognition” (Anerkenntnis), the formal for the concrete other who confronts the I as 
barrier, a ‘You’ in relation to whom the I first becomes an ‘I’ (I, 46).  The ethical basic 
relation constitutes Persons, where the metaphysical leaves over mere “individuals” or 
atomized “spirit.”  Bonhoeffer can also speak of “ethical individuals” or “original spirit,” 
since the individual is never lost in sociality, whether restored (as ethical Persons) or 
original (as primal Spirit).  In both original and restored sociality, the individual, God and 
neighbor belong together.  God’s presence in and to the neighbor explains how one 
moves from the epistemological to the sociological sphere, from metaphysical to ethical 
relations.      
 “Social basic relation” (Sozialgrundbeziehung) refers to the essentially 
intersubjective dependence of my ‘I’ upon a ‘You,’ in original, broken and restored 
forms.  Those relations underwrite all sociological types, divisible into categories 
according to the acts of will that hold them together.  Like social philosophy, sociology is 
a “phenomenological” and “systematic” rather than “genetic” discipline, delimiting the 
patterns of willing characteristic of social arrangements or communities (I, 30ff.).  
Sociological types are determined by the “direction” or “goal” (Zweck) or “content” 
(Inhalt) of willing (I, 86ff.).  If a group wills a particular content against one another, no 
social form results at all, and if they will beside one another, no community results but 
only the “mass” (Masse), a kind of mindless lockstep.  Only if a group wills together 
(Miteinander) is there community, either in the form of Society (Gesellschaft) or 
Community (Gemeinschaft).  Society is willed as a means to an end, as a “rational 
purposive will” (I, 88).  Community is an end in itself and involves a “will to meaning” 
(ibid).     
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 Acts of willing towards Society or Community configure the “plurality” of 
individuals into a “community” guided by some factor of “unity,” manifested in 
“objective spirit” (I, 97ff.).  Bonhoeffer never explicitly defines the general categories of 
plurality, community and unity, despite their obvious significance for determining social 
structure.  The concepts of plurality and community are relatively obvious: a community 
is a plurality of individuals with a purpose.  Unity as a third formal characteristic 
indicates something more substantial than just a shared idea of what the collective is ‘up 
to.’  If the cooperative will of individuals defines a community, it has a fundamentally 
active character, but there remains a passive relation as well, an inheriting of the social 
whole out of which the individual acts, so that plurality, community and unity stand in a 
circular relation.  As we will see below, ‘sociality’ consists in this passive-active relation 
to the whole.  Hegel certainly saw the matter this way, and a less logically 
overdetermined Hegelianism is transparently at work here, as Bonhoeffer’s use of 
“objective spirit” makes clear. 
 In objective spirit individuals are confronted with the “concrete totality” or 
“objectified selves” of the community, combining temporal (historical) and spatial 
(social) dimensions, and leading the individual beyond themselves to a new concreteness 
nonetheless possible only through them (I, 98-99).   Both Community and Society have 
objective spirit.  Where Community necessarily takes up its objective spirit as an end 
itself, the Society may abandon it like a mollusk shell, as a dead husk with form but no 
life, concreteness but no purpose.  Consequently, a Society cannot project itself 
symbolically beyond time and is bound by time (zeitbegrenzt), but the “temporal 
intention” of a Community is towards the boundary of time itself (grenzzeitlich) (I, 101).  
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The most important difference between Community and Society is that the objective 
spirit of the former can take on personal form as a “collective person” with its own 
“center of activity,” self-consciousness and spontaneity (I, 102).  Society cannot produce 
collective persons because a person is never a means to end, and the volitional, temporal 
and impersonal limits of Society mean that church only appears as a form of Community.    
The “principle” of the church-community is a unique social basic relation that 
unites the social forms of Community and Society through the “vicarious representative 
action” of Christ in what Bonhoeffer calls the “community of love” (Liebengemeinschaft) 
or “community of Spirit” (Geistgemeinschaft) (I, 105).  It resembles the volitional form 
of a Society by willing what is beyond itself, the will of God; but in willing God’s will, it 
takes on the volitional form of Community because the church is the ultimate object of 
God’s creative will. In willing God’s will it wills itself.  I will explicate the content of 
this social basic relation in greater detail below, but only its methodological implications 
are significant for the moment.  What is true of the basic relations here holds true for the 
structure of the essay in general: revelation “transcends” and “incorporates” not only the 
acts of will associated with Community and Society but the full pattern of original and 
broken community (I, 262).  This double movement “from above” follows Barth’s 
appropriation of Hegel, ‘canceling’ and ‘taking up’ the relations and structures of sin into 
a relation that can only be “given” and never “deduced” (I, 127, 206).  Within that 
movement, the other methods and concepts find their place. 
 
I.a.2 Theological Method: Suspension (Aufhebung).  
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 The theological method of Sanctorum Communio often appears alongside the 
sociological as one of two “perspectives” (Seiten) (above/below, inside/outside, etc.), but 
its real significance is first explained in connection with the doctrine of the primal state, 
which “forces a methodological clarification of the structure of dogmatics as a whole 
(Aufbaus der Gesamtdogmatik)” (I, 62).  The primal state also “renders concrete and 
vivid the real course of things from unity through break to unity” (ibid).  ‘Method’ speaks 
to the order of knowing, the ‘course of things’ to the order of being, and their inversion 
gives the dissertation its complex structure: 
Thus the concepts of person and community, for example, are understood only within an 
intrinsically broken history, as conveyed in the concepts of primal state, sin and reconciliation.  
Neither concept can be understood theologically ‘in itself,’ but only within a real historical 
dialectic—not a dialectic of concepts.  In this respect we differ fundamentally from idealism, for 
which origin and telos stand in real, unbroken connection...(I, 62-63).  
The order of being, the ‘real course of things’ from the unity of the primal state through 
the break of sin to the unity of reconciliation, is only visible from the eschatological 
standpoint of reconciliation.  The order of knowing “projects backwards” the light of 
reconciliation so as to gain the perspective on the order of being, the alteration of basic 
relations and empirical structures.  
 That these conceptual ‘layers’ stack up symmetrically owes to the coordinates 
provided by social philosophy and sociology, but how they form a unity cannot be 
explained “from below.”  If it were, the study would proceed synthetically, deducing the 
“essence” of the church from the forms of original and broken community, but 
Bonhoeffer insists that “methodologically, all statements are possible only on the basis of 
our concept of the church, i.e., from the revelation we have heard” (I, 64-5).  The 
relations and structures of sin and the primal state are visible from the perspective of the 
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church, “which only appears to emerge” out of the prior concepts of creation and sin 
(ibid). This “reversed logic of the theological system” gives the “method” its “theological 
character” (ibid).  Social philosophy and sociology enter into an investigation of the 
church not because they “can be proven generally on the basis of creation but because 
they are presupposed and included in revelation” (ibid).  So the study proceeds 
analytically, “separating out” what is only grasped as a unity ‘from above’ (ibid).   
  The method of Sanctorum Communio includes the sociological and philosophical 
methods within the theological.  In the overarching theological design, the 
phenomenologically apprehended form of broken community is suspended in the new 
relations and sociological forms of the church.   With this structure in view, we can 
determine the placement and significance of the guiding concepts. 
 
I.b Basic Concepts: Person, Primal State, Sin, Church. 
 After distinguishing sociology from social philosophy in the first chapter (so as to 
foreground the dogmatic method of the study), Bonhoeffer turns in the next four chapters 
to the respective concepts mentioned in reference to sociality in the preface.  The 
sequence is not a ‘logical’ one in the sense that later concepts are ‘deduced’ or ‘derived’ 
from the earlier.  Just the opposite is the case.  The church has noetic priority, even if it 
bears ontic and logical anteriority.  Because the primal state and sin precede redemption 
as “concrete states,” they precede it in the conceptual presentation.  By expanding upon 
these concepts, we expand upon the whole course of the study.   
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I.b.1 Person: Revealed Relations as Heuristic 
 Given that the (‘Christian’ and ‘revealed’) concept of Person both derives from 
the dogmatic concept of the Church and presupposes the philosophical concept of the 
primal state, it is initially unclear why it should stand on its own and prior to the primal 
state.  It is abstracted from the “concrete course of things” and offers no methodological 
elucidation. Why is it here? The simplest solution here, since Bonhoeffer does not 
explain the role of this chapter directly, is that the Person encapsulates all of the “basic 
relations” in the Sanctorum Communio and by anticipating its full content throws into 
relief from the beginning what could only be apparent from the standpoint of the final 
chapter.  Its abstraction from the concrete sequence makes the sequence itself legible.  In 
this sense, it does offer a ‘methodological’ elucidation by displacing the “epistemological 
category” with the sociological one.   
 The epistemological category names the ‘subject paradigm’ of philosophy from 
Descartes to Idealism, with its attempt to ground all knowledge in reason by first 
reflexively grounding reason in itself.  Bonhoeffer contrasts the theory of a self 
comprehended sufficiently “out of itself” with one defined by the “basic relation” 
(Grundbeziehung), a relation with social, ontic, and ethical dimensions.  As social, the 
relation between ‘I and You’ has an essential character; neither pole survives apart from 
the relation.  This grants it ontic status, for the being of both depends upon the relation, 
and ‘basic’ (Grund) carries something of this connotation.  Most importantly, the relation 
is ethical in that it involves an other who can never be reached through thought but only 
through moral demand, experienced not as an “object” but as a “barrier” (Schranke) and 
“limit” (Grenze) to the I as a whole (I, 45ff.).  “It is impossible to reach the real existence 
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of other subjects by way of the purely transcendental category of the universal” (ibid).  
The ethical opens up a “sphere” completely different from that of epistemology or 
subject-object relations.  Where Kant defined reality (Wirklichkeit) as the logical function 
of the mind’s own categories, Bonhoeffer understands it as the unassimilated You.  The 
moral self-legislation of this “self-knowing, self-acting spirit…divides the human being 
down the middle” because the “boundary between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ does not coincide with 
the boundary of the person as a whole” (I, 46).  Reminiscent of his attack on Barth’s 
“heavenly double”—for which Kant supplied the template—Bonhoeffer’s concern here is 
concreteness and history.  The whole person is addressed. 
 The ‘basic relation’ leads directly to the problem of time.  If the transcendental 
subject is merely “formal” and “inconcrete,” it construes time as a “pure form of the 
mind’s intuition…[an] essentially timeless thinking,” or a “mechanically conceived 
atom,” the smallest measurable unit of time (I, 47).  The ethical Person experiences time 
as “value-related” (weltbeziehend) or as a “moment” (Augenblick) of “responsibility” 
(Verantwortung), much like the “now time” (Jenseits) of Barth in which one stands 
“answerable” (verant-wort-lich) to the Word (Wort) (I, 48).  Such “time related to God” 
is, however, not elevated above history, not “inconcrete” or “not given” and 
“transcendental,” as for Barth in Romans II, but occurs as “concrete time” (ibid).  At 
stake here are two anthropologies, one social and the other atomistic, one ethical and the 
other “metaphysical,” one temporal and the other transcendental, one “dynamic” and the 
other “static,” one “concrete” and the other “abstract” (ibid).  In the second, conscience 
governs a rational will that ‘can’ because it ‘ought.’ In the first, conscience battles with 
an “anxious” will facing “endless decision” and “movement” (Bewegung) (I, 49).  
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 To be moved one must encounter an other, and for the Christian concept of 
Person, the primary other is God:  “For Christian philosophy, the human person 
originates only in relation to the divine; the divine person transcends the human person” 
(ibid).  The difference between God and humans is “absolute,” but its ethical exigency 
deepens with the awareness that one must “answer” (verantworten) to the barrier before 
them.  If the barrier is so “decisive,” what is its “form” (I, 50)?  Here Bonhoeffer returns 
to a set of earlier distinctions by contrasting the Person with the Individual, where 
‘individual’ is “metaphysical” and “immediately determined” (Unmittelbarbestimmung) 
or determined “through itself” (ibid).  Its reality does not depend on anything exterior.  
The Person is “ethical-social” and “reflexively determined” (Reflexivbestimmung) or 
determined “through others” (ibid).  The usage of ‘reflection’ and ‘immediacy’ may seem 
peculiar in that ‘reflection’ ordinarily summons up the image of consciousness ‘turning 
back’ upon itself or mediating everything through itself conceptually, so that the world is 
its ‘mirror.’  Bonhoeffer’s transposition of the terms is at least partially justified by their 
migration from the epistemological to the ethical sphere.   
The You of the ‘basic relation’ up to this point has been God, but now clearly 
concerns the “concrete You,” the neighbor.  If God is known through the concrete other, 
how are the two related?  This is distinct but inseparable from a second question as to 
how one enters the ethical sphere in the first place.  The limit of knowledge in the 
epistemological (Erkenntnistheorie) and ethical-social spheres differs according to the 
way one perceives the ‘other.’  Knowledge (Erkenntnis) sees another ‘I’ like unto the self 
(a determined object), recognition (Anerkenntnis) sees a ‘You’ whose meaning is hidden 
(a free subject).  The subject has no “direct experience” of this ‘I’ as a ‘You’ if grasped in 
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the “general sense of self-consciousness,” so one has to distinguish between the other as 
an “object form” and a “reality form” (Wirklichkeitsform) (I, 51).  The You is never 
thinkable or “immanent to my mind as a subject,” nor can it be “deduced” (ibid). 
Bonhoeffer’s point is familiar enough to contemporary philosophy—I cannot think my 
way to the other.  “The transcendence of the You says nothing at all about 
epistemological transcendence,” and its form is “purely ethical…experienced only by 
those facing a decision” (I, 52).4  One enters the ethical sphere through interdependence 
of self, other and God, an axiom earlier introduced (with minimal defense) as constitutive 
of the basic relation.  The ethical sphere opens, and God and neighbor are found together, 
in faith: “one person can’t know the other but can only recognize and ‘believe’ in the 
other” (I, 54).  The circle of faith now includes the neighbor, and in doing so has become 
historical and concrete.  
 The Holy Spirit creates this circle, its subject and its object, by “joining” to the 
concrete You “from whom my I arises” (ibid).  The concrete You appears as “an image 
of the divine You,” is “real and absolute and holy…[and] its claim to holiness rests in 
God alone” (I, 55).  As an object of God’s creative will, Persons stand forth in “concrete 
vitality (Lebendigkeit), wholeness (Ganzeheit), and uniqueness (Einzigentkeit),” just the 
opposite of Barth’s “heavenly double” (ibid).  The ‘taking up’ of the whole person in 
their sociality has consequences for revelation as well: 
The other person presents us with the same challenge to our knowing as God.  My real 
relationship to another person is oriented to my relationship to God.  But since I know God’s ‘I’ 
only in the revelation of God’s love, so too with the other person; here the concept of the church 
comes into play. Then it will become clear that the Christian person achieves his or her essential 
                                                          
4
 A near identical statement occurs in the prison letters:  “The transcendence of God has nothing to do with 
epistemological transcendence” (VIII, 367).     
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nature only when God does not encounter the person as You, but ‘enters into’ the person as I. (I, 
56) 
That God’s ‘I’ is known in the concrete You of the church means that ‘Person’ is a 
revealed self and that revelation has a concrete, historical form in the church.  It also 
implies that community and recognition of others becomes real only in the church, and 
we will have to ask later if Bonhoeffer thought that only Christians are Persons.  This 
seems to follow from the negative opposition between Person and Spirit as two 
completely disconnected spheres, traversed only by grace.  The doctrine of the Primal 
State shows in what sense Spirit is “an indispensable presupposition in order for the 
ethical person to come to be,” presenting Spirit in the original integrity of its sociality (I, 
57). 
 
1.b.2 Primal State as Original Community 
Having already disavowed any ‘speculative’ or ‘idealist’ knowledge of Spirit and 
Person in their “essence,” Bonhoeffer adds that “essence, nature and history” cannot be 
thought “in general terms” but only in the context of revelation (I, 60).  Human essence is 
therefore thinkable, and philosophy possible, in light of revelation.  The essence of 
humanity is fulfilled in the Christian Person, true philosophy is Christian philosophy.  
One could conclude that humanity and reason are void in themselves, that creation and 
Fall are identical or that the Fall leaves no remainder.  If the Person belongs to the ethical 
sphere of revelation and reconciliation, then the individual belongs to the unreconciled 
sphere of sin. Does sin exhaust the essence of humanity apart from revelation?  
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  The Primal State offers a philosophy of Spirit prior to the Fall, and although we 
have no experience of it, Bonhoeffer insists on its reality and concreteness, its place in 
the “inner historical dialectic” or “inner history” of the church, which he once more 
contrasts with ‘idealist’ philosophies of history as “unilinear” (I, 58-9 A).  A philosophy 
of Spirit includes not only its essential structure, its combination of individuality and 
sociality, but also the “essential acts of willing” that belong to that structure and the types 
or forms of community they produce.  These are the “pure” social-philosophical and 
sociological aspects of the essay.  
 Spirit as the negative reflection of Person appeared as atomistic and asocial, but 
now “Spirit in general” appears as “woven into a web of sociality,” which originates in its 
“structural openness” and “closure” (I, 65).  These descriptions belong neither to ethical 
nor to the epistemological sphere and beg the question of self-consciousness.  Self-
consciousness is the defining feature of Spirit, but if Spirit is constitutively social, then 
self-consciousness must originate in sociality (we might say ‘intersubjectivity’).  
Phenomenology discovers that “material spirituality [materialle Geistigkeit] is personally 
bound together in self-consciousness (Selbstbewuβtsein) and self-determination 
(Selbstbestimmung) as documenting its structural unity, formally determinative [formal 
bestimmbar] as the principle of receptivity and activity” (I, 67).  The inner core of Spirit 
includes a double dialectic, first between self-consciousness and self-determination, and 
from this the dialectic between structural openness and closure.  For the sake of 
simplicity, let us call these the primary and secondary spiritual (geistig) dialectics 
respectively, in order to differentiate them from the theological and sociological 
dialectics (“suspension” and the “concrete course of things”). Upon the dialectic of 
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openness and closure are founded those various spiritual acts underlying the volitional 
acts and empirical forms of sociology.   
 The secondary spiritual dialectic is constructed to avoid collapsing the social into 
the individual or the individual into the social.  Openness establishes the basic sociality of 
Spirit as coming to self-awareness through others; closure establishes the individuality of 
Spirit as irreducible to impersonal social processes.  Structural openness and closure, 
sociality and individuality, are balanced in the concept of a collective person, or the 
‘personal’ character of the social whole (objective spirit).  In the course of elaborating 
these concepts, Bonhoeffer relies on a philosophical vocabulary of his own tailoring, and 
the seams are not always well aligned.  We will have to take care in defining the terms 
here so that the systematic analysis below judges his pattern correctly.   
 The several distinctions just mentioned contain further distinctions of their own, 
and definitions are not always forthcoming.  The primary spiritual dialectic of 1) self-
consciousness and self-determination is 2) the “principle” of activity and receptivity, 
which manifest their potentiality 3) in acts (partly passive) of thinking, willing and 
feeling, and these in turn 4) arise only from a sociality rooted 5) in the secondary spiritual 
dialectic of openness and closure.  Let us untangle these elements in turn.  Self-
consciousness is the inner awareness I have of myself as a unity and includes a volitional 
element (intentionality), and this is what he means by self-determination.  To say that the 
two stand in a dialectical relation is to say that one is irreducible to the other, self-
consciousness is not purely will, anymore than self-determination is a pure mode of 
knowledge.  Ernst Tugendhat has expressed the matter well:  
103 
 
The relation in which we speak of self-determination appears somehow to be founded as 
a higher level upon this relation to ourselves [i.e., self-consciousness] that we have in doing and 
wanting something.  We have the possibility to disengage ourselves from what we do and want 
and from the intersubjective roles in which we function, and to ask ourselves, Who am I in all of 
this?  And this means, of course, What do I myself want? What does the talk of ‘I’ and ‘self’ 
signify here?  It obviously has something to do with the autonomy and self-determination of the 
agent…opposed to the expectations of others, to existing intersubjective norms and to one’s own 
instinctual drives.
5
 
As Tugendhat points out later (vis-à-vis Heidegger), self-consciousness (1) is never the 
kind of stale, formal relation that Descartes or Kant imagined but rather a disposing of 
oneself, a directing of the being extant in awareness towards an end.  The two are 
dialectically related but self-consciousness always retains a certain primacy over the self-
determination it exercises and over the ‘doing and wanting’ (2, 3) that belong to myself 
as well as (4) the ‘intersubjective roles’ in which those interior acts occur (without 
reduction to their processes).   
 Like Tugendhat, Bonhoeffer wants to distinguish between a basic or primary 
sense of self in distinction from any specific act (of doing, wanting, thinking, willing, or 
feeling) and the sociality in which the self is embedded.  Like Tugendhat, he also sees 
language as the medium of sociality and self-consciousness but does not go so far as to 
reduce self-consciousness to a propositional structure (he also develops no theory of 
language).  This leads Bonhoeffer to talk about activity and passivity, thinking, willing 
and feeling, even though he admits the terms are “outdated” (I, 67).  Activity and 
passivity only refer to the spontaneity of the self and its simultaneous dependence on an 
exterior, determined abstractly or in principle by the primary spiritual dialectic in that 
self-consciousness is presupposed by both.    The linguistic mediation of self-
consciousness threatens to wash the self out into a “great sea of Spirit” but is protected by 
                                                          
5
 Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewuβtsein und Selbstbestimmung, trans. Paul Stern, Self-Consciousness and Self-
Preservation, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986), p. 21.   
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a further distinction between “structure” and “intention” (ibid).  “Structure” corresponds 
to the “bond” of self-consciousness and self-preservation that gives Spirit its “structural 
unity,” while “intention” encompasses the range of “actions” associated with receptivity 
and activity which are “only real in sociality” (ibid).  As the primary spiritual dialectic is 
the “principle” of activity/receptivity, structure “becomes visible only in the individual 
intentions to action, but in principle is independent of them” (ibid).  These internal acts 
are further differentiated from the “will to community” (Gemeinschaftswille) as having 
an “indirect” relation to community.  Where the latter takes “empirical community” as its 
“content,” the former is “purely ontological” and thus within the perspective of social 
philosophy (ibid).  
    The primary spiritual dialectic maintains the individuality of the self as it moves 
within the “stream of spirit” whose current is driven by language, for every individual 
and every “intellectual act” assumes the possibility of “understanding, expressing 
themselves, and being understood” (I, 68).  Bonhoeffer even approves Hamann’s thesis 
that language precedes thought, so that “with language a system of social spirit has been 
built into the human being…‘objective spirit’ has become effective in history” (I, 70).  
Language depends on the “objective intention of meaning,” on will in the “purely 
phenomenological-structural sense,” but intention is bound to language and therefore 
depends on sociality (I, 69).  His conclusion, that “there would be no self-consciousness 
without community” and that the two arise “concurrently,” is balanced by the caveat that 
reflexive access to the “genesis” of self-consciousness is impossible (I, 70ff.).  But this 
flatly contradicts his attempts to demonstrate the structural interdependence of 
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subjectivity in “intention” and “recognition”—to show how self-consciousness originates 
in social interaction.   
Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer is not attached to any particular theory of self-
consciousness, so long as it maintains both the individuality and sociality of Spirit.  What 
his project in the dissertation does require is a volitional focus to secure the threads  of 
argument, and he follows Scheler by depicting self-consciousness as generated from a 
contest of wills within a community, from “resistance” (Widerstände) or “strife” (Kampf) 
(I, 72).  The particular combination of volitional and intellectual acts defines the 
structural openness of spirit, its essential relatedness or sociality. 
Spirit is also structurally closed, not only a “passive receptacle” but an active 
“bearer” of the “great social nexus” (I, 73).  So conceived, intersubjectivity would be 
meaningless without subjectivity (an ‘I’ must persist in the I-You relation), but the 
balance is difficult to maintain for reasons already suggested.  “One cannot speak of the 
priority of either personal or social being” but must also admit that the “structural unity 
of the I is given as an experience already in the experience of the You…[and] cannot be 
constituted by acts” (I, 75).  Hegel rightly saw “that there is an objective spirit, the spirit 
of sociality, which is distinct in itself from all individual spirit,” but he destroyed the 
individual by submerging it in the impersonal unity of Absolute Spirit (I, 74).  
Bonhoeffer’s solution, following Scheler, is to construe the objective spirit of the 
community as personal, as a “collective person” or a “corporate individual” with the 
“same structure as an individual person” (I, 77).  This is much more than metaphor.  The 
collective person has its own will, spontaneity and even self-consciousness, and by 
participating in a personal unity the personal character of the individual is strengthened 
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rather than abolished.  I will try to show the intelligibility of this concept below, along 
with Bonhoeffer’s illustration of the Leibnizian monad.  The real point for now is that the 
community itself is personal and therefore “concrete.”  In the collective person of the 
church, revelation attains its concrete historical form. 
I have already mentioned the sociological concepts presented in the 
methodological discussion raised in connection with the primal state 
(Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, the “bond” (Verband) of wills, its “direction” and “strength,” 
etc.).  I also noted that objective spirit communicates the “concrete totality” of a 
community in the temporal dialectic of “being moved” and “being objectified” (I, 99).  
But these are ethical categories, and time in the sense of “being moved” belongs after the 
Fall, to the ‘knowledge of good and evil’ that is the making of history.  Yet the primal 
state aims to represent Spirit in its original integrity.  Two trains of thought collide here.  
All sociological and social-philosophical principles should derive from revelation.  There 
can be no ‘general’ account of humanity in its social relations and structures, save one 
warped by sin, and speculation proves a dead end in this respect.  Even so, the primal 
state should paint a portrait of humanity prior to sin and in light of the true humanity 
revealed in Christ.  The contradiction appears when the terms of revelation are transferred 
to the primal state alongside a sociological vocabulary of other provenance.  Social-
theoretical concepts should be cut only from the ‘real dialectic’ in which they operate, 
and so Bonhoeffer elaborates his theoretical vocabulary piecemeal throughout the essay.  
But the concepts obviously stand on their own in many cases as part of general social-
theoretical framework taken from formal sociology and phenomenology.  Again, a full 
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consideration of the problem waits below.  Similar but less disruptive questions confront 
his treatment of sin. 
 
I.b.3. Sin as Broken Community 
Sin has its own unique basic relation, “demanding” rather than “giving,” “selfish” 
rather than “loving” (I, 108, 107).   “Isolation” now replaces shared life in God, and the 
law of conscience, which enters only after the Fall, throws each person back upon their 
own culpability.  Still, sociality is not lost but distorted, and humans remain aware of 
their essential relation to others.  The “natural forms of community” (marriage, family, 
government) remain but are “corrupted in their inmost core” and “emptied of their 
content” (I, 108).  Individuals no longer will a shared vision and each other as ends in 
themselves, but now will only themselves and everything as a “means to one’s own end” 
(ibid).  This self-will defines the corrupted basic relation of “solitude,” the awareness of 
separation from God and from others before God.  It remains social in the sense that the 
individual is nonetheless aware of being one among many cast into solitude, a ‘person of 
unclean lips, surrounded by a people of unclean lips.’  Sin takes on the paradoxical form 
of solitude as a consciously shared state.   
As before, Bonhoeffer interprets theological concepts through sociological ones, 
in this case replacing the “biological” notion of sin with a “Christian-ethical” 
understanding of its universality and transmission (I, 111, 112).  By “Christian-ethical” 
he has in mind a focus on volition or action and goes so far as to say that the definition of 
the human species should be limited to persons of responsible action (deliberately 
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excluding children and apparently the “mentally deficient”).  The theological problems of 
universality and transmission, the double aspect of ‘original sin,’ converge in the 
sociological problem of how the act of the whole is present in the act of the individual, 
which necessarily leads Bonhoeffer back to the concept of a collective person.   
In their rebellion against God, individuals become aware that in them the whole 
has risen up against God, and the knowledge of this mutual failure of personal and 
universal vocation generates an “experience of common sinfulness,” being one of many 
sinners before God, without excuse (I, 116).  This awareness of the whole revolting in the 
individual is asserted without further reflection and serves as the basis for the rest of 
Bonhoeffer’s deliberations on sin.  It is perhaps partially substantiated by the observation 
that the consciousness of isolation does not create sociality, which is “independent” of 
and “preexists” it, but is a reflex of its destruction (ibid).  The “ontic-ethical separateness 
of persons” is preserved “in a sinful way [i.e., isolation], whose ‘overcoming’ 
[Aufhebung] is only possible in the concept of the church” (I, 117).  The “experience of 
common sinfulness” must also, then, preserve a form of community (or I-You relations) 
that does not completely degenerate into a mere plurality but remains a unity (an 
elementary feature of all Spirit in its sociality).   
The sociological unity of sinful or ‘Adamic’ humanity (Adamsmenschheit) is, 
claims Bonhoeffer, an ethical collective person in the “concrete situation of being 
addressed by a You” (I, 118).6  God calls not only or primarily individuals but also 
communities, and so the call comes to the ethical collective person of the community, not 
                                                          
6
 His question whether the collective person is also ‘ethical’ suggests that a collective person could exist 
which is not ethical, but this violates the definition of ‘person.’    
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the individual.  Communities as well as individuals face judgment and grace, as does the 
church, the “community which is from God and to God” (I, 101).  In the individual the 
“one conscience” that is simultaneously the conscience of the community is addressed by 
God, so that each individual is an “integrated being” struggling for an “integrated 
decision,” not a structural duality with “two layers” of sociality and inward intentions (I, 
120).
7
  But a fundamental duality does mark the “universal community” 
(Gesamtgemeinschaft) of ‘Adam,’ in that its unity is the unity of solitude, a “collective 
person yet infinitely fragmented,” a humanity with “one heart” stained by infinite and 
reciprocal selfishness (I, 121).  
Even granting the validity of the concept of a “collective person,” this portrayal of 
the solidarity of ‘original sin’ still faces at least one obstacle on its own terms.  Recall 
that only Communities can produce the forms of objective spirit proper to collective 
persons and that Communities are constituted by the willing of a common ‘content’ 
central to the Community, so that the Community becomes end in itself.  The peccatorum 
communio clearly fails on these criteria.  Adamic humanity is not willed as an end in 
itself, since self-will destroys all will to community.  At best, one could argue that ‘self-
will’ somehow aims at a shared content (each individual self), but it is still external to the 
community and would constitute a Society, not a Community.  In either case, no 
‘collective person’ is here possible by its own definition, but a collective person is 
required if the duality of sinful humanity is to be “superseded (aufgehoben) through the 
unity of the new humanity in Christ,” the Church (I, 121).     
 
                                                          
7
 On structure and intention, see above, p. 108.  
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I.b.4  The Church as Reconciled Community 
 Sin remains in the church and remains real.  Grace has overcome sin and 
overcome it in reality.  The reality of grace and the reality of sin stand alongside one 
another in the church as an object of revelation and hope, for Christ replaces Adam “only 
eschatologically” (I, 124).  In this way the “lines of thought pursued thus far [person, 
primal state, sin] converge…are carried to their logical conclusion and transcended in 
both senses of ‘sublation’ [aufgehoben]” (I, 124 A).  The “old ontic relations” of sin are 
not “radically abolished” (radikal aufgehoben), so what is “unprecedentedly novel” in the 
church is the “necessary bond between the basic relations and the empirical form of 
community,” which “constitutes the essence of the church” (I, 125).  Not only the basic 
relation itself but its bond with the empirical structure sets the church apart from all 
other communities.  Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of the church is founded on these three 
elements: Christ’s vicarious representative action as establishing a new basic relation, the 
Holy Spirit as the bond between that relation and the empirical structure, and the 
elements of that structure in the cultus.   
 The basic relation forged in the “vicarious representative action” of Christ exists 
in conflict with the basic relations of sin, or rather in a double relation according to 
which the church is already “realized” and “consummated” (Vollendung) in eternity but 
also “actualized” or becoming in time, as ecclesia triumphans and ecclesia militans.  This 
corresponds to the aforementioned distinction between “gift” (Gabe) and “task” 
(Aufgabe) and to a series of other conceptual pairs, including the “essential” and 
“empirical” church, “invisible” and “visible,” the “Realm of God” and the “Rule of God.”  
Each expresses in some form the Pauline tension between ‘already’ and ‘not yet,’ a 
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tension that can be released on the side of historical immanence or eschatological 
transcendence.  According to Bonhoeffer, liberal theology characteristically falls to the 
side of immanence, Barth to the side of transcendence.  He confusingly refers to these as 
“historicizing” and “religious” tendencies, but only the former has anything to do with 
“religion” in the sense Barth and Bonhoeffer ordinarily use the word (I, 125).  The 
“religious” error in fact catches both sides in the debate between Barth and Eric Petersen, 
so that “historicity is either objectified and deified, as in Catholicism, or simply regarded 
as accidental…circumventing God’s will that all God’s revelation, both in Christ and in 
the Church, be concealed under the form of historical life…[rather] it loses its real 
character and becomes formalistic” (I, 125-6).8  Only when the Word is properly 
understood, from within, as the principle of the community can the relation and structure 
of the church come into view.      
 In an excursus on the concept of the church in the New Testament, Bonhoeffer 
begins to spell out the meaning of the Word as fulcrum between the two communities.  
Christ is “foundation” and “completion,” part and whole; “being in Christ” and “being in 
the church community” (Gemeinde) are the same; the church is a collective person; it is 
the presence of Christ, as Christ is the presence of God; the church is the “form of 
revelation, Jesus Christ existing as community,” and is “visible” only as a social body in 
worship and mission, “invisible” in its full eschatological reality (I, 134-141).9  These 
ideas drawn from the NT are reducible to two basic theses, that 1) the reality of the 
church in Christ is caught between its temporal and eternal poles and 2) its temporal pole 
is the personal presence of divine revelation, “Jesus Christ existing as church-
                                                          
8
 Recalling the licentiate thesis regarding the ‘dialectic of dialectical theology.’ 
9
 Note the correspondence to several of his licentiate theses.   
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community.”  They correspond loosely to the themes of “realization” and “actualization,” 
to the extent that the former concerns the eternal foundation of the church in Christ and 
the latter its temporal ‘building up’ in the Spirit.   
 Bonhoeffer’s systematic discussion of the church is structured according to three 
concepts or problems:  realization in Christ, actualization in the Spirit, and the relation 
between Holy Spirit and human spirit.  The first deals with basic relations (social 
philosophy), the third with empirical structures (sociology).  The second establishes that 
“necessary relation” between relations and structures distinguishing the essence of the 
church community from all others: 
 The church does not first become real when it assumes empirical form, when the Holy 
Spirit does God’s work.  The reality of the church of the Holy Spirit is just as much a revelational 
reality; the only thing that matters is to believe this revelational reality in the empirical form.  As 
Christ and the new humanity now necessarily belong together, so the Holy Spirit must now be 
understood as being at work only in this new humanity.  It is evidently a mistake, therefore, to 
attempt to reflect on the objective work of the Holy Spirit independently of the church-
community.  The Spirit is only in the church-community, and the church-community is only in the 
Spirit. (I, 144) 
The actualizing work of the Spirit links the basic relations made real in Christ with the 
empirical, objective form of the church.  The ‘necessity’ that binds them is the necessity 
of faith, the Spirit’s act “in me” creating the whole event of revelation, subject and 
object, election and sanctification.  The Spirit can no more be separated from the prior 
realization of the church in Christ than from the empirical form of the community which 
is its exclusive province.
10
  An overview of these concepts (realization of basic relations 
in Christ, their actualization in the Spirit, and the empirical forms of human spirit in 
grace) will complete the exposition of Sanctorum Communio and prepare us to place it in 
a broader analytic and genetic context.   
                                                          
10
 So much for Green’s claim that Bonhoeffer “offers the most catholic of ecclesiologies”  Green,  
Bonhoeffer, 52.  
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 The “realization” of the church in eternity is the event of election and divine 
decision and is therefore “completed” (vollendet).  The “foundation stone” is laid and the 
“head” established, while the edifice is “built up” and the body grows in time rooted in 
the “life principle of the new basic relations of social existence…analogous to the basic 
relations established in Adam and their preservation [Aufhebung]” (I, 142, 143-4).  God 
decision goes out not primarily to individuals but to a community, called together around 
the Word as the “temporal, clear expression of the supratemporality of election” (IX, 
312).   The Word greets humanity as a whole, a collective person: 
Now since in the individual guilty act it is precisely the humanity of human beings that has been 
affirmed, humanity has to be considered a community.  As such it is also a collective person, but a 
collective person that has the same nature as each of its members.   In Christ this tension between 
isolation from, and bondage to, each other is abolished [aufgehoben] in reality.  The cord between 
God and human beings that was cut by the first Adam is tied anew by God, by revealing God’s 
own love in Christ, but no longer approaching us in demand and summons, purely as You, but 
instead by giving God’s own self as an I, opening God’s own heart.  The church is founded on the 
revelation of God’s heart.    (I, 145)  
To say that God ‘reties the knot’ of love between God and humans is to say that a new 
basic relation has been created.  Through his vicarious representative action (love), the 
“history of Christ” overcomes the history of sin, and the eternity of Christ overcomes the 
time of Adam, issuing in the new time of the church, a time actualized in the Holy Spirit 
in the form of renewed  social basic relationships.  To understand the realization of the 
church in Christ according to Bonhoeffer, we need to see in what sense vicarious 
representative action is representative of all,  how it ‘suspends’ time as a mode of 
isolation, and how it leads to new social basic relations in time.   
 The new humanity is a unity in Christ, concentrated in a “single point” and 
established “once for all” by his vicarious representative action; representative function is 
bound up with finality (I, 146).  Christ “represents the whole of humanity in his historical 
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life” because that life gathers up history into itself and because the personal message of 
Jesus places him in opposition to—in solitude before—the whole of humanity (ibid).  The 
‘historical life’ of Christ has these two senses, the individual life testified to in the 
Gospels and the ‘real dialectic’ (of Adam and Christ) that encompasses the divided 
courses of history, and their real meaning and unity is inaccessible apart from the Word.  
Bonhoeffer interprets the personal history of Jesus through a more or less standard 
Lutheran version of the relation between Law and Gospel.   Christ places himself ‘under 
the Law’ in order to turn the Law back on Israel, condemning all in shared solitude, so 
that Israel is part of Adam.  In his preaching of the Kingdom and repentance, Christ 
“reveals God’s ultimate claim,” and the recognition of our failure makes way for Christ’s 
gift (I, 149).  For all who acknowledge their solitude, “hear and believe,” God creates a 
new community from the cross, whose curse Christ bears because of his singular 
obedience.  In accepting the punishment for our sins (Bonhoeffer points to Luther here), 
Christ stands in our place, is our vicarious representative.  Christ ‘represents the whole of 
humanity in his historical life’ in that he is rejected by all, Jew and Greek, and sent to the 
cross. 
 The retrospective of the resurrection brings the full meaning of his personal 
history into view as part of the ‘real historical dialectic’ in which Christ overcomes the 
broken history of sin.  In the resurrection, Christ’s ‘body’ is realized “only insofar as it 
has now run the dialectical course of its history,” taking up the broken world into itself (I, 
152).  One enters this history only by the Word, in being addressed as a sinner, found in 
solitude, and restored to community through faith—in short, by being “suspended” or 
“overcome” as a child of Adam. 
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 To enter Christ is to leave the form of time and history “constituted by sin and 
death,” in which past and future are set against one another.  Unfortunately, Bonhoeffer 
does not much elaborate his understanding of time and history, but isolation is the 
distinguishing feature of time in sin.  A ‘history’ in which one has no real community or 
relations is a history of atomized moments—a sense of time, as Bonhoeffer says earlier, 
more fit to the physicist than the musician.  With these thoughts he has come near to 
Augustine on the extension of the soul. Temporally retrojected and projected, the unity of 
the soul is found in memory and anticipation, the whole always present in the parts, as the 
anticipated whole of a melody grants each note its meaning.  Death and sin shatter the 
melody into a mere non-sequence of notes, where “life abiding in love breaks the 
continuity of the historical process” and unites past and future for us in the death and 
resurrection of Christ (I, 146).  Faith and election create a community from isolation by 
reestablishing a coda that orients the scattered, discordant notes to itself.   
 Vicarious representative action therefore leads to the “paradoxical reality of the 
cross-community, which contains within itself the contradiction of simultaneously 
representing utmost solitude and closest community” (I, 151).  Solitude has reached its 
deepest because the call and commandment of God has touched all, Jew and Greek.  
Community is closest in that the goal which unites is God as the community itself, so that 
the community wills itself only by willing God.  The community of the cross reflects 
Christ’s vicarious representative action in its three basic social relationships of plurality, 
community, and unity.  The death of Christ isolates individuals into a plurality, each 
conscience admitting culpability in rejecting the claim of God he represents.  The 
resurrection makes the community of the cross into a unity through justification, all 
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becoming one in the collective person of Christ.  With the community between God and 
humans restored by love, human beings are restored to loving community with one 
another.    
 In Christ God creates the reality of a “pardoned humanity…not religion, but 
revelation, not religious community, but church…[and yet] there is a necessary 
connection between revelation and religion as well as between religious community and 
church” (I, 153).  This ‘necessary connection’ founds a twofold relation between Christ 
and the church.  On the one hand, the “church is already completed in Christ, time is 
suspended (aufgehoben)” or the “border of history marked by death is abolished 
(aufgehoben)” (I, 154, 151).  On the other, the church is to be actualized in time and 
history through the Holy Spirit.  The ‘necessary connection’ here is identical with that 
previous ‘necessary connection’ by which the Spirit bridges the questions of realization 
and the empirical form of the community.  The church is real, the outward form of 
community must be actualized. 
 But what is ‘real’ if not ‘actual’?  Bonhoeffer’s use of these terms reflects what 
Christoph Schwöbel has called Barth’s “inversion” of “the modern paradigm,” reversing 
the priority of knowing over being as well as the priority of possibility over actuality.
11
  
Revelation demands both.  The theological method makes the first inversion.  One must 
be within revelation to know it, and there is no hope of thinking one’s way to the other.  
The being of revelation as church makes the second inversion: 
But we must pay strict attention to the fact that here the counterpart of actualization by the Holy 
Spirit is not potentiality in Christ, but the reality of revelation in Christ.  This is the foundation for 
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 Christoph Schwöbel, “Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 29.  
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the entire understanding of the problem of the church…the church that is established in Christ and 
already completed in reality must necessarily be actualized. (I, 144)  
Appeals to ‘possibility’ as the counterpart of ‘actuality’ would “destroy the reality 
character of redemption,” and faith in the reality of justification and reconciliation (the 
church) is only possible in the actual church (ibid).  In both inversions, Bonhoeffer has 
followed Barth with a predictable twist.  If for Barth the “being of God must be 
understood as the ground for knowledge of God” and “the actuality of the Word of God 
determines the possibility of theology,” then the being of the church as the being of 
Christ preconditions both the knowledge of God and the actuality of the church as the 
place where the Word is spoken (theology).
12
  Bonhoeffer’s unwillingness to separate the 
Word from the community in which it is spoken forces him to these conclusions. 
 The main difference between realization and actualization, though, is that 
realization lacks temporal concreteness; in the divided path of history, it tracks with the 
undercurrent of eternity, bending time towards itself through the Word.  Actualization 
begins with the “social nexus” initiated by the Word, in which Christ is present through 
the Spirit, and Bonhoeffer draws a familiar circle linking Christ, Spirit, faith and Word 
(I,158).  The Word has three ‘modes of operation’ analogous to the three social basic 
relations in Christ.  As Christ’s death breaks the plurality of sinners into “isolation” 
(Alleinsein), the Spirit as personal will leads the plurality of elect into “solitude” 
(Einsamkeit), a reckoning of the individual with the “claim” and “gift” of the Spirit (I, 
162).  As the vicarious action or love of Christ brings community by opening again 
relations within humanity and between humanity and God, the Spirit presses all towards 
the church-community itself as the object of God’s creative will, where the other (contra 
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Barth) is no mere “parable” and “proxy” for the divine Other but is “infinitely important” 
(I, 169ff.).  The new social basic relations here are “giving” not “demanding,” but the I-
You relation of “solitude” remains as the Law remains with the Gospel.   It is 
“overcome” (überwinden) and “abolished” (aufgehoben), but never completely, never 
‘radically.’ Finally, as the resurrection of Christ ‘justifies’ the community as a unity, in 
the Spirit Christ is present as a “concrete” collective person, the “social form” of the 
church’s unity.   
 Subtending the collective person as the form of unity is the objective spirit of the 
church community, from which spring the empirical social structures of the human spirit 
adopted by the Holy Spirit in grace.  This structure is not decisive, however, for the thesis 
of this chapter or the study as whole, and so I will conclude with a few selective remarks.  
The non-necessity of dealing with the particulars of the empirical form when 
understanding the theological structure of the church is given by Bonhoeffer himself: the 
objective spirit and its forms are not identical with the Holy Spirit.  Objective spirit gets 
its character from its “historical context” and always differs (I, 215).   The “material” 
relation between the empirical and essential churches is found in the Holy Spirit, so that 
outlining the nature of the essential church and the Spirit effectively settled the 
fundamental questions concerning the relation between church and revelation.  With 
regard to the empirical church, three other points may be made briefly. 
 First, and alongside this “material” unity of the church, Bonhoeffer asks about a 
“logical” unity or the possibility that everything referred to under the label of the church 
could really belong together in a single concept.  The Word provides for this unity by 
gathering all individuals into empirical congregations as collective persons and finally 
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into the one collective person of Christ according to the “function” of the body of Christ 
(I, 225).  The next two points follow from this and will reveal their full significance later 
when considering Bonhoeffer’s complete thought-form.  If the Word holds together all 
aspects of the empirical and essential church in its function, then, second, the 
“sociological functions” of the church relate directly to the Word.  The congregation’s 
sociological reality is in the assembly for preaching and sacrament, and while the 
assembly gathers to hear the preached Word, it also “bears” the office of preaching.  The 
Word is inseparable from the church, the community of faith, just as the community is 
inseparable from the Word (I, 232ff).  The congregation and not the Word alone is the 
presupposition, the reality, of revelation.  Third, however, there is the question of right 
preaching, which is the question of teaching or theology, a question of “authority and 
freedom” with regard to the Word and church doctrine (I, 250ff).  These three elements in 
Bonhoeffer’s discussion of the church will correspond to three forms of theological 
knowledge, as we will see shortly.  The remaining topics of the dissertation (the 
placement of the church among sociological types, faith and the “experience” of the 
church, and eschatology) add nothing to our exposition of Bonhoeffer’s concept of the 
church as a solution to the problem of revelation and may be set aside.  With the three 
preceding points, one sees that the entire scope of the church is referred back to the Word 
and to the theological dialectic as the unexamined presupposition of the whole study.  AB 
fills the lacuna at the center of SC.           
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 ACT AND BEING: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE RESOLVED IN THE 
CHURCH 
 
 After completing his dissertation in December 1927, Bonhoeffer left the 
following January for a pastoral appointment to a German congregation in Barcelona, 
Spain.  The change of climate seems to have yielded, or at least helped along, certain 
theological changes as well.  One of the last entries in his Barcelona diary (Mar 10, 1928) 
reflects a perplexity towards his new direction: “My theology is beginning to become 
humanistic; what does that mean? I wonder whether Barth ever lived abroad?”1  The 
significance of this “humanistic” departure from Barth becomes more apparent as the 
Spanish sojourn wears on.  Spain’s relative political peace and the sincere piety of his 
parishioners led Bonhoeffer to a new question regarding ‘strength of life.’  Shortly after 
his last diary entry in a letter to Walter Dreβ, he remarks that “my previous understanding 
of dogmatics is being seriously questioned by all these new impressions in a country that 
has known neither war nor revolution, neither a youth movement nor a Spengler…In any 
case, I know have serious questions about whether Barth could have written in Spain” (X, 
76).  In order to turn his “Berlin winter theology” towards spring and summer, he would 
have to revise it “from the ground up” (X, 77).   
 The absence of war and the nationalist enthusiasm it generated in Germany 
apparently allowed Bonhoeffer to reconsider pietism.  Writing to Dreβ again (April 20), 
he comments on the “uninhibited theological element” of a certain inauspicious book, its 
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“enormous piety,” the sense for which “Barth somewhat blunted” in him (X, 87).  
Bonhoeffer goes so far as to admit that “Barth has become quite dangerous personally for 
me as well, a fact I sense with increasing clarity here in the life of the congregation when 
I occasionally…people characterized by an extremely strong piety or even pietism” 
(ibid).  He hardly restricts the recognition of such piety to the ‘holy’ but finds it also in 
“people with passions, criminal types, small people with small goals, small drives and 
small crimes…real people” (X, 127).  It is these people who “stand more under grace 
than under wrath,” whereas “it is precisely the Christian world that stands more under 
wrath than under grace,” a world he judges as a “masquerade” (ibid).  In this same letter, 
Bonhoeffer also partially acknowledges Widmann’s insistence that there are 
“sociological prerequisites” for theology.  If the sermon and its hearers are “grasped by 
Christ,” then “Christ becomes flesh as much in the word of the pietists as in that of the 
clerics or of the religious socialists…[and] these empirical connections actually pose 
difficulties for preaching that are absolute, not merely relative” (X, 127-8).  “At the most 
profound level,” he admits, “people are simply not all one, but are individuals, totally 
different people, people ‘united’ only by the word in the church” (ibid).  This holds true 
for teaching as well as preaching, and during his tenure as assistant vicar, Bonhoeffer 
delivered three lectures and a number of sermons.  The three lectures correspond rather 
neatly to the epistemic, historical and ethical circles, so we shall ask first to what extent 
his new found humanism has altered the connections forged in Berlin (I), turning then to 
the habilitation essay, Act and Being, in order to analyze the structure of its argument (II).  
The conclusion will then gather up the threads of this study to consider the unity of the 
dissertations and the thought-form that embraces them.   
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I.  The Will is a Wild Bull: Barcelona and the ‘Strength of Life.’ 
 
 While in Barcelona, Bonhoeffer took in at least two bullfights, to great theological 
effect.  Observing that the bourgeois spectators believe they “owe it to their central 
European civilization to be shocked,” he still finds that behind the lust for “blood and 
cruelty,” it is also true that “wild, unrestrained power and blind rage…ultimately 
succumb[s] to disciplined courage, presence of mind, and skill” (X, 83).  “Not by 
accident,” the bullfight exists alongside a “most gloomy Catholicism” as a “remnant of 
unrestrained, passionate life…the Sunday corrida constituting the necessary counterpart 
to the mass” (X, 77).  This element of ‘unrestraint’ is perhaps what Bonhoeffer has in 
mind when he likens Spain to Germany, musing that neither nation “completely opened 
up to humanism” so that “a remnant of something else always persisted” beneath or 
alongside the inheritance of classical western antiquity (X, 89). Indeed, a kind of vitalistic 
Nietzschean affirmation of the will is combined with Luther’s admonition to “sin boldly” 
in the final lecture on ethics.  Bonhoeffer seems pulled thereby between not two but three 
poles, not merely between Barth and the humanistic, pietistic, liberal Protestantism of 
Berlin, but now too a second humanism opposed to both, a humanism of “strong life,” a 
humanism not of the good but of the capable, the powerful will. 
 The capacity and struggle of the will for obedience was, as we have seen, a 
distinct—and distinctly “unBarthian”—theme present in his writings from the beginning.  
If a new emphasis is readily identifiable at all, it appears in rhetoric that closely 
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resembles that of the prison letters, although the language of the sermons and the lecture 
series is noticeably different on this point.  While no single trope shapes all of the 
sermons, a collection of related themes repeat themselves throughout.  Near to the center 
of this rhetorical constellation is the concept of life, understood as strong or weak.  
Weakness belongs to death, the world, loneliness, homelessness, judgment, guilt and 
time.  Strength belongs to life, the church, solidarity, home, grace, forgiveness and 
eternity.  The dualism of time and eternity, religion and revelation, sin and justification 
remains, but the focus of the sermons, including the choice of texts, increasingly tends 
towards the presence of God in history, and the neat separation of church and world 
characteristic of the dissertation seems to have relaxed.  The lecture series given to the 
Barcelona congregation also employs figures typically associated with the prison 
writings, such as center and periphery or religion as the attempt to “put Christ in place” 
and Christianity as “irreligious” and “amoral,” as well as a thoroughgoing affirmation of 
“strength of life” (X, 354, 374).   
 The lectures topics reflect a continued outworking of the three circles, but in a 
more practical, pastoral manner.  The first lecture on “The Tragedy of the Prophetic and 
Its Lasting Significance” deals with the distinction between faith and knowledge in terms 
the divine Word and call as a crisis of historical and political life.  The second lecture, 
“Jesus Christ and the Essence of Christianity,” presents the distinction between Christ 
and history, Christ’s “contemporaneity” to the present, as the answer to whether Christ 
can still lay claim to the whole and center of cultural existence.   The final lecture, “Basic 
Questions of a Christian Ethic,” continues this line of thought by arguing for a distinction 
between ethics and metaphysics, between Christian ethical life and the search for 
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enduring moral “principles,” grounded in the continuously new relation of God to human 
history.  Despite the fact that the lectures were delivered towards the end of his stay in 
Barcelona, the ‘humanistic’ note seems less pronounced than in the sermons, or at least 
Bonhoeffer accents the ‘either-or’ with equal weight.  The notion of “strength” 
nonetheless shows up with some frequency, along with a litter of references to Nietzsche 
and a perplexing display of nationalism, all of which we will have to consider in 
weighing the ‘humanism’ of the Spanish interlude.  Rather than treating the sermons 
independently, I will bring them to bear on the themes of the lectures as relevant.   
 Delivered on November 13, 1929, the first lecture announces as its occasion the 
crisis of contemporary European culture, a crisis driven by “unclear political ideology” 
and the marginalization of the educated middle class, for whom “the rug—or the 
bourgeois parquet floor—has been pulled ruthlessly from beneath [their] feet” (X, 326).    
In the midst of this disorientation, Bonhoeffer seeks a polar star in “traces of God’s 
presence on earth, in ancient or modern times…eternal, supratemporal” (X, 327).  The 
prophets, as he often suggests with Barth, belong to a line extending through Paul to 
Luther and Kierkegaard, a line extended into the present by dialectical theology.  The era 
of the prophets he likens to his own, full of “Volkish arrogance and immorality,” to 
which the prophet must preach a message of judgment and destruction (X, 330).   This is 
the ‘tragedy’ of the prophet, that in the name of God he turns against the people he loves, 
so that his own life is divided, the “battlefield of two worlds,” to which he “rushes in 
blindly—into divine ruin” (X, 333).  Such remarks echo his earlier description of Luther 
and the Barthian contest between time and eternity, localized again in the soul and will of 
the individual who experiences the divine call.  Alongside the declaration of God’s 
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unapproachable holiness and the condemnation of religion stands God’s lordship over 
history.  The next lecture explores the character of that lordship in the cross and its 
community. 
 The second lecture addresses directly the place of Christ in history, “in the place 
where decisions are made concerning…our own lives and the life of our Volk” (X, 342).  
The problem is the marginalization of Christianity in the bourgeois world, where “Christ, 
instead of being the center of our lives, has become a thing of the church, or of the 
religiosity of a group of people…the so-called parlor into which one doesn’t mind 
withdrawing for a couple of hours...the cross as an ornamentation or decoration for our 
lives” (ibid).  By contrast, to take Christ “seriously” is to accept his exclusive claim, 
rather than put him “in the appropriate and worthy position” as religious genius or ethicist 
(X, 343).  Bonhoeffer sets out to distinguish the Christian message from all others, 
religious or secular, by separating  two modes of historical interpretation, one in which 
everything has already been decided by the categories of interpretation (“idealism”), and 
one in which the phenomena of history are permitted to speak for themselves 
(“contemporaneous”).   In the latter, “psychology” and “chronology” are set aside, 
unrelated to any abiding human essence (X, 354).  “Humanism” and classical culture are 
derided as the “enemies” of Christianity, to the extent that they see the divine already in 
the human, for Christianity consists in “the way of God to humanity,” with all its 
consequences for ethical life. 
 Bonhoeffer’s first sustained work at Christian ethics returns to question of the 
child as one “beyond good and evil,” prior to the Fall and in the “primal community” of 
loving immediacy to God (I, 363).  Taking the Sermon on the Mount as his guide, he 
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argues that what is new in Jesus’ ‘ethical’ message is the complete surrender of the 
human will to the divine will in every moment of ethical decision, that there are no laws 
by which a person could make themselves ‘good’ but only God’s will, renewed every 
morning.  Grace is the ‘end’ of the Law, abrogation and fulfillment.  He then illustrates 
this ethical reasoning by engaging three contemporary issues: the relation between 
“historical development” and the commandment to love, the relation between love and 
truth, and the relation between “nature and spirit.”  Less abstractly, these are the 
problems of war against neighbors, lies and social order, and sexuality, all of which 
exemplify a conflict in the “hierarchy of divine orders,” a tension between nature and 
grace, and all of which recur in his nearly completed Ethics in the 1940s (X, 369).       
 In these “concrete situations,” the vitalist element is most evident.  “War,” he 
writes, “is murder…nothing but a crime,” but how does one choose between killing one’s 
enemy and allowing them to kill one’s neighbor, when we are commanded to love both 
(X, 370)?   Here Bonhoeffer takes a surprising turn, moving back to a “broader problem, 
to the question of the relation between history and God, Volk and God, growth and God” 
(X, 373).  He then likens a ‘Volk’ to an individual, whose growth requires expansion, 
“pushing aside other individuals,” where every people is “called to create its own history, 
to enter into the struggle with the life of nations,” where God gives youth, strength and 
victory (ibid).  “For God wills strength of life, not anxiety” (374).  That strength is found 
only where Christ has “liberated [human beings] from the world, ethics remaining merely 
a sacrifice, a demonstration of our weak will…In this way the kingdom of grace 
establishes itself above the kingdom of the ethical” (X, 378).   
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 The volitional element so pervasive in the student essays and dissertation 
eventually had to face not only these concrete ethical questions, but the question of 
German “self-assertion,” where Nietzsche’s name had been so forcefully invoked.  The 
problem of “self-assertion” was framed as a question of Germany’s right to “growth” or 
“maturation,” a framing that acquired metaphysical force from the German understanding 
of nations as individuals and providence as favoring some over others.  The ambiguous 
humanism hanging over these lectures therefore crystallizes in the confrontation between 
Nietzsche and Christ, the “overman” and the “child.”  Already underway, the habilitation 
essay develops the problem of Christian understanding as the problem of the child.       
 Shortly after the last lecture, Bonhoeffer returned to Berlin in late February of 
1930.  Only a few weeks later, he submitted his habilitation essay for approval to 
Seeberg’s replacement, Wilhelm Lütgert, for whom Bonhoeffer would serve as assistant 
until his first trip to America in September.   We can safely say that his time back in 
Berlin little impacted the writing of Act and Being, which was carried out largely in 
Barcelona.  His correspondence with Detlef Albers, a teacher at the German school in 
Barcelona, reveals the continued spiritual impact of the city, particularly in contrast with 
his feelings about Germany.  He describes the atmosphere in Berlin as “old, gray, 
covered in the moss of tradition…the air is close…and musty enough to suffocate you, 
and everywhere it smells like sweat…it costs the me the most resolute energy and self-
control” (X, 177).  To Albers’ complaint that Barcelona is more “stale and worthless” 
than Berlin, Bonhoeffer responds in earnest: 
But if one believes one understands something of the nature of what spirit really is, can one not 
somehow welcome a turn away from what has in fact become an all-too-human spirit—including 
the spirit of humanism (or perhaps this very spirit is meant)—and the turn to the ‘material,’ which 
is also bequeathed by the spirit and is less likely to be subject to misunderstanding?  Perhaps today 
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as never before, ‘spirit’ really is to be found in the particular, that is, precisely in the material, in 
concrete, given reality—and precisely not in ‘intellectuality.’ (X, 182) 
A turn to the ‘material’ seems perfectly in keeping with the appropriation of Nietzsche so 
apparent in Barcelona, and he points Albers to the people, the “unintellectual ones,” who 
make it seem that the “the intellectual overproduction [in Germany] has something 
repugnantly nonintellectual about it” (ibid).  In a letter to Helmut Roβler, he dismisses a 
lecture by Seeberg as “shallow religious babble,” and despite his respectful 
correspondence with and eulogy for von Harnack, it is hard to believe that the latter really 
understood the direction of his last close pupil.  Act and Being would certainly have 
surprised the old master. 
 
II. Act and Being 
 
 In order to qualify for a teaching appointment, Bonhoeffer had to submit a second 
dissertation or habilitation essay, and while the planning and execution of the habilitation 
generally followed quickly upon taking the doctorate, Act and Being seems to have been 
conceived and written at unusual pace.  His advisor, Seeberg, had only approved the 
dissertation in December of 1927, and Bonhoeffer took up pastoral duties in Barcelona in 
February of the next year, dealing with the consistory and ordination requirements in 
between, as well as the revision of Sanctorum Communio for publication.  The first 
mention of his habilitation topic only appears in June of 1928, in a letter to Walter Dreβ, 
where he mentions “beginning a longer work—either a complete piece about 
‘consciousness’ or a smaller preliminary piece about ‘the child and theology’” (X, 103).  
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A month later, in a letter to Seeberg discussing the revision of his dissertation, he 
comments that “my thoughts are already busy with another project, albeit again not 
historical but rather systematic.  It picks up the question of consciousness and conscience 
in theology and also several Luther citations from the big Galatians commentary…this 
will be theological rather than psychological” (X, 122).  With the deadline for its 
completion in February, only nine months remained for actual writing, and it was 
accepted by the Berlin faculty on July 12, 1930.   
 The connections between consciousness, conscience, the child and justification 
(Luther’s concern in the Galatians commentary) should already be partly in view.  
According to the student essays, sermons and dissertation, conscience is the place where 
the message of justification strikes in order to break through the self-enclosure of 
“knowledge.”  References to ‘the child’ as a theological concept appear only in 
Barcelona, and then infrequently, although Bonhoeffer had obviously struggled with the 
idea indirectly from the beginning of his academic career, preaching to children in Berlin 
and again in Barcelona.  The continuities with his previous work are more visible in his 
initial statement of the problem in the habilitation essay itself. 
 The central thesis of AB is the most noticeable (and significant) of these 
continuities, namely, that the tension between act and being is resolved only in the 
“sociological category” of the church (II, 31).  If the church is the solution to the problem 
of revelation—the subject matter of the essay—then AB must stand in some systematic 
relation to SC.  I have suggested that SC approaches the problem of revelation from the 
direction of its mediation in the church, the ‘horizontal’ or historical dialectic, while AB 
approaches revelation from the standpoint of the knowing subject’s relation to God, or 
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the ‘vertical’ dialectic.  Again, both AB and SC treat both dialectics, the suspension of the 
isolated individual into community and the suspension of the blind individual into a 
knowing relation with God.  The entwinement of the dialectics means that the whole 
‘event’ of revelation can be understood by apprehending it first from one aspect, then 
from the other.  I will return to the relation between the two texts and their arguments in 
the final chapter, focusing here on AB. 
 Exploring Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of the problem confronted in AB will 
clarify these connections somewhat.  This preliminary statement of the problem may be 
divided into four sections.  After listing current theologians and philosophers preoccupied 
with the themes of ‘act’ and ‘being’ respectively (1), he names the question of act and 
being explicitly as a theological question regarding revelation (2), extends this statement 
by defining his terms (3), and then provides an outline of the argument (4).   
 The theoreticians of ‘act’ include Karl Barth, Frederich Gogarten, Rudolf 
Bultmann, Hans Michael Müller, and Frederich Karl Schumann, while those associated 
with ‘being’ include Paul Althaus, Reinhold Seeberg, Karl Holl, Emanuel Hirsch, 
Frederich Brunstäd, Erich Peterson, Martin Heidegger, and Erich Przywara.  Whether or 
not such a division really characterized the field at the time, the lines so drawn tell the 
reader what Bonhoeffer is after.  On the one side, we find Karl Barth and the dialectical 
theologians, with a mixed lot of idealists, Thomists, and existentialists on the other.  
Generally speaking, Bonhoeffer divides the field into two camps, those who allow Kant 
to determine the path of their thought and those who seek to go beyond or behind him.  
His statement of the problem makes this relation to Kant explicit: 
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At the heart of the problem is the struggle with the formulation of the question that Kant and 
idealism have posed for theology.  It is a matter of the formation of genuine theological concepts, 
the decision one comes to between a transcendental-philosophical and ontological interpretation of 
theological concepts.  It is a question of the ‘objectivity’ of the concept of God and an adequate 
concept of cognition, the issue of determine the relationship between ‘the being of God’ and the 
mental act which grasps that being.  In other  words, the meaning of ‘the being of God in 
revelation’ must be interpreted theologically, including how it  is known, how faith as act, and 
revelation as being, are related to one another  and, correspondingly, how human beings stand in 
light of revelation.  Is revelation ‘given’ to them only in each completed act; is there for human 
beings such a thing as ‘being’ in revelation?  What form does the concept of revelation have when 
it is interpreted in terms of act and when it is interpreted in terms of being?
2
  
Although the repetition might be distracting, this introduction to his theme is sufficiently 
clear.  The ‘act’ in question is the act of faith as a ‘mental’ or ‘cognizing’ act in its 
relation to the being of God in revelation.  As an inquiry into “how the human being 
stands in light of revelation” and whether revelation occurs only in “each completed act,” 
AB recalls the earlier critique of Barth’s actualism.   
 A few important terminological distinctions follow.  The act of faith is not 
identical to consciousness as act because faith has a specific character as “pure 
intentionality,” whereas consciousness “in itself” is malleable, capable of multiple modes 
(II, 28).  This allows Bonhoeffer to discriminate between “direct” and “reflexive” 
consciousness, or actus directus and actus reflexus (ibid).  When consciousness turns 
back on itself and takes itself as its own object (as in Idealism), the outward direction of 
faith is lost.  The curvature of knowing has consequences for being: “even as 
consciousness [Bewuβt-sein], being [Sein] is not in principle contained within 
consciousness [Bewuβt-sein]” (II, 29).  By playing on the semantics of  Bewuβtsein, as a 
variation on the verb ‘to know’ (wissen), Bonhoeffer attacks the transcendental and 
idealist definitions of subject and object, knowing and being.  Though consciousness is a 
                                                          
2
 II, 27ff.  It is unclear why the editor of the English edition italicizes the phrase “how human beings stand 
in light of revelation.”  This would reinforce the emphasis, for example, of Clifford Green, that AB 
concerns anthropology rather than revelation—an emphasis this study shows to be mistaken, despite its 
many contributions.   
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manner of being, being is not contained in or objectified for consciousness.  Being (Sein) 
is not the being of beings (Seiendes).   
 Bonhoeffer then outlines the study in three parts, corresponding to the table of 
contents, and each develops the problem of revelation in greater detail.  Section A 
examines act and being as two strategies for dealing with the question of knowledge in 
terms of self-consciousness and applies those strategies to the “conceptions of God and 
revelation, from which everything else proceeds” (II, 30).  The question of knowledge is 
not only a question of the creature regarding itself, but in that question the creature is 
carried out beyond itself, and the vector of its understanding “in reference to 
transcendence…suggests that the question of God is part of [the question of self-
knowledge] too” (ibid).  Because “the meaning of epistemology is anthropology,” not 
every epistemology will be compatible with the Christian understanding of God and 
revelation: “the concept of a contingent revelation of God in Christ denies in principle the 
possibility of the self-understanding of the I apart from the reference to revelation 
(Christian transcendentalism).  The concept of revelation must yield an epistemology of 
its own” (II, 31).   
 If the first part demonstrates that both act and being lead to irresolvable 
contradictions in terms of human self-understanding, the second part looks to reconcile 
them in the church: 
But inasmuch as an interpretation of revelation in terms of act or in terms of being yields concepts 
of understanding that are incapable of bearing the whole weight of revelation, the concept of 
revelation has to be thought about within the concreteness of the concept of the church, that is to 
say, in terms of a sociological category in which the interpretation of act and of being meet and are 
drawn together into one.  The dialectic of act and being is understood theologically as the dialectic 
of faith hand the congregation in Christ.  Neither is to be thought without the other; each is ‘taken 
up’ or ‘suspended’ [aufgehoben] in the other.  The theological concepts of object and knowledge 
are shown to be determined by the sociological concept of the person and must be recast 
accordingly.  (ibid)  
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Again, the Barthian dialectic, the ‘act’ of suspension, is corrected with the “sociological 
category” of the church.  The dissertation makes the same claim in substance, but the 
argument there proceeded from the perspective of the historical or sociological dialectic 
of the church, not the eternal or theological dialectic that founds it.  The act of faith 
occurs in the being of the church and is “suspended” in it, providing for its continuity and 
concreteness.  Here too, the key is the “sociological concept of person” or the being of 
the church is conceived in personalist terms, thus as spirit and act.  The braiding of the 
dialectics gives Bonhoeffer’s theology its unique shape as a synthesis of Barth and 
Berlin.  
 In the final section, he denies the possibility of neutral conceptions of knowledge 
and being, claiming that all such concepts, “insofar as they are acquired from revelation, 
are always determined by the concepts of sin and grace, ‘Adam’ and Christ” (II, 32).  As 
a mode of humanity in contrast with Adam, ‘being in Christ’ belongs to the “wider 
concreteness of…the church” where the past is “suspended [aufgehoben] in the future” 
and “out of the human being of conscience grows the child” (ibid).  Bonhoeffer’s final 
summary of the essay cements its continuation of the logic set forth in the dissertation: 
“This entire study is an attempt to unify the concern of true transcendentalism and true 
ontology in an ‘ecclesiological form of thinking’” (ibid).   
 If SC explored the form (or being) of revelation as a community (“Jesus Christ 
existing as community”), AB examines the knowledge of the individual as they are 
transferred into that community by revelation.  Just as the church, in its historical 
dialectic through sin to reconciliation, is the goal and fulfillment of all human 
community, so too “being in Christ” is the fulfillment of individual human thought and 
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life.  To make good on this claim, Bonhoeffer must show that every attempt of human 
beings to understand themselves apart from God fails (A), that only the church can offer a 
full account of human self-understanding (B), and that this understanding corresponds to 
a mode of “being human” in Christ (C).  After interpreting each of these steps in greater 
detail, the final chapter will take up the unity of Bonhoeffer’s thought-form in relation to 
the being of God as conceived in his habilitation essay.   
 
I.a. The Failure of Autonomous Self-Knowledge as Act and Being. 
 The first chapter of AB divides into two subsections on transcendental and 
ontological philosophies respectively, or idealism and phenomenology in “genuine” and 
spurious forms.  Although Bonhoeffer describes Kant as a “transcendental” philosopher 
in distinction from the “idealism” of Fichte and Hegel, it is more accurate to speak of 
“transcendental” (Kant) and “absolute” (Fichte, Hegel) idealism, just as we must 
distinguish here too between “formal” (Husserl, Scheler) and “existential” (Heidegger, 
Przywara) phenomenology.  Kant’s is the genuine transcendental attempt, while 
Heidegger and Przywara present genuine ontologies.  The criterion for a “genuine” 
philosophy is the same, regardless of its transcendental or ontological orientation, 
namely, that it refuses to let the I understand itself “out of itself” or autonomously.  For 
both attempts at self-understanding, transcendental and ontological, Bonhoeffer tries to 
show that philosophy fails according to internal (philosophical) and external (theological) 
criterion.  Philosophically, the I can never catch hold of itself, so that when it pretends to 
know itself (as in Idealism) it has covered over a contradiction, and even when it tries to 
acknowledge this limitation (as in Kant), it still establishes itself by cunning—in the 
135 
 
apparent “kenosis” of reason, it wins itself back by “krypsis” (II, 60).  Theologically, the 
self-enclosed I leaves no room for revelation by drawing God into what the I already 
knows about itself.  Each philosophy reflects these failures in a different way, depending 
on whether it prioritizes thought (transcendental) or being (ontological) in its 
interpretation of self-consciousness.
3
 
 Transcendental philosophy is “epistemology,” or the theorizing of self-
consciousness in reflection, the I’s taking hold of itself by turning back upon itself in 
thought (I, 33).  Where the priority of thought is affirmed, genuine transcendental 
philosophy (Kant) denies the I access to itself, whereas Idealism gives the I over to itself 
completely.  In the former, the ‘reality’ behind subject and object, thought and being, I 
and other—the “transcendental unity of apperception” and the “thing in itself”—are 
“pure limit concepts,” so that the human being (Dasein) is stretched out between two 
unknown poles (II, 35).  It is “being between” (Sein zwischen) and “between 
transcendence” (zwischen Transcendenz) as a consequence of the definition of being in 
relation to thought, object in relation to subject (ibid).  ‘Objects’ for Kant are functions of 
judgments in the synthetic act of consciousness, so neither the world nor the I are 
available “in themselves” to the thinking subject.   This has ontological consequences on 
both ends.  For the self, it means that there is no “being pure and simple” but only being 
“in reference to,” being from and unto two poles which cannot be defined in advance of 
concrete experience (II, 37).  Similarly, the being of a thing only ‘is’ in reference to 
knowing.  What or how it ‘is’ depends on its relation to the self and vice versa, since the 
two are “constituted” by this relation.  
                                                          
3
 Whether or not Bonhoeffer’s criticisms are correct and whether or not his position is viable in light of the 
counter critique by any one philosophy (especially Heidegger) is immaterial here.  I only intend to present 
accurately the unfolding course of his thinking.   
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 Idealism, by contrast, goes beyond the “modesty” of the transcendental 
perspective to a metaphysical “violence” that “lays hands” on the unconditional (II, 40).  
For idealism the I is no longer “entwined in transcendence” or “between” but is “turned 
in upon” itself,  just as being is no longer “in reference to” thinking but occurs “through” 
it (II, 42).  The failure of idealism is stated rather directly.  Philosophically, it 
presupposes the very thing it believes itself to have established, that is, the capacity of 
self-consciousness to grasp not only itself but also the structure of being.  The equation of 
being and thought, substance and subject, is simply incoherent.  The I cannot be thought 
because it is the “precondition” of thinking (II, 38).   “The eye does not see itself,” but 
idealism nonetheless pretends to have accomplished a “self-sublation” (Selbstaufhebung) 
of thought into itself (II, 45-6).  Yet the I must already be there in order to “create” itself 
through the movement of thought.  That is the irresolvable contradiction of absolute 
idealism.  Theologically, idealism leads to the equation of God and humanity by defining 
both, together with reality, as spirit (Geist) or thought “in the unity of spirit beyond the 
subject-object dichotomy” (II, 49).  Epistemology has become the “turning of spirit to 
spirit” (ibid).  
 Despite his intentions, Kant repeats the more evident philosophical contradiction 
of idealism in a different form, as Hegel had already suggested
4
.  It is meaningless for the 
I to set its own limits over against the ‘unknown,’ since it must know the hither side of 
the “boundary” of reason to do so.  In drawing its own limits, the I has once again 
embarked on a “self-suspension” and reinstated its omnipotence by sleight of hand, hence 
it is guilty of a false modesty and the same violence as idealism (II, 38).  But Kant has 
                                                          
4
 For background here, see Sally Sedgwick, Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012).   
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resisted the desire of idealism to render God an object.  For transcendental philosophy, 
God only ‘is’ in the act of consciousness as “pure intentionality” and “condition…in 
process, never completed,” so that God is “always at the back of human being”  (II, 45).  
God is simultaneously “honored” by the “boundary” that reason imposes on itself and 
dethroned because “there are for reason essentially no boundaries,” if it can legislate its 
own limits (ibid).  The limitation of reason, says Bonhoeffer, is therefore a matter not of 
theoretical but of practical reason—a moral decision and not a rational necessity.  Reason 
“can only be brought into obedience,” and there is a boundary “only for a concrete human 
being in its entirety, and this boundary is Christ” (ibid).  If thought has, by an illusion, 
seized itself in this way, then being has been absorbed into the act of consciousness and 
the logos placed above and beyond being, so that neither is “suspended” into the other (II, 
46).  
 The ontological strategy, represented for Bonhoeffer by phenomenology, aims “to 
demonstrate the priority of being over against consciousness and to uncover this being” 
(II, 59).  The question is whether is reason can really “surrender its claim” upon being, so 
that thinking is itself “suspended (aufgehoben) in being” with the recognition that Dasein 
is “always already existing” before it turns to itself in reflection (II, 60).  Here human 
self-understanding derives not first from observing oneself but from the world, “from 
what they have beheld,” the being in which they live and move (II, 61).  Bonhoeffer does 
not draw the distinction explicitly, but the difference between spurious and “genuine” 
phenomenology corresponds to formal and existential phenomenology, Husserl and 
Scheler versus Heidegger and Przywara (the latter is only an ‘existential 
phenomenologist’ in a qualified sense).  
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 The four lie along a continuum, measured by the extent to which being is given 
due priority over thought.  Husserl remains “partially under the spell of idealism,” since 
he examines only the “phenomenon of pure consciousness” and brackets out the 
existence of the essences that comprise intentional objects (II, 62).  Scheler is a slight 
improvement in this respect, moving from the purely logical to the “totality of life” by 
“transferring the a priori from the formal, from what pertains to consciousness, to the 
material…to the domain of value, to the given” (II, 65).  He dismisses the Kantian 
question as “formalistic,” but being is still accessible to the I “from itself,” so that he slips 
back into a “pure immanence” (II, 67).  By describing Dasein’s thinking as mode of 
being (existentia “as a mode of the esse of essentia”), Heidegger overcomes the 
formalistic and timeless view of being.   Where Husserl “brackets,” Heidegger 
“discloses” (ibid).  Being achieves thereby an “unconditional priority over thought” and 
yet “being equals Dasein, equals the understanding of being, equals spirit” (II, 71).  The 
apparent reconciliation of act and being is subverted by the self-enclosure of Dasein, 
which awakens itself through its own conscience and authenticates itself through its own 
death.  Finally, then, this “ontological accomplishment of the suspension [Aufhebung] of 
thought in being is conditioned by the view that human beings…have the understanding 
of being systematically at their disposal” (II, 72).  Heidegger’s Dasein understands itself 
solely from itself, even it is already ‘in the world.’  Przywara goes beyond Heidegger by 
freeing Dasein from this self-enclosure, claiming that humans understand their being only 
in analogy with the being of God.   
Each fails of internal philosophical criterion (humans grasp their being out of their 
own resources) but also of external or theological criterion.  Przywara’s doctrine of the 
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analogia entis, for example, still risks a “metaphysics of immanence” and does not 
“adequately express the transcendence of God” (II, 74).  The pretense of this 
“formalistic-metaphysical” attempt resides in its appeal to a generic being, particularly a 
generic human being or creatureliness, as its starting point (II, 75).  Human being is 
unknown to itself as a creature, but is understood theologically only as being-in-Adam or 
in Christ, in sin or in grace, in shattered community or in the church.  Being is always 
morally charged, for God is “not primarily the ‘sheer is,’ but the ‘righteous one,’ the 
‘holy one,’ ‘love’” (ibid).  Once more, reason has justified itself.  Heidegger has so 
defined being temporally that even God’s eternity would be subjected to time, resulting in 
a “consciously atheistic philosophy of finitude” in which “being enclosed…can no longer 
be separated from finitude” (II, 72).  Scheler contrives a “religious phenomenon” that 
depends a priori on the thought but not the existence of God.  Husserl simply brackets 
God out.  
The litany of charges raised against transcendental and ontological philosophies 
comes down to the notion that human beings cannot understand themselves on their own.  
Philosophically, this would entail reason or thought catching hold of itself, which always 
leads back to the contradictions and circularities of reflection.  Theologically, reason’s 
desire to close the circle of self-understanding leaves no room for revelation; if humans 
can understand themselves alone, they do not need God.  But if the unity of the self is 
found only in revelation, then philosophy finds its limit only when it “knows revelation 
and confesses itself to be Christian philosophy in full recognition (Anerkenntnis) that the 
place it wanted to usurp is occupied by another—by Christ” (II, 78).    Put differently, the 
“offense against Christian theology in any autonomous self-understanding is that it 
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believes human beings to be capable of giving truth to themselves” (II, 79).  In their 
“genuine” forms, these philosophies nonetheless lend themselves to theological 
interpretation, insofar as the “in reference to” (in bezug auf) and “being suspended” 
(Aufgehobensein) of act and being point out beyond themselves, so that in revelation 
“both are brought together, surmounted and transcended [aufgehoben] in an original 
fashion” (ibid).  A human ‘is’ only ‘in reference to’ themselves or to the Word, and so 
they ‘exist’ only in Adam or in Christ, in isolation or in the church, which reconciles act 
and being, continually suspending one in the other.  
 
I.b. The Church as the Reconciliation of Act and Being and the Place of Human Self-
Understanding. 
 If human being cannot answer the question about itself, the answer must be given 
to it by God, or not all.  To show that humans come to themselves only in the church, 
Bonhoeffer argues that neither act nor being alone can “bear the whole weight of 
revelation” and that the church holds the two in a proper dialectical tension.  Part A of AB 
demonstrated in a “preparatory” fashion that self-understanding is heteronomous, since 
autonomous attempts fail.  B.1 and B.2 deal with revelation conceived as act and as being 
respectively, and both follow the same threefold line of questioning by beginning (a) with 
God’s ‘being’ in revelation (as contingency versus continuity), then turning (b) to human 
knowledge of revelation (as non-objective versus objective), which (c) defines human 
being in revelation (as decision versus being-in).  Section B.3 argues, in response to Part 
A, that (a) human beings are led out beyond themselves and encountered only in the 
church, and then in response to the three aspects of B.1 and B.2 that (b) God is both 
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contingently free and continuously present in the church, that (c) human beings must 
decide freely in faith for God and that they are already ‘in’ faith in the church, and finally 
(d) that there are forms of knowledge appropriate both to direct and reflexive 
consciousness in the church.  Part C elaborates this knowing human being as two basic 
forms of intentionality in Adam and in Christ, with social and temporal dimensions.   
 Let us compare Bonhoeffer’s separate analyses of revelation in act (B.1) and 
being (B.2) with regard to their three components, the being of God (a), knowledge (b), 
and human being (c), so as to highlight the tensions reconciled in the concept of the 
church.  If the manner of knowledge defines human being, and if divine revelation 
defines the character of knowledge, then revelation redefines human being.  A brief 
comparison will elucidate how the limits of act and being for interpreting revelation 
mirror one another and point to a higher synthesis.  If revelation is interpreted only as act, 
it is merely contingent, never objective, and demanding continual decision.  If revelation 
is interpreted only as being, it becomes continuous but at the risk of being merely 
objective and existent, having the being of a thing.  As Bonhoeffer stated in the 
introduction, everything depends on the proper theological concept of the object 
(Gegenstand) as what stands against (gegen) the subject without being reduced to its 
corollary, a mere object.   
 A proper understanding of the being of God in revelation (B1/2.a) must overcome 
two mistaken tendencies, one born from the concept of act, the other from the concept of 
being.  When revelation is interpreted solely in terms of act, God’s freedom is maintained 
in its contingency, but the continuity of revelation is lost.  When one approaches 
revelation strictly from the standpoint of being, revelation remains in continuity but its 
142 
 
contingent, free character is replaced by the being of a thing, an “existent” (Seiendes).  
Where the freedom of God takes precedent, as it does in Barth, revelation, “which places 
the I into truth, which gives the understanding of God and the self, is a contingent event 
that is to be affirmed or denied in its positivity—that is to say, as received reality” (II, 
82).  Such freedom admits of a “twofold” interpretation, as “formal” (formal) and as 
“actual” (aktuell) or as “formalistic-actualistic” (II, 85, 83, 90).  Formal freedom is sheer 
autonomy, bound to nothing, always beginning anew; actual freedom has “all the 
instability of a deed being done right now” (II, 83).  Coinciding with the act of 
consciousness, revelation occurs only in the “direct” intentionality of faith, never in 
reflection, and is “supratemporal”  (II, 84, 99).   
 Barth meant to preserve the freedom of God in this way, and the formal concept 
of freedom inevitably leads him, says Bonhoeffer, to a “dialectical” thinking that prevents 
theological concepts from “petrification” into the categories of being (II, 90).  
Griesbach’s philosophy takes a similar approach, as do the theologies of Gogarten and 
Knittermeyer.   Like Barth, they attack the claim of thought to absorb being entirely into 
itself, seeking “reality” in the “encounter” of existence with its “other,” an encounter that 
“takes place in, and really constitutes, history” (II, 88).  But if the ‘other’ is God, human 
existence is not encountered as a “whole” or “concretely,” but only in its transcendental 
aspect—as a “heavenly double” (II, 99).  If the concrete other, the neighbor, replaces 
God, then the finite ‘you’ (Du) is “absolutized” and humans again find that they can place 
themselves in the truth and revelation is excluded.  The aporia of a “formal” notion of 
God’s freedom are overcome only in a “substantial” one, wherein “it is not so much a 
question of the freedom of God…on the other side of revelation, as it is of God’s coming 
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out of God’s self in revelation…a matter of God’s given Word, the covenant in which 
God is bound by God’s own actions…not free from human beings but free for them” (II, 
91).  Here, God is “bound” to the “‘historical,’ ‘existing’ Word,” and Christ forms the 
“boundary” of concrete existence that is “no longer located in or can be established by 
human beings” (II, 82).  Whenever Bonhoeffer speaks of the “historical” Word or the 
Christ as “concrete” limit, he has in mind the church.   
 Revelation conceived as being, rather than act, suffers just the opposite 
predicament.  Revelation is indeed ‘given’ in continuity, but as a thing, an “existent,” 
whether in the form of doctrines, “psychic experiences,” or institutions (II, 103ff.).  None 
of these can provide the “encounter” that “draws out” the mind and existence turned in on 
itself, and only the Catholic view of revelation as institution encompasses thought so that 
its being is ‘in’ revelation rather than standing over it.  Even when the being of revelation 
is conceived as institution, it “is not capable of encountering the existence of human 
beings qua sinful existence…[that] can happen only in the real encounter with another 
person” (II, 105).  Two sets of criterion converge here. Not only is an existent incapable 
of encountering a human being and so breaking them out of thought’s self-enclosure, but 
neither act nor being can be interpreted in terms of an existent, since an act is never a 
thing available to reflection and being is irreducible to the being of beings. Genuine 
ontology “suspends” (aufgehoben) thought in being, rather than leaving being over as 
remainder for thought, an existent (II, 106).  Bonhoeffer turns to the kind of being that is 
not a thing, that is, personal being, but not even the “claim of the neighbor” can break 
through to us without God.  “That this [break through] does happen ‘through’ something 
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that exists is the problem of revelation; everything depends, therefore, on the 
interpretation of ‘through’” (ibid).     
 Barth pursued the actualistic strategy to free God from the knowing subject.  To 
be “known” of this subject is to be its object, its “captive”—as “something known, it ‘is’ 
only in the system” of thought (II, 46).  So that God may not be reduced to a thing, God 
‘is’ for Barth only “in God-understanding-Godself  in human beings in the act of faith” 
(II, 93).  If the act of consciousness, which is humanity’s, and the act of revelation, which 
is God’s, are to coincide in the act of faith, Barth faces two obstacles.  He not only has to 
avoid the idealist identification of the I with God, but the human subject must really 
participate in God’s own self-knowledge that is the content of revelation.  According to 
Bonhoeffer, Barth accomplished the first at the expense of the second, so that “it remains 
unclear, even in Barth, how the religious act of human beings and God’s action in human 
beings are to be thought, without dividing them into two…spheres, or without suspending 
either the objectivity of God or the fact that human beings are encountered in their 
existence” (ibid).  Barth fails on all these points.   God’s presence in thought is 
transcendental, dividing the self into a “heavenly double.”  Presence in is never presence 
to thought; God is not ‘thinkable’ or available to reflection (an object).  The placement of 
revelation in the transcendental sphere means that the human being is not really 
“encountered in their existence” because they are not encountered as a whole, 
confronting a concrete limit.  Revelation therefore requires a being beyond knowledge 
but upon which faith can rest, an ‘object’ that is not a ‘thing.’  That is the correction to 
transcendental thinking.  Ontological thinking earns a similar reproach.  It must overcome 
the “false objectivity of something that exists” for the objectivity of what freely ‘stands 
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against’ the subject and limits it, “so that knowledge is itself based on and suspended 
(aufgehoben) in a being-already-known” or “as that in the presence of which it must 
suspend (aufgehoben) itself ever anew in knowledge” (II, 107).   
 Knowledge (B.1/2.b) joins the being of God in revelation to human being.  If 
God’s being is contingent and the knowledge of it only in the constantly renewed act of 
faith, the human being standing before that knowledge must constantly decide for or 
against it.  Constant decision is constantly under the threat of slipping away, of deciding 
against God or God deciding against the person.  The question of faith’s continuity 
becomes urgent, and in two forms, since there is the continuity of the new and the old ‘I’ 
(the “heavenly double” or Adam and Christ), but also the continuity of the “total-I,” the 
“transcendental” and the “empirical” or concrete I (II, 99).  Barth preserves the first 
continuity at the expense of the second, while Bultmann does just the opposite. 
 For Barth, the new I (Christ) is “formally presented as the non-being of the old” 
or its “suspension” (Aufhebung), with the emphasis on the negative connotation as 
‘cancellation,’ and so the self is split in two (II, 98).  Revelation is relegated to the 
transcendental sphere, while the empirical I remains untouched.  The continuity of the 
new self with the old (as a suspension/cancellation, in the manner of Luther’s simul) 
bifurcates the total I into discontinuity.  The transcendental self is renewed, the empirical 
remains unregenerate.  The historical character of human existence is lost along with the 
historical character of revelation.  This effectively reaffirms Bonhoeffer’s earlier thesis 
concerning the formal rather than historical quality of Barth’s “dialectic.”  To be 
historical rather than “timeless,” the act of faith would direct itself to the manner in which 
Christ “touches upon existence in its historical, temporal totality” (II, 100).  In doing so, 
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Barth would have to explain how it is that the human subject participates actively in the 
event of faith, avoiding “two separate acts of faith, I and not-I” (ibid).  Bultmann, by 
contrast, begins with continuity of the historical I, but never finds his way to the 
continuity of the old and new existence, since it cannot be sustained by a constant 
decision, much less as a human possibility.   
 For the “conjunction” of this new I and historical human existence (B.1/2.c), 
Bonhoeffer returns to the idea of the church in Reinhold Seeberg, who in connection with 
Luther and on “the basis of his consistent voluntarism” conceived the new I as the 
“redirection” of the will by God (II, 101).  The newness is in the direction of the will, its 
intentionality, while the continuity lies in the reality of the will itself.  It is “my will” that 
is redirected in Christ ‘existing as community,’ as church.  Revelation as act and being 
are “truly combined” (II, 102).  Nonetheless, the conflict of the two wills breaks up the 
continuity of the new self, “infringed upon again and again by the old,” and Bonhoeffer 
finally rejects the notion that the individual can in any way sustain the continuity of the 
new existence (ibid).  Humans know their motives no more (or only a little) than those of 
God, yet they can only understand themselves as a “unity,” by somehow closing the 
circle of self-understanding, albeit provisionally.  As the first part of the essay 
demonstrated, that unity has to be given in faith and revelation, since self-consciousness 
or reason cannot supply it for itself.  Only in the gift of a new self does real unity occur 
for the first time, in the encounter with and participation in the ‘person’ of Christ as the 
church.   
 Human existence is (re)born of encounter that things can never give, must be 
“affected” and “thinkable in continuity,” else it deteriorates into shards of act and 
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intention (II, 113, 115).  One can be ‘in’ the church as an institution, a thing, but it can 
never reach through to existence.  The being of revelation converts human being “in such 
a way that knowledge, encountering itself in that which is, suspends [aufgehoben] again 
and again in the face of the being of those existence things and does not force them to be 
at its disposal” (II, 108).  He again signals the church as the solution to these questions, 
remarking that “the reality of revelation is just the sort of thng which constitutes the 
being (the existence) of human beings—but this being is the triune divine 
person…provided that it is understood as being-in-Christ, that is to say, being in the 
church” (ibid).   
 The final section of Part B (B.3.a-d) shows how the church reconciles all of these 
tensions between act and being.  In correction to all philosophical attempts at autonomous 
self-understanding (Part A), the church alone is the place where human beings are 
encountered and so led out beyond themselves to unity and understanding (B.3.a).  In the 
church also the freedom and being of God (B.3.b) come together so that human decision 
and ‘being in’ (B.3.c) are united in the form of knowledge specific to the church (B.3.d).   
 Bonhoeffer departed from a specific interpretation of Kant’s philosophy in which 
the priority of thought over being led to the self-enclosure of human beings, the perverse 
curvature of intention and reason.  Siding with Kant against Hegel, he asserts that human 
beings cannot place themselves in the truth.  Siding with Hegel against Kant, he also 
asserts that to define the limits of knowledge is to effectively place oneself in the truth, a 
theoretical sleight of hand.  Self-imposed limits are not real limits.  Instead, the 
perception of one’s life as limited by truth only comes from revelation as the only real 
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extra nos. That limit takes the form of a “theological-sociological category” that resolves 
all foregoing questions regarding divine and human being and knowing (II, 110).   
“Theological-sociological” means the Other present in the others, God present in 
and through the neighbor in the congregation.  Revelation involves the being of God 
(B.3.b) and the human being in the being of the church.  Both the being of God and 
human being must be contingent and continuous, combining act and being.  Now what is 
the being of the church, that it alone can encounter human beings and lead them out to 
self-understanding, while preserving at once the contingent freedom and continuous 
presence of God?  Bonhoeffer’s first remark in this direction concerns the nature of 
temporality.  In order to encounter human existence, revelation must be present, else it 
would sink into the past, and being “caught up in its context” (the first century), would 
revert to the being of a thing, an existent (II, 111).  Proclamation raises the past into the 
present by means of the future.  Scripture and sacrament are mere artifacts of history 
unless in preaching their meaning, the Word, addresses humans in the horizon of their 
future as a word of coming judgment and forgiveness, brought into the present.  Like 
Barth, the subject of that address is Christ but in a completely different form, as the 
subject of the community in which preaching and hearing, revelation and faith, take 
place.  In this being “Christ is the common person [Gesamtperson] of the Christian 
community of faith,” and the “protestant idea of the church is conceived in personal 
terms” (ibid).  
As the earlier references to the “sociological category” suggest, Bonhoeffer is 
now falling back on his dissertation to comprehend the form of mediation appropriate to 
revelation.  “Common person” is a synonym for “collective person” or the community as 
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person.  The question is how the sociological category of Gesamtperson reconciles the 
freedom and contingency of God with divine presence and continuity in revelation.  Barth 
tied the freedom of revelation to its personal character, to divine election, but God’s 
person remained wholly transcendent to history, bifurcating the human being.  For God to 
enter history, to become ‘objective,’ would be to sacrifice the contingency, the 
subjectivity of God in revelation.  That in brief is the problem of ‘act’ and ‘being,’ which 
Bonhoeffer resolves by construing the community, a worldly object, as an active subject.  
The personal is the objective par excellence as what ‘stands against’ and limits my own 
subjectivity.  Transcendental philosophy and ontology, Barth and Przywara, all think too 
“individualistically,” when what is needed is a “Christian sociology,” a conversion of the 
act-being problem through the “sociological category” (II, 113).         
The sociological category satisfies the criterion of continuity through a “trans-
subjective” reality, since it is not Barth’s ‘solitary I’ but the church community which 
hears the Word and is the counterpart of the Kingdom of God.  The church precedes and 
survives every individual encounter with the Word as a field of encounters in which the 
individual’s hearing is caught up, and so the continuity of revelation “does not lie in 
human beings, but rather it is guaranteed suprapersonally through a community of 
persons” (II, 114).  The whole nexus of relationships, of “being affected,” depends on the 
fact that Christ is the “subject” of the whole community, for “only through the person of 
Christ can the existence of human beings be encountered, placed into truth, and 
transposed into a new manner of existence” (ibid).  The community as church (and not 
simply religious community) ‘is’ only in the act of faith and encounter with Christ; only 
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in faith does Christ speak.  The dialectic of act and being, thought and reality, now 
“emerges with clarity as the form of the dialectic of faith and church” (ibid).   
The being of revelation, as community, necessarily involves human beings 
(B.3.c).  Where act and being converged in the being of God through the Gesamtperson 
of Christ, in contingency and continuity, they converge also in human being as suffering, 
as those “who are acted upon” (II, 116).  Human beings stand under the power of sin or 
of grace, Adam or Christ, and so are not in possession of their own being, which is 
always “in reference to.”  The self-reference of sin is shattered only in Christ, who lays 
exclusive claim to “existence in social context” and to “authentic” existence and 
personhood (ibid).  This suffering or passivity of creatures in Christ must hold together 
the continuity of the new and old existence with the existentiality of the decision of faith.  
The eyes of faith open to discover that the being of revelation (the church) preceded it, 
even if that being only ‘is’ for faith, which is “suspended” (aufgehoben) in the 
community of faith that is in turn suspended in the Trinitarian life (II, 118).  Suspension 
grants a new intentionality or point of reference, so the being of revelation 
(Offenbarungsein) and the human being (Menschsein) are neither “reified” nor “non-
being” (II, 120).   
All of this assumes that “the individual pure and simple is an unworkable 
abstraction…[instead] woven into sociality not only in their general spiritual nature, but 
also and especially in their existentiality,” that is, their being encountered by Christ 
(ibid).  Clearly, the entire argument of Sanctorum Communio is presupposed here, given 
that “general spiritual nature” refers to the primal state broken by sin and “existentiality” 
to the church.  The dialectic of act and being could just as well be described using the 
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monad image from SC.  Bonhoeffer makes the equation himself: “To speak of the human 
being as individual person and humanity, never in separation but always in unity, is only 
another way of talking about the human being as act and as being” (ibid).  This also 
explains the continuity and existentiality of human beings in the church, that one gives 
and receives forgiveness, receives the Spirit (Geist) of the church and “expresses” it (II, 
121).  The subject, the I, of the new existence is always the “historical One,” Christ 
existing as community, but “only in faith” (ibid).  The “unity” of this “historical I” is the 
unity of the community of faith—in the language of SC, the unity of its objective spirit.  
Faith knows it is possible only through the community of faith in which it is “suspended,” 
and its act “comes from being just as it proceeds towards being” (II, 122). 
Terms like ‘suspension’ and ‘reference’ are epistemological (B.3.d). Bonhoeffer’s 
anthropology closely aligns being and knowing.  To be is to be ‘in reference to,’ and 
reference is determined by intentional consciousness or knowledge. But faith is only in 
direct consciousness or intentionality, even if it is suspended in the being of the church, 
and never in reflection.  Barth did not differ greatly on these points, but beyond this 
Bonhoeffer rapidly distances himself.  For Barth, God remains known indirectly in the 
act of faith in order to remain free from objective knowledge, under the power of the I.  
Against this, Bonhoeffer brings three objections, that Barth’s whole scheme is 
individualistic, that he has misunderstood God’s freedom, and that there is more than one 
form of theological knowledge.  If revelation is “essentially oriented towards the 
community of faith,” then something more than the “individual act” must hold it in place 
(II, 124).  Similarly, to think of God’s freedom as detached from the event of salvation 
“is to formalize, to rationalize, the contingent positivity of that occurrence” (ibid).  These 
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two objections are clearly related (to the individual act corresponds a formal freedom, 
while to the social act corresponds a concrete or substantive freedom) and have 
consequences for knowledge.  Twice Bonhoeffer lists three forms of theological 
knowledge, and while the parallels and precise meaning are not especially clear, the basic 
significance of the three forms is that there is a kind of objective or reflective knowledge 
of revelation.  Barth’s fundamental error on all counts is to have defined God as subject 
rather than person, as abstract knowledge rather than volitionally as “creator and lord,” 
and “from such an inadequate conception of the being of revelation arises an inadequate 
concept of knowledge” (II, 125).   
Proper knowledge, like the concept of person, is “framed in sociological 
categories,” corresponding to sociological functions of the church, only indirectly named 
as hearing, preaching, and teaching, or the believing, preaching, and theological ways of 
knowing (II, 126).  The first is “existentielle,” the knowledge of direct consciousness 
encountered by the word; the other two “ecclesial” and occur in reflection (ibid).5  
Believing knowledge is encountered by the person of Christ, preached in the community 
whose ‘suffering’ testifies to the true character of revelation as coming “from outside,”  
and that is the “peculiarity of the sociological-theological category,” that there is a 
“genuine outside only where human beings are in Christ” (II, 127).  This even applies to 
                                                          
5
 The earlier reference (pp. 124-5) to the three modes of theological knowledge as “believing, existentielle, 
and ecclesial” can be interpreted two ways.  One may regard it as an error by assuming that Bonhoeffer 
only meant to refer to the two forms of consciousness, direct (existentielle) and reflective (ecclesial), that 
comprise the three ways of knowing (believing, preaching, theological), in which case he should have 
omitted “believing,” or rather “unbelieving,” making it a double error.  But if the “unbelieving” is not an 
editorial error, then one may regard the categorization as correct, since alongside the two forms of 
consciousness in faith (existentielle and ecclesial), there is also the possibility of unbelief.  The confusion 
arises from the fact that both the believing and unbelieving modes of consciousness, as well as the 
believing, preaching and theological ways of knowing are all referred to generally as “theological ways of 
knowing,” that is, made real on the basis of revelation. On Bonhoeffer’s terms, of course, such a 
description (‘theological’) is no less appropriate for unbelieving than believing consciousness, since unfaith 
is known in light of faith, Adam in light of Christ.  This latter interpretation of the passage seems to me 
correct, contra the German editors.     
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the external world of ‘things,’ illuminated as a “new sphere of knowledge and objects, 
that of existence in social reference” (ibid).  Yet all of this holds only for faith and 
vanishes when the direct intention tears away from its object to reflection, where the 
Word is no longer encounter but memory, not present but past.  Where “person and word 
have separated,” preaching and theological knowing remain (ibid).   
The whole problem of preaching and the knowledge appropriate to it arises from 
the fact that, as for Barth, in true preaching it is God who speaks, ‘taking up’ the words of 
the preacher and making them God’s own.  With nothing more than testimony and 
memory at their disposal, preachers are helpless to ensure that their speech contains the 
living spirit and not merely the dead letter.  Bonhoeffer’s solution lies in the fact that 
preaching is an office of the church, so that preaching is itself ‘born’ by the community 
of faith.  The office itself rests upon the promise that when preachers strive to speak 
faithfully, God will not forsake them.  But the question of right preaching is inseparable 
from the question of right doctrine and the problem of theological knowledge as the 
“memory of the church” (II, 130).  Taking place in reflection, the knowledge of theology, 
like that of preaching, is not existential, and in referring itself to ‘things’ (dogmas), it 
does not differ in method from profane thinking except by working itself out in 
obedience, ‘in reference to’ Christ and the church.  Methodologically, the “dialectical 
method of ‘the proviso’ is as such no humbler than any honorable systematic thinking” 
(II, 131).  The difference between profane and theological, disobedient and obedient 
thinking, is the decision to think in the presence of the church or of the “living person of 
Christ…[who] can destroy this existing thing or acknowledge it” (ibid).  Dogma may 
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state that God forgives sins, but nothing is effected by this statement one way or the 
other.  God must act for dogma to be meaningful.   
All three forms of knowledge belong to a mode of being, ‘being in Christ.’ The 
final chapter contrasts its specific form of intentionality, and its unique consciousness of 
time, with ‘being in Adam.’  The intentionality and temporality of humans is conditioned 
by the community that defines them, broken or reconciled. 
 
 
1c. Human Being and Self-Understanding in Adam and Christ.  
 The forms of human being and self-understanding that follow from the view of 
revelation worked out above are familiar enough to the reader of SC.  The problem of 
self-understanding does not begin with the abstract question of epistemology but with 
human being before God.   The attempts at autonomous self-understanding from which 
the essay departed turn out to be ontologically and so theologically loaded: thinking 
directed to itself turns the human heart in on itself and amounts to sin.  Adam is the form 
of autonomous thinking and being; it is “solitude.”  In solitude human beings have 
“turned inward” and “torn themselves loose from community with God…and other 
human beings” (II, 138).  The whole world, including God, is reduced to “things.”  
Thought is most helpless to escape itself here.  But Bonhoeffer also rejects the appeals of 
Kant and Heidegger to conscience, which “only dulls the mute loneliness of a desolate 
‘with-itself’” (II,139).  He has already indicated the arrogance concealed in conscience, 
that in judging itself, it wishes to set itself up as judge, and thus absolve itself.  To count 
up one’s own errors may be nothing more than a subtle reaffirmation of one’s moral 
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competence.  Conscience, like reason, can give itself no real limit, no ‘outside,’ which 
Bonhoeffer locates again in the encounter with Christ, so that solitude recognizes itself as 
“guilt towards Christ” (II, 141). 
 In its self-referentiality, solitude is a “decision made in self-seeking,” a “free and 
conscious” act of will (II, 144).  Absent the dimension of will or act, sin would not be 
guilt or transgression, but in accordance with the whole set of problems raised by the 
essay, one must also speak of the being of sin so as not to exclude act.  Contingency and 
continuity must be held together, even in sin, and no definition of sin as an “entity” will 
suffice.  The concept of “person” again, and without much definition, resolves the 
tension.  Adam is both I and humanity, act and being, with a ponderous consequence, that 
“just because the deed of the individual is at the same time that of humanity, human 
beings must hold themselves individually responsible for the whole guilt of humankind” 
(II, 146).  Conceiving Adam only in the “mode of being of ‘person’” makes this possible 
(ibid), but that conception is in turn only possible on the basis of revelation  (Bonhoeffer 
claims this despite the fact that “persons” are by definition only in Christ).   
Returning to Heidegger’s language of “everydayness” (Alltäglichkeit) as “guilt” 
and a “decision for solitude,” he shows again how conscience aids the unbeliever in their 
“flight” from all limits, including death and the future, reduced to “an event that 
conscience can conquer” (II, 148).  What conscience cannot overcome is Christ, who in 
“temptation” (Anfechtung), rather than conscience, exposes solitude as an inescapable 
guilt and death, where, so far from being alone, everything speaks and “becomes their 
accuser” (II, 149).  Temptation is no “dialectical point of transition toward faith,” as if by 
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dying one were guaranteed new life, which is “God’s free gift to God’s community,” 
those who are ‘in’ Christ (ibid).   
 Adam’s being is an inverted, self-seeking sociality lived in fear of the future.  
Christ’s being, by contrast, is an open, self-giving sociality that takes up the fear of Adam 
into hope and lives out of the future as a child.  Here intentionality has shifted from the 
self to Christ, from one’s own sin to grace.  It is no longer under its own power, but the 
power of God.  The reality of this new being depends on the “person-being” (Person-
Sein) of God as the “unity of act and being” in the church (II, 151).  The meaning of 
being has to be revealed, and only reconciled life knows the shape of life violated by sin: 
“it is only in revelation itself that being-a-creature can be defined in terms of being-a-
person, insofar as it is the person whose existence has been encountered, judged, or 
created anew by Christ…all ontological definitions remain bound to the revelation in 
Christ” (II, 152-3).  The being of revelation in the church as the union of act and being 
provides only a “formal definition” of being, rendered concrete and “historical” through 
its intentional and temporal reference to past and future (II, 155). 
 Conscience, in fear of the future and death, twisted the heart of Adam back 
around itself, but freed from this fear in Christ, conscience now “belongs to the past” 
(ibid).  Yet even in Christ, human beings return to reflection on themselves, reawakening 
conscience, and this can mean falling back into “temptation” (as “disregard” for grace by 
fixating upon sin) or continuing toward “penitence” (as seeing one’s sin in the light of 
forgiveness).  In the former, intentionality inclines to the past and to death alone, where 
in the latter it views the past in relation to the future and life.  Being ‘is’ now not in the 
mode of past or present, as “thing” or “existent,” but defined instead by the future.  In sin, 
157 
 
there is no future; the world closes in on itself.  In contemplating and deciding for the 
future, conscience, even as penitence, is “suspended” (aufgehoben) in the “personality in 
relation” that consummates intentionality and freedom (II, 158).  The transcendence 
“amidst” and “between” which faith too is “suspended” reveals itself as the coming of 
God that alone has the power to “determine the present” (II, 159).   
 Bonhoeffer concludes by arguing that infant baptism captures the paradoxical 
being of faith as what “lies temporally in the past and is, nonetheless, an eschatological 
occurrence” lying “between eternity and eternity” (II, 160).  Faith, for Barth, had to wait 
on the arrival of the future in each new moment.  Bonhoeffer finds the promise of its 
presence, its continuity, in the sacrament of baptism: “faith is able to fix upon baptism as 
the unbreakable Word of God, the eschatological foundation of its life” (II, 160).  The 
exiled adult has found their way home, and “home is the community of Christ” (II, 161).  
With the being of God revealed in the sacramental being of the church,  we are finally in 
a position to survey the systematic connections in Bonhoeffer’s theology as they appear 
in the unified pattern behind both dissertations.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE CHURCH AS THE BEING OF GOD AND THE UNITY OF 
BONHOEFFER’S THOUGHT-FORM. 
 
 
 For German theology in the nineteenth century, “religion” offered an answer to 
the great intellectual and social questions of the time.  Intellectually, it overcame the firm 
boundary between God and humanity drawn by the previous century, if always on the 
side of humanity.  As thought, feeling or conscience, God proved immanent to human 
self-consciousness.  This immanence extended to the course of history as well through an 
identification of the Kingdom of God with the German “religious community” as the 
highest development of the human spiritual essence.  Socially, then, it promised to endow 
an emerging German nation with purpose and unity across religious and class divisions.  
The failure of the churches in the face of the “social question” and the general crisis of 
the educated middle class in the period leading up to the Weimar Republic had ripened 
the German ideology for attack.  Karl Barth turned the Kingdom of God against history, 
revelation against religion.  His early work, at least, left no room for God in the German 
Gemeinschaft.  Bonhoeffer accepted the displacement of religion by revelation, but felt 
that Barth had abandoned history, choosing instead to find God in the community of the 
church.  His early theology, from its beginnings at Berlin until his departure for America 
in 1930, is one sustained attempt to articulate this position, laid out chiefly in the 
dissertation and habilitation essay.       
 The unity of these two lines of argument, and many subsequent or ancillary 
pieces, has been overlooked.  It lies, first, in a common thought-form, received, modified, 
and unfolded over the course of his career.  Composed of three interlocking problems, 
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which I have described as the tensions between faith and knowledge, Christ and history, 
ethics and metaphysics, the unity becomes visible only in continuity with a complex 
“constellation” of attempts to resolve these tensions, reaching back to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.  In order, by way of conclusion, to draw together the threads of 
this study and of Bonhoeffer’s early theology into a coherent pattern, let us first 
recapitulate briefly the path of inquiry so far (I), turning then to the unity of the thought-
form in the dissertations (II), its discontinuities in both (III), and finally to a few 
concluding remarks (IV).   
 
I.  Recapitulation 
 
I began by observing that terms like “religion” and “religious community” 
functioned in a complex semantic web (summarized in the ideal of Bildung) that 
stretched and reformed with the economy of German social and intellectual life in the 
nineteenth century, while retaining its basic shape.  Nonetheless, one could essentially 
define religion as the relation between finite and infinite spirit (Geist), corresponding to a 
particular theory of self-consciousness.  Despite some still prevailing caricatures, religion 
was conceived socially, and the religious community played a critical role in the 
intellectual and social functions allotted to the concept.  If the ‘infinite’ was the invisible 
and unknown source from which society could alone draw its meaning and direction, 
religion described the link between the invisible world and the visible one.  Hegel, for 
example, believed that by isolating the conceptual structure of self-consciousness, he had 
unlocked the structure of being itself and could apply it to the whole of nature and 
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history.   Faith becomes knowledge through the ‘Trinitarian’ mediation of God’s being in 
history, especially the history of the church.  Where faith and knowledge, Christ and 
history are identified, so are ethics and metaphysics in the morality (Sittlichkeit) of 
nations.  Troeltsch would later combine a metaphysically less confident version of this 
approach with the emerging field of sociology.  Following in the more skeptical line of 
Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Hermann separated what Hegel had identified.  The rift 
between thought and being, and the being of God in particular, forced the question of 
God into the ethical sphere, where conscience found in Christ the absolute claim of God 
upon human existence.   
Karl Barth took over this strategy with a few serious revisions, and Bonhoeffer 
aims at a synthesis of Barth’s theology with aspects of the Hegelian legacy, mediated to 
him most directly through Reinhold Seeberg.  Barth’s theology developed in four stages.  
After an initial agreement with Herrmann, he articulated his “dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling” first in an eschatological and later in a Christological idiom (with 
“pneumatocentric” and “Christocentric” phases).  These two idioms corresponded to the 
dialectical and dogmatic methods respectively.  The eschatological idiom expressed the 
dialectical of veiling and unveiling as the dialectic of time and eternity.  Here Barth 
imposed the Kierkegaardian distinction of time and eternity on the Kantian distinction of 
known and unknown.  But the core dialectic was preserved in route to his Dogmatics 
through the Hegelian language of ‘suspension’ (Aufhebung), interpreted in a loosely 
phenomenological rather than metaphysical manner.  The “triple circle” or “trinodal 
logic” (Ward) showed itself as the Trinitarian outworking of this phenomenality in which 
the knowledge of objects, over which the subject lords itself, suffers a “crisis” in 
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encounter with the Word.  The autonomy of reason is broken by the autonomy of God.  
Faith and knowledge, Christ and history, ethics and metaphysics are all set in disjunction. 
 Barth’s diastasis begins by sealing the human subject in on itself in the circle of 
knowledge or self-consciousness.  The normal order of knowledge as subject-object 
relations is then revealed as a perversion of the self not through any experience of the 
phenomenal world, but through a purely free and contingent act of God.  The “rupture” 
occurs at the edge of consciousness, never within it, as the governing tropes of Romans II 
indicate (tangent, crater, prison).  A fissure opens up in the self-relation that constitutes 
knowledge.  The subject-object relation remains in all of its limitations, except that it 
knows them as its limits and in them knows God as “the Unknown.”  But this is not 
knowledge per se, knowledge as the cognizing act of the subject.  Barth calls such 
knowledge sin and its subject “Adam.”  To the new knowledge relativized in faith 
corresponds a new subject, “Christ,” whose eyes are opened to its blindness.  This 
opening transpires in an ethical encounter with the cross of Christ or the word concerning 
it.  Still, the historical or phenomenal reality of the cross has no force of its own, 
appearing as one object among others.  The primary “node” of God’s hidden reality only 
shows through the second “node” of the historical medium (Christ) through a third, the 
Holy Spirit, which gives the human subject ears to hear the ethical claim placed upon it.  
The “saturation” of the phenomenon, to borrow a recent phrase, has a “trinodal” character 
that explodes the adequacy of subject-object relations.        
 Saturation in this instance is not just phenomenal richness (rather than “banality”) 
but personal, thus ethical and free.  Its contingency can only be ascribed to the invisible 
agent uncovered (and hidden) therein.  Around the time of his dogmatic turn, Barth had 
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already recognized the ontological deficiency of his interpretation of the 
phenomenonality of revelation, its merely functional character.   In a 1923 letter to 
Thurneysen, he exclaimed, “A Trinity of being, not just an economic Trinity! At all costs, 
a doctrine of the Trinity!”1  Bonhoeffer would no doubt have concurred with this piece of 
self-criticism, for that was the substance of his remark that Barth’s dialectic (another way 
of saying “Trinity”) was “formal rather than real.”  The dogmatic method and the 
doctrine of God that supported it did not, in Bonhoeffer’s view, correct the formalism of 
Romans II, since it short-changed the role of human faith in revelation,  the being of God 
in revelation, and the concreteness of Christian ethics.  Formalism continued to riddle the 
whole thought-form with difficulties.  The concreteness and continuity of the self and of 
God in revelation, as well as genuine ethics, could only be had in the sociological 
category.  Barth’s formalism was of a piece with his individualism, and that was the real 
problem.  The heavenly double, the absence of the incarnation, and the confusion of 
indicative and imperative all required an entirely new mode of thinking.   
 
 The sociological category introduced within the theological dialectic a second, 
historical dialectic, and although its complete form appears only in Bonhoeffer’s 
dissertation, its elements are clearly present (retrospectively) in his student essays and 
sermons.  He fastens his new direction to the “voluntary-form of Spirit,” with three 
consequences drawn explicitly in the student essays.  First, the splintering of the self into 
two subjects, Adam and Christ, is overcome through the presence of the Holy Spirit as 
the gift of a new will.  Second, the church community as a whole and not the individual is 
                                                          
1
Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, Trans. James 
Smart (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1967), p. 176.   
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the counterpart of election and the recipient of this gift, where the preached Word 
presupposes the living congregation.  Third, the identification of indicative and 
imperative, commandment and new creation, is broken, allowing for sanctification as 
well as temptation.  If Bonhoeffer considered Barth’s thinking too “formal” and 
“logical,” the shape of the “material” and the “real” is in the will.  That is the difference 
between a theology oriented to the subject and one oriented to the person.  Barth’s 
theology is also personalist in a sense, dependent as it is on the idea of an ethical 
encounter irreducible to the thinking appropriate to things, but he also describes the 
person as “inconcrete” (Nichtgegebene).  Bonhoeffer, following Seeberg, construes his 
opposition to Barth on this point as distinctively Lutheran (versus Reformed), but his 
volitional interpretation of the concept of “person” partially derives from sociological 
sources.  His reading in the formal sociology of Weber, Troeltsch and Simmel would 
have already provided a volitional framing to sociological questions well before he run 
across Barth.  Seeberg and Scheler only reinforced it theologically, and he exploited this 
tendency in the correction to dialectical theology.   
    The need for such a correction was in view almost from the beginning of his 
studies.  Recall that his letters with Richard Widmann (summer 1925) dealt with the 
tension between theological and sociological dialectics and the shortcomings in Barth’s 
doctrine of revelation.  I have tried to show—convincingly, I think—that the question of 
revelation is actually a whole constellation of questions arranged within a coherent but 
generally unarticulated thought-form, one that for Barth and Bonhoeffer is virtually all-
encompassing.  If this is the case, then SC deals with revelation, as the “weaving 
together” of divine and human freedom, from the standpoint of its historical form or 
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mediation, while AB treats the question of knowledge proper.  SC begins with the 
problem of community or of the sociological dialectic and finds its answer in the form of 
the church, which is established in revelation.  AB begins with the problem of human 
self-understanding and finds its answer in divine revelation, given in God’s being as the 
church.  The two lines of investigation converge in the identification of revelation and the 
church, “Jesus Christ existing as community.”  SC asks about the form of the church as 
the form of God’s presence in history, but does not address the relation between God’s 
being and the individual’s knowledge, upon which rests the outward form of the church 
in its historical dialectic.  AB asks about the knowledge of God’s being for individuals, 
but does not address the personal form of the church in which that being subsists. 
 These are the intersections that give Bonhoeffer’s early theology its shape, 
coherence, and direction.  He could not state the matter more directly: “the dialectic of 
act and being is understood as the dialectic of faith and the congregation in Christ” (II, 
114).  I now want to spell out in more detail how the two studies and the dialectics they 
develop hold together in a unified thought-form, turning then to the discontinuities. 
 
II. The Unity of Bonhoeffer’s Thought-Form  
     
To the reader who is not yet convinced that the heuristic guiding this study, the 
“triple circle,” really structures Bonhoeffer’s theology and does so in a roughly self-
conscious fashion, I offer two further pieces of evidence, probably in vain.  The first is 
the lecture series from which I took the phrase in the first place.  Speaking on the topic of 
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“The History of Twentieth-Century Systematic Theology,” Bonhoeffer organizes his 
theme into fourteen paragraphs.  The first two summarize the situation of society and the 
church since 1900 (§1-2), the next seven interpret the themes and figures of liberal 
Protestantism in recent theology (§3-9), and the last four present the thought of Karl 
Barth (§10-13), concluding with the question of theology’s present situation (§14).  In 
§10, “The Turning Point,” Bonhoeffer sums up the crisis of the nineteenth century: “In all 
three circles (the problems of knowledge, history and ethics), there was the issue of 
balance with culture.  In all three [there is] the same structure; culture should not be 
confronted with a claim that is unsustainable” (XI, 224).  These three circles correlate 
loosely to the progression of the lectures, although the lines between topics are uneven.  
Epistemology (§3-4) as developed in connection with the “mediating concept” of religion 
(Troeltsch, the Neo-Kantians, Otto) merges with the question (§5-7) of the historical 
“essence” and “absoluteness” of Christianity and the theme of the “biblical Christ” (von 
Harnack, Kähler), which leads in turn to the problem of ethics (§8-9) by way of the 
doctrine of justification (Ritschl, Holl).  This thematic order is repeated in the lectures on 
Barth, as Bonhoeffer moves from the question of God (§10-11) to that of the preached 
Word of the cross and its ethical implications (§12-13).  The final section, “Where do we 
stand?,” raises questions against each of these three emphases, pointing forward to the 
tripartite structure of Bonhoeffer’s own theology.  
   The lecture was given in Berlin during the winter of 1931-32, and later that April 
the triadic theme appear again in a published essay entitled “Concerning the Christian 
Idea of God,” although it was prepared for Prof. Lyman’s seminar at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York in December 1930.  The essay aims to present “no more than the 
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framework within which the idea [of the Christian God] should be thought,” and the 
frame is conceived “dogmatically” according to the problems of knowledge, history, and 
justification (X, 451).  The first section revisits the argument of AB, rejecting the 
autonomy of a thinking that “is in itself a closed circle, with the ego at the center…[and] 
does violence to reality, pulling it into the circle of the ego” (X, 452).  Genuine reality 
(Wirklichkeit) is not a possibility of thought but is “given before and beyond all 
thinking…[and] limits my boundlessness from the outside” only in faith  (X, 453).  
Echoing again his critique of Barth, God is “not logically transcendent, but really 
transcendent,” and this means a transcendence in the form of “personality” found in 
God’s “self-revelation in history” (X, 453, 455, 456).  The second section recalls his 
earlier critique of Idealism, which offers a philosophy of history based in general 
principles of thought, whereas Christianity views history as continual “decision,” and the 
difference “becomes very consipicuous in the interpretation of the other man, of the 
neighbor, that is, of present history” (X, 458).  Bonhoeffer plainly has the church in view 
with these remarks.  The concreteness of historical decision leads, in the final section, to 
the questions of justification or the “pure way of God to man,” with the paradoxes of 
revelation and hiddenness, death and resurrection, sin and forgiveness (X, 461).  Just as 
the particulars of the church recede in the previous section to focus upon the idea of God, 
the particulars of ethics recede here behind the act of God in making a “new creature,” 
but the implicit connections with ethics are evident enough.   
 The lecture follows the completion of AB by a eighteen months, the essay by 
perhaps as little as little as six months.  Their thematic connections are hardly new, and it 
is more than reasonable to assume that the structure which holds them together is 
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operative all along the line.  The 1930 essay is especially useful at this point, since it 
relates all subsequent themes back to the idea of the self-revealing God.  All three 
“nodes” belong to the concept of self-revelation or what we might call the theological 
structure of phenomenality.  I take this to be the meaning of Bonhoeffer’s claim that 
“when we come to interpret the content of the self-revelation of God, we will see that this 
content is only the explication of the fact of the absolute self-revelation and authority of 
God” (X, 460).  Put differently, “in the act of justification God reveals himself as Holy 
Trinity” (X, 461).  The form of the event of self-revelation already implies its content; 
justification implies Trinity.  If one recalls Bonhoeffer’s insistence on the concreteness of 
that form, then the unity of his theology crystalizes in the concept of the church.  I have 
sketched repeatedly the three dimensions of this thought-form and their unity.  I have also 
tried to uncover the thought process and motivations behind the historical development of 
that pattern in Bonhoeffer’s thinking, for example, why his exposition of the concept of 
the church precedes his exposition of revelation , narrowly conceived.  I now want to 
explore the unity of both dissertations in detail.   
 That unity depends on the identification of two dialectics.  The dialectic of 
thought and being is interpreted through the dialectic of the individual in society, or, 
theologically, the dialectic of faith and the being of God in revelation is interpreted as the 
dialectic of faith and the church community.  The church is the being of God in history, 
the heart of God become visible in the world and at one with it.  Both dialectics belong to 
the interpretation of self-consciousness, which stands (differently) at the center of both 
AB and SC.  In each study, Bonhoeffer attacks the possibility that self-consciousness is 
self-explanatory.  In the case of AB, this involves a negative demonstration, that the I 
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cannot understand itself, whether by reflexively tracing its genesis and constitution back 
to some fundament of its own existence (Hegel) or by circumscribing the limits of its 
knowledge with respect to itself (Kant).  The limit of its reason and the meaning of its 
being must come from without, given and revealed from the hidden source and destiny of 
the ego’s being.  In the case of SC, a positive demonstration is pursued, showing that self-
consciousness arises only in intersubjective relations of ethical encounter, that is, in 
sociality.  The self seeks its meaning in what is given, and what is given is the church; the 
self is whole only in sociality and community, but it enters community only through 
revelation.  The compound tension between thought/being and self/others is an 
irreducible feature of subjectivity, resolved in the church.   
 The fact of this irreducibility should caution readers against trying immediately to 
make sense of Bonhoeffer with the categories of “narrative” or “grammar” or more 
aggressively “postmodern” notions.  The justification for such (too often procrustean) 
procedures is a well-established cliché about the ‘death of the subject,’ which is part and 
parcel of a much grander cliché about the end of ‘modernity.’   Clichés need not be 
outright lies but merely sins of omission—a truth whittled down to a half-truth for the 
sake of convenience.  This is what one finds in so many ongoing eulogies (or malogies) 
for the recently un-deceased.  Where subjectivity or self-consciousness is construed as 
the conceptual identification of the I with itself through the act of reflection, its implosion 
is unavoidable.  For if the identity of self-consciousness depends on the reflexive 
mediations of language, then one may dissolve it into the processes of communicative 
action (Habermas), the differential relations of semiology (poststructuralism), the 
epistemic self-ascription of mental states (analytical philosophy via Wittgenstein), or the 
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hermeneutically prior reality of language (Heidegger).  But the reflection theory suffers 
from an obvious defect.  In order to recognize or represent myself, and so establish the 
identity of the ‘I’ with itself, I would already have to know that the ‘I’ identified in 
reflection is in fact mine.  The Ego always stands in an immediate relation to itself, since 
I never need proof that the contents of my consciousness are actually mine (the basis of 
Kant’s transcendental deduction).  Bonhoeffer expressed this succinctly at the outset of 
AB when he follows Kant’s recognition that the I “cannot be thought, because it is the 
precondition of thinking” (II, 38).  It cannot become an object for itself because the self-
relation that defines precedes every attempt to objectify itself.   
 He is mistaken, however, to accept Kant’s other assumption, that “everything 
about the I is constituted by thought, even if it is true that “thinking precedes the I” (ibid).  
If the former were the case, the I would have to constitute itself in concepts and thus in 
reflection, leading back to the circular logic just denied.  Kant simply turned his back on 
the question by throwing the identity of consciousness out of the court of reason, which 
could establish its limited rights without tracing its roots that far.  Fichte and Hegel 
pursued the model of reflection to its logical conclusion.  The alternative, pursued by the 
Romantics and Schelling in his critique of Hegel, understands that the identity of self-
consciousness precedes any act of reflection through which the self might re-cognize 
itself, and thus precedes language and concepts, to which it is irreducible.  Dieter Henrich 
has called this a “pre-reflexive” model of self-consciousness, in distinction from the 
model of reflection.  But because an I, an ego, is difficult to imagine apart from reflection 
and language, Henrich calls this pre-reflexive I non-egological, viewing it as mysterious 
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substrate in which the processes of sociality originate and from which all further 
conscious, linguistic ‘identity’ is built up.    
 We need not chase down these difficulties any further, but having a sense of the 
paradoxes immanent to self-consciousness will shed a little light on Bonhoeffer’s 
grappling with them.  So if the “eye does not see itself” in reflection, its intentionality 
stretches outward from an unknown origin towards an unknown future (II, 46).  Kant 
described this condition as the “homelessness of the mind,” that we are “neither 
suspended from heaven nor rooted in earth,” and Bonhoeffer plays upon the image of 
exile in AB by arguing that the I cannot understand itself out of its own resources.  
Thought wants to touch its feet down to earth and take hold of the heavens—to 
circumscribe its place, its being, in the whole of Being.  If thought grants itself priority 
over being in this task, a reality that supersedes the I is never recovered.  Any object 
(Gegenstand) that it comes upon is the creation of the I and so fails to ‘stand against’ the 
I as an independent reality.  That is the weakness of transcendental thinking, but even 
ontological thinking, which attempts in principle to cede being a priority over thought, 
falls back into the same predicament.  The fate of God in each case reinforces 
Bonhoeffer’s conclusion: the kind of self-understanding that lies within reach of human 
beings always conceals its own failures and distorts the reality of God.  This is the 
epistemic circle, the circle of consciousness. 
 The tension between thought (act) and being has two consequences for 
interpreting the being of God in revelation.  On the one hand, God’s being must be, as for 
Barth, in the act of faith.  That is only to respect the theological dialectic that governs 
Bonhoeffer’s entire theology.  God must remain the free subject of revelation, creating 
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the ‘subject’ appropriate to the ‘object’ it reveals in the “secondary objectivity” of the act 
that “suspends” human subjectivity in divine subjectivity.  On the other hand, if God is to 
reveal “Godself,” then God must really become “objective,” being in such a way that 
each new moment does not threaten to dissolve the relationship.  Barth’s God not only 
lacks concreteness but seems fickle as well, bound to nothing.  If revelation is only in act 
and non-objectivity, the continuity of God’s gift and human life within it falls apart.  
Here we are confronting the historical circle of mediation, of Christ and the incarnation.  
Bonhoeffer only has recourse to one kind of being that is non-objective and that is 
personal being, which is actualistic.  But how can the being of God become historical 
(objective) and personal (subjective) so as to embrace the whole of human being?  
 As the previous chapter explained, Bonhoeffer resolves the tension between act 
and being by interpreting the act of faith as occurring within the church as the personal 
being of Christ.  The church is the sort of the being that is both personal and objective, 
contingent and continuous, a field of faith whose subject is Christ.  To be “suspended” in 
the being of God is to be “suspended” in relation to others in the church as the ongoing 
current of the divine life in which one rises and falls as the direction of human existence 
runs with or against God.  This depends entirely on the notion that the church is a) a 
personal being made up b) of concrete ethical relations between individuals with a 
continuous worldly form.  AB makes no effort to defend or explain that claim, and absent 
any awareness of SC, the reader might find it simply unintelligible.  What does it mean to 
say that the community has a personal character?  Certainly not an “absolutizing” of the 
concrete You, a total identification of the divine claim with the claim of the neighbor, 
such that one becomes a cipher for the other (II, 88ff.).  Similarly, the modes of human 
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being as Adam and as Christ are social, modes of the dialectic between the I and 
community.  SC fills out the problem of mediation with the sociological or historical 
dialectic. 
AB contained the implicit claim that human beings are constituted in social 
relationships.  The church is the fulfillment of human being as the place where human 
beings are encountered and find the meaning of their existence, but even the anxious, 
isolated sinner “in Adam” lives out of the dialectic between self and community.  This 
anthropological underpinning is the real key to Bonhoeffer’s early theology.  By altering 
his anthropology, Bonhoeffer alters the meaning of revelation.  The “suspension” of a 
person, constituted in sociality or ethical relations, necessarily differs from the 
“suspension” of a subject, constituted by subject-object relations.  These two basic 
poles—suspension and sociality, revelation and church, dogmatics and sociology—
control the dynamics of his theology in this earliest stage and probably well beyond.  The 
concept of suspension comes from Barth, sociality from Seeberg, and I think we best 
understand Bonhoeffer as trying to synthesize the two, or to fit Seeberg’s theology of 
sociality into Barth’s notion of revelation.  The possibility of reconciling the terms does 
not, as one might suspect, owe to their common origin in Hegel.  Neither Barth nor 
Seeberg has left the ideas where Hegel set them.  “Suspension” for Hegel describes the 
dialectical movement of all reality, whether logically as “autonomous negation,” 
ontologically as the “self-unfolding of the concept,” or theologically as “self-revelation.”  
Suspension is the act by which being comes to know itself, by which ‘absolute spirit’ 
attains self-consciousness and identity.  It is identical with the process of history.  The 
processive nature of being explains the twofold sense of suspension as ‘canceling’ and 
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‘taking up.’  The achievement of identity depends upon integrating the past into the 
present, such that the meaning of the past is preserved and takes on new significance.   
Hegel’s dialectic is objective, for what is ‘taken up’ passes through a stage of 
‘determinacy’ or ‘concreteness’ or ‘objective spirit.’  The path of Hegel’s dialectic can be 
comprehended panoramically, horizontally, from beginning to end, and the end is 
determined by the beginning.  The future is already decided by the past.  Barth’s 
dialectic, by contrast, uses the language of ‘canceling’ and ‘taking up’ to describe the 
subject-object relation of human knowledge that has been ‘elevated’ vertically into the 
self-relations of intra-Trinitarian life.  Its path can only be comprehended out of the event 
itself, since there are no necessary logical or ontological connections between the state of 
nature and the state of grace.  On this basis, Barth reverses the relation of possibility and 
actuality.  There is no path from thought to being, possibility to actuality, humanity to 
God.  What truly “is” never intrudes into the realm of finite being for Barth, and here 
Bonhoeffer introduces his distinction between real and actual as the provisional presence 
of the Kingdom of God (the real) in the church (the actual).   
Seeberg also divorces Hegel’s conception of sociality from its metaphysical 
scheme and the necessary identification of real and ideal, substance and subject.  Will 
(Urwille) replaces Idea (Begriff) as the core of reality, and Seeberg can speak of an 
“overcoming” (Überwindung) of individual wills or “evil will” in the Ürwille as the 
“solution of world problems.”2  As opposed to Hegel’s faceless Absolute, Seeberg’s God 
is personal, and the concept of personality is naturally volitional.  Despite the disavowals 
                                                          
2
 Reinhold Seeberg, Christiliche Dogmatik, 2 Bds., (Erlangen: A. Deichertische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1924), Bd.1 92ff, 212ff,  
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of metaphysics and speculation in the “modern positive” school of Erlangen Lutheranism, 
compared to Barth a thoroughly ‘religious’ mindset still governs Seeberg’s dogmatics, 
with its progressive historicism and talk of the “religious community” as the “form of 
appearance of the Kingdom of God” (Erscheinungsform Gottesreich).3  “Sociality” is an 
integral aspect of this appearance, belonging to the human “essence” (Wesen) for the sake 
of the “divine world-administration in history,”  and “objective spirit” provides the 
“connecting link” (Verbindungsglied) between the sociality and historicity of human 
being, our spatial and temporal dimensions. To be human is to be co-constituted in acts of 
will, so that “all human community is community-of-will (Willensgemeinschaft).”4   
Bonhoeffer follows Seeberg on these points, as well as his use of the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction, but loosens them from a comprehensive theory of 
religion. 
Whether or not the idea was filtered through Seeberg (this is unclear), Bonhoeffer 
also approximates his professor in borrowing Hegel’s description of the church as “Jesus 
Christ existing as community.”  This idea is the real meshing point between Barth and 
Seeberg, suspension and sociality, and thus provides a valuable insight into the 
reconfiguration of the three circles.  Barth’s solution to the problem of transcendence was 
the (formal) ethical address of the Word in Jesus Christ, an encounter with the divine 
Thou in the word about the cross which brings about, by God’s free act, the ‘taking up’ of 
human into divine knowledge.  The personalist element is crucial, since it sustains the 
non-objectifiable character of revelation by which it pierces the immanent circle of 
consciousness.  Barth’s view of revelation (as of 1922) had no worldly form, which is 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Ibid, Bd.2, 319ff, 332ff.   
4
 Seeberg, Bd.1, 505, 507.   
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another way of saying it does not enter history.  A worldly form would be a thing, not a 
person, an object rather than God.  Seeberg finds the form of revelation 
(Erscheinungsform) in the church, but its form is that of “religious community,” a merely 
immanent and objectified form.  In its “objective spirit” God has become an object, and 
that is precisely why Barth rejected ‘religion’ in the first place.  Only if the worldly, 
historical, socal form of community takes on the ethical-personal character, can the 
proper transcendence of revelation be preserved.  Scheler’s concept of ‘collective person’ 
fills the gap, linking suspension to sociality through the ethical-personal social form.   
 The two subjects of Adam and Christ are now two communities which 
nonetheless bear a personal character.  The discontinuities of the self, old and new, 
concrete and transcendental, have been reconciled in Christ as the personal being of God 
made visible and historical in the communal life of the church.  From the broken sociality 
of human existence God in revelation brings a new creation.  The theological dialectic 
becomes an historical dialectic.  God’s freedom is woven into human freedom.  This is 
the unity of Bonhoeffer’s thought-form in its earliest stage.  I turn now to its 
discontinuities.    
 
III.  Discontinuities in the Thought-Form. 
  
Bonhoeffer seems to have had the problems of AB in view when he wrote SC, as 
his correspondence and student papers indicate.  His reservation towards Barth, which 
birthed the dissertation, had to presuppose some conception of the problems presented in 
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AB, however vague it might have been.  The questions of God and revelation were 
second to none, and the matter of mediation would have been pointless without them.  In 
fact, the project of describing the mediating form of revelation in the church was a 
preliminary stage to getting at a new conception of God and revelation, or rather taking 
Barth’s conception in the appropriate direction with the help of Luther.  But continuities 
in the thought-form by no means guaranteed continuities in the means used to express it.  
Barth himself had abandoned the eschatological idiom for a Christological one and the 
dialectical method for the dogmatic, all the while retaining the language of “suspension” 
and the elements of his thought-form.  Barth likely thought that he had only found the 
language to better articulate the “material insight” of his theology.  With the sociological-
theological dialectic of Adam and Christ, we touch upon a similar discontinuity in 
Bonhoeffer’s early work, and certainly the most obvious one. 
 His dissertation had to supply the historical form of revelation 
(Offenbarungsform) without sacrificing its theological, that is, revealed, status.  What 
distinguished the form of the Christian community from others was a unique pattern of 
willing, one unavailable in the normal range of volitional configurations that separated 
mass (Masse) from Society (Gesellschaft) from Community (Gemeinschaft).  The 
tradition of formal sociology provided the terms for distinguishing the church’s historical 
form, a form which, strictly speaking, was not historical but essential, since formal 
sociology distinguished itself sharply from the science of history as dealing with essential 
sociological types.  A social philosophy drawn from the formal phenomenology of 
Husserl and Scheler underwrote the perception of these types, and Barth’s theological 
dialectic was inserted at the ground level to explain the reality of ethical basic relations 
177 
 
that constitute the church.  Scheler may have described his phenomenology as “material” 
in comparison with Husserl’s, but its formal character is quite clear in comparison with 
Heidegger, upon whom Bonhoeffer draws heavily in AB.  This is perhaps the most 
significant discontinuity between the dissertation and habilitation essay, a transition from 
formal to existential phenomenology, or from a symbiosis between Husserlian 
intentionality and sociological will-structures to Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein and its 
modes of self-disclosure.   
 Heidegger does not blend easily with any of the thinkers, mostly of Neo-Kantian 
stock, that form the background of Bonhoeffer’s theology, and it is doubtful that 
Bonhoeffer understood immediately the real challenge Heidegger posed to theology.  At 
the same time, Bonhoeffer’s God was not the God of metaphysics, the God whom 
Heidegger wished to banish “from the realm of thought,” but the young theologian did 
not raise the question of God’s being with rigor one might have hoped for.  Instead, he 
assumed the rights of theology to the name of God and went on to look for a new method 
that nonetheless held profound implications for the being of God.  Barth believed his 
theology depended on an isomorphism between his dogmatic method and his doctrine of 
God, and the dogmatic method presumed a specific methodological role allotted to the 
church as confessional authority.  What put the “church” in “church dogmatics” was its 
teaching authority in the service of preaching.  Bonhoeffer’s turn to a sociological 
method (a “Christian sociology,” to be precise) takes on a new significance in this light, 
for the church enters in to theology in a completely different mode, as the living 
congregation and the very presence of God.  This, and not merely anthropology, is at 
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stake in the contrast between Adam and Christ: the being of God.  So discontinuities are 
of no small importance. 
 How do the accounts of Adam and Christ differ in SC and AB?  At the most basic 
level, they do not.  The being of Adam in both is described by terms like “isolated,” 
“demanding,” “selfish,” “inverted,” burdened by conscience and self-justification, as 
“individual” and “supraindividual deed,” and as cast down into “solitude” and “guilt.”  
The being of Christ in both is described by terms like “sharing,” “giving,” “being for/with 
others,” “turned outward,” as contemplating Christ alone, as God’s creature, and as 
“living from the future.”  The question, then, is whether the move from Scheler to 
Heidegger substantively altered the interpretation of these common descriptions.  I do not 
see that it has, since the being of Christ in both conforms to the criterion of the 
sacraments as the temporal paradox of the future in the past and the social paradox of a 
community upholding that which upholds it (I, 240ff; II, 160ff).  The differing languages 
used to describe this being in SC and AB do not measure the phenomenon Bonhoeffer is 
after and add nothing to it on their own.  It is plausible that acquiring a new vocabulary 
would permit him to see aspects of the sacramental ontology that escaped his attention 
before, but that does not seem to be the case in the period from 1927 to 1930.  
       
IV. Conclusion 
  
I have mentioned a few other discontinuities above, for example, his “humanistic” 
interest in Nietzsche and the “strength of life” at Barcelona.  Here one may well find the 
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beginnings of a genuine departure from the thought-form that structures Bonhoeffer’s 
early theology, or at least its first iteration.  By the Christology lectures of 1933, real 
changes in this pattern are undeniable, and of course the prison writings reflect a new 
orientation as well, although even here I have given reason for suspecting continuity (as 
in the analogues between “sociality” and “worldliness”).  But on the whole, the years 
1918-1930 reveal a surprising unity and continuity, identified in a complex thought-form 
that lays the foundation for his theological work beyond the university in the spheres of 
the church and the world.  Judgment as to whether that thought-form really remained 
constant through several modifications, as did Barth’s, must await a complete study of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology.  Perhaps the current study moves us closer to that goal and to the 
understanding of Bonhoeffer’s vision, the vision of God’s heart, revealed in the 
communion of saints for the sake of the world.    
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